Comparison of Asian Powers

China, India and Pakistan. Nuclear Asians.


Currently, there is an increased frenzy about China’s incursions, referred to by some of the seasoned analysts as “war hysteria”. China, from 1962, never deviated from its path of an aggressive posture. While India is being blamed for its 1962 syndrome, China is equally guilty of freezing its 1962 mindset on India.
But India is itself to blame for the present situation.. While China, slowly and steadily was on the military build-up, Indian leadership has continuously followed an ostrich like approach towards the implications. It pains to accept the China’s description of India as a ‘paper tiger’. By this, I don’t refer to the capability of our armed forces but to the timidity of our Indian leadership. Many articles, have already been written on the timidity of Indian leadership and the ineptitude towards strategic and military doctrines. Hence, this article mainly tries to draw a comparison of the nuclear forces by these countries to assess where India stands, at present.

Nuclear Forces by 2006-2007

The data for the countries were not available at the same timeline hence, the closest available data were used. According to the Nuclear Notebook published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, China’s nuclear arsenal comprised of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft and 70 more is predicted to be in storage. According to the report around 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. China is retiring some of its liquid fueled DF-3 missiles with a range of about 3100Km but has slowed down the retirement of the missiles, apparently, due to delay in the deployment of modified DF-21 and DF-21A missiles with a range of around 2100Km.

China has deployed around 22 two-stage DF-4 missiles with a range over 5500Km, the targets for some of these missiles is expected to be in Russia, India and Guam. While the number of Chinese ICBM, DF-5, is unclear Chinese military power 2005 claims to have deployed 20 of them in 20 launchers. These missiles are capable of targeting the entire continental US. China, undergoing military modernization, for quite sometime is also developing a new 3-stage, solid-fueled, mobile ICBM, DF-31 with a range of about 7200-8000Km and a circular error probable of 300 to 600 meters. The targets for these missiles are expected to be in India and Russia from the range of the missiles. Another version of DF-31, DF-31A, is expected to have range of about 12000Km. Reportedly, China have had the capability for Multiple Reentry Vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry vehicles. China is also developing new nuclear powered submarine capable of carrying 16 modified versions of DF-31 missiles which is expected to be deployed in 2008-2010 or later. China also has a stock of nuclear payload to be delivered through aircraft, whose combat radius is around 3100 Km.

In 2007, Pakistan was credited with a nuclear arsenal of 60 and it is busy in increasing its capability rapidly. From 2005-2007, Pakistan has deployed two nuclear capable missiles and developments are underway for the third. According to the reports, Pakistan, which declared a moratorium in 1991 on the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) soon resumed its production of the weapon grade uranium and has setup a 40-50MW heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor completed in 1998 and work were under way for the second reactor which will double its production capability. In this venture Pakistan is being helped totally by china. No one appears to blame China which is the root cause of proliferation by Pakistan.
Pakistani nuclear devises are expected to have a yield in between 5 – 10 kilotons. Pakistan was developing a nuclear capable cruise missile with a range of around 500 Km.

By 2007, India has produced enough plutonium for around 100 payloads but is estimated to possess only 50-60 warheads by the time. According to the report, India’s nuclear deterrent is predominantly aircraft-based. While, after the repeated announcements of Indian officials, US Air force in 2006 reported that India has not deployed Agni I and Agni II. While Agni III, Dhanush and Sagarika are underdevelopment, a cloud of uncertainty surrounds the Indian missile based nuclear deterrent capability. While technical capability exists in India for developing and deploying missiles, the reports questions on the number of missile currently deployed.

Nuclear Forces by 2008-2009

In 2009, Bulletin of Atomic scientists has estimated the Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to include 70-90 warheads and that it is busily enhancing its nuclear capabilities. In 2009, Pakistan was readying a new nuclear capable ballistic missile and two cruise missiles for deployment. Pakistan is believed to have produced around 2000kg of HEU and 90 Kg of plutonium sufficient to build 80-130 Kg. But based on several factors, the report suggests that Pakistan has not yet crossed 100 warheads. Reportedly, all of Pakistan’s missiles and aircrafts are of dual purpose. Pakistan is also expanding its nuclear processing facilities. Hilary Clinton, in her address to Congress have said that Pakistan’s Nuclear arsenal are spread across the country and not in a single central location. The aircrafts deployed for nuclear mission are predominantly F-16s given by the US by waiving the Pressler Amendment. The cruise missile of Pakistan, Babar, is similar to that of the Chinese DH-10 air launched cruise missile and has a range of about 320Km, according to US intelligence agencies, as opposed to the media that suggests it to have a range of 500-700Km. The design of the missile also suggests that Pakistan scientists to have made progress in warhead miniaturization. The other cruise missile Ra’ad is expected to have stealth and standoff capability at sea and land.

In report on Chinese nuclear forces in 2008, it is believed that China is expanding its nuclear arsenal boosting its number by 25 percent since 2005. In 2008, China also deployed DF-31, DF-31A and DH-10 missiles. By 2008, China is also reported to be building 4 new ballistic missile submarines. By 2008, China is estimated to possess around 176 nuclear arsenals deployed by missiles and aircrafts. Another 65 warheads is expected to be in storage. The nuclear arsenals are expected to have a yield of 10Kilotons to 3 Megatons. The Pentagon projects that by 2010 Chinese nuclear forces would include DF-4s, DF-5As, DF-31, DF-31As and upto 5 Jin class submarines carrying between 10 and 12 Jl-2 SLBMs.

According to report on Indian nuclear capability in 2008, India is reported to be struggling to develop a complete nuclear triad and currently only its fighter bombers constitute the fully operational leg. All Indian nuclear delivery systems are dual-capable but their operational status are ambiguous. The report estimates, India to have assembled around 70 warheads but only 50 is expected to be operational. Currently, out of the four land based missile systems, only Prithivi has been fully deployed but how many of them are deployed with nuclear warheads is uncertain. Of the variants of Prithivi, only the army version is identified by CIA to have a nuclear role. The report is skeptical about India acquiring multiple warhead capability any time soon. Another subsonic cruise missile is also reported to be under development.

Conclusion

Compared with Pakistan and China, India scores low with respect to its military modernization and preparedness. Much of the India’s long range missiles were not fully operational. It is also alarming to note that Pakistan as well as China are expanding their nuclear arsenal rapidly creating a huge gap between the numbers with India. Indian leadership is yet to shed its timidity and ineptitude to come up with a strong military doctrine. It is also worth noting that, apparently the current government's diplomacy and the so-called US relationship seems to have no say in the expansion of the nuclear capability of Pakistan. Pakistan’s Babur cruise missile, which is believed to be based on DH-10 of China also asserts beyond doubt the proliferation of missile technology by China, which is a member of security council and it is be noted that none of the superpowers have done anything to put a tab on China.

In this scenario, India still is unlikely go down the 1962 scenario. But this time, India has to remember that Pakistan’s interest in India is not just Kashmir. It is also foolish to believe that China’s interest is limited to Arunachal Pradesh. In practice, India should build up to be fully capable of deterring Chinese incursions. It has to expect a two multi-point war as China has covered India on all sides and with a strong ally in the west. India’s missile systems are not fully developed and/or deployed restricting its capability. India is also continuously failing to take advantage of its technically developed workforce, much of which moves to other nations for better education, and opportunities. Indian establishment is yet to take steps to bring in the Indian minds from abroad. To be eligible for an NRI to be considered for DRDO, he has to have a PhD and at least 3 years of experience abroad. Most of the people by the time would have settled and it is practically not possible for them to return even if they wish to. ISRO, has not even an option for an NRI. Corruption and the lethargic unchecked bureaucracy is continuing to be another checkpoint for India to develop.

It is also to be noted that Pakistan’s ISI is having a significant presence in India but not the other way around. Indian RAW is considered to be one of the most bureaucratic organizations and Mr. Gujral’s misplaced trust has fully left India vulnerable. Taking into consideration the Chinese publication to split India into many parts it could be expected by Pakistan to up its shadow war against India with China acting as a pressure point for any retaliation by India. India lost its covert capability long ago and will the political leadership allow the organization to renew it?

If Indian governments timidity and lack of foresight continues then Indians should brace themselves for another 1962 embarrassment .

*The source on Nuclear arsenals were taken from Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst

India,China and 62

Looking Back at 1962

The Sino-Indian war of 1962 had the following lessons for India:

1. While we had a good capability for the collection of tactical and topographical intelligence about Tibet, we lacked a similar capability relating to Yunnan.

• 
  Our threat perceptions were largely, if not exclusively, focussed northwards towards Tibet and likely Chinese threats from Yunnan in the East through North Myanmar, by taking advantage of the lack of control and presence of the Yangon Government over vast areas of the Kachin State of Myanmar, were not adequately anticipated. Consequently, a disturbing increase in Chinese intelligence operations directed at India's North-East mounted from Yunnan and clandestine intrusions and movements of Chinese troops from Yunnan through Myanmarese territory to the North of Putao in the Kachin State remained either unnoticed or ill-assessed, if noticed. After the war, there were valid grounds for suspecting that some of the Chinese troops, which took the Indian Army by surprise in the North-East, had moved unnoticed by the Indian intelligence from Yunnan through unadministered Kachin territory.
• 
  While we had a certain capability for the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) from Tibet, our capability for the collection of technical intelligence (TECHINT) was woefully inadequate. So was our capability for the collection of strategic intelligence indicating Chinese intentions, mindset, perceptions, medium and long-term planning etc. Our capability for the collection of strategic intelligence was badly affected by the failure of the intelligence community since India's independence in 1947 to build up a high-level of knowledge of the Chinese language and by the difficulties faced by all countries in interacting with Chinese leaders and officials at policy-making levels in Beijing. The rigorous restrictions imposed by Beijing on their citizens, whether in the Government or outside, interacting with foreigners drastically reduced opportunities for strategic intelligence collection. While Chinese officials posted in New Delhi were freely able to interact with Indian leaders, officials and non-governmental analysts and collect strategic intelligence by picking their brains and other means, Indian officials found themselves denied similar opportunities in Beijing.
  
• Even though arrangements for the sharing of China-related intelligence between India and the US existed in a rudimentary form even before October,1962, the US intelligence chose not to share with India its knowledge of the Chinese military-build up in Tibet and the goings-on in Yunnan. The John F.Kennedy Administration in Washington DC, though well-disposed towards India, had apparently calculated that an Indian set-back at the hands of the Chinese would make New Delhi more amenable to US influence in strategic policy-making. (A similar failure to alert New Delhi about the movement of Pakistani troops to occupy the Kargil heights was discernible before the Indo-Pakistan Kargil military conflict of 1999. Again, the US calculatioin apparently was that an Indian surprise at the hands of Pakistan, even if temporary, would serve the USA's long-term policy interests).
  
• Our capability for a meaningful analysis and assessment of even the available intelligence, open as well as secret, was very poor. Consequently, policy-making was based more on wishful-thinking and personal hunches than on well-analysed and assessed likely scenarios.
  
• We had failed to foresee the likelihood of a military confrontation with China resulting in the occupation of some of our territory by the Chinese. As a result, we had not developed a stay-behind capability for the continued collection of intelligence and covert harassing operations against the Chiese troops in our territory occupied by them. Once the Chinese occupied portions of our territory, we hardly knew what was happening there and watched helplessly.

2. The painful experience of 1962 led New Delhi, for the first time since 1947, to have a comprehensive look at our intelligence collection, analysis and assessment and stay-behind operational capabilities with regard to China. Certain long-neglected measures were taken such as:
Giving priority to the collection of intelligence about North Myanmar and Yunnan.

Improving our HUMINT capability in Tibet.

Strengthening our TECHINT capability.

Improving the knowledge of the Chinese language in the intelligence community as well as outside.

Creating a stay-behind intelligence collection and operational capability in our territory claimed by the Chinese so that if the Chinese again occupied it in future, we would not be as helpless as we were in 1962.

Improving arrangements for intelligence and assessment barter with countries sharing India's concerns relating to China, while not developing a dependence on them to meet our needs.

Improving our analysis and assessment capability through the Joint Intelligence Community (JIC) at the Governmental level (since converted into the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) in 1998) and the Institute for Defence Studies And Analyses (IDSA) at the non-governmental level. The creation of the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in 1998 was meant to further strengthen the assessment capability at the non-governmental level.

3. The benign face of the post-1978 Chinese policy-making as illustrated by Beijing's discontinuance of its assistance to insurgent groups in India's North-East since 1979 and its keenness for the improvement of bilateral relations at various levels without letting them become a hostage to the long-pending border dispute have led to a certain complacency in policy-making in matters relating to National Security Management (NSM) and China. India continues to have serious concerns over the modernisation of China's Armed Forces, its nuclear and missile capability, its military assistance to Pakistan in the nuclear as well as conventional fields, its intentions in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Nepal etc. Despite these concerns, Indian attitude towards China seems to be more relaxed and more trusting than in the past. This is evident from the following:

• The gradual erosion of our stay-behind intelligence collection and operational capabilities.
• 
  The almost exclusive focus of the Special Task Force on the revamping of the intelligence apparatus set up by the Government in 2000 on strengthening our capabilities vis-a-vis Pakistan without a similar exercise relating to China.

4. This relaxed attitude was also evident during the Asian Security Conference with a focus on China organised by the IDSA at New Delhi from January 27 to 29, 2003. Though well-organised with a large participation from abroad, its focus was too dispersed and too diffused to enable any meaningful assessment. There was hardly any participation of Indian experts with insights, knowledge and the painful experience of dealing with China before and after 1962, who have already started fading away and will do so completely in another few years. Foreign perceptions-- particularly American, Israeli and Taiwanese--- received greater prominence and attention than Indian. One got the impression that the emphasis was more on quantity (so many foreign participants, so many papers, so many pages etc) than on quality.

5. This was reflective of the lack of attention to details and the superficiality, which have again come to mark our China analysis and assessment. It is important that we continue to move forward in improving our relations with China, but our keenness to move forward should not make us forget the painful lessons of the past. We cannot afford another traumatic experience in our relations with China.

Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst
Thanks,
South Asia Analysis Group.
B.R.Raman

Part 2. Chinese String of Pearls Stratergy

China’s “string of pearls” strategy appears to be taking another step forward as Beijing increases ties with the Sri Lankan government. The strategy, which was the subject of a 2005 U.S. China Commission report to Congress, is driven by China’s need to secure foreign oil and trade routes critical to its development. This has meant establishing an increased level of influence along sea routes through investment, port development and diplomacy.

To date, China’s investments extend from Hainan Island in the South China Sea, through the littorals of the Straits of Malacca, including port developments in Chittagong in Bangladesh; Sittwe, Coco, Hianggyi, Khaukphyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun in Myanmar; Laem Chabang in Thailand; and Sihanoukville in Cambodia. They extend across the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, and in islands within the Arabian Sea and into the Persian Gulf.

Not surprisingly, both the U.S. and Indian governments are concerned, part of these developments include the upgrading of airstrips, many supported with military facilities, such as the facility on Woody Island, close to Vietnam. These developments mean that the balance of power within the Indian and Arabian Gulf has now shifted away from the traditional Indian government management, backed up with U.S. military strength, but to China, backed up with regional diplomatic ties that dispense with the need to engage with either power.
The strategy has been developed partially in response to a lack of progress on the Kra Canal Project in Thailand, which would directly link the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. The “string of pearls” strategy however provides a forward presence for China along the sea lines of communication that now anchor China directly to the Middle East. The question both the United States and India have is whether this strategy is intended purely to cement supply lines and trade routes, or whether China will later use these in a bid to enforce regional supremacy.

India has not been an innocent party to the development of the “string of pearls.” Somewhat foolishly, it threatened to cut off China’s choke point for oil and trade – the Malacca Straits – in both 1971 and 1999, when it moved to blockade Karachi Port which at the time handled 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea trade, including oil supplies to China. India has also recently attempted to persuade the Sri Lankan government not to permit Chinese development of the country’s Hambantota Port, a project that is now well underway. Chinese investment in Sri Lanka is also likely to significantly increase given the likely conclusion of the civil war, and Chinese interests in drilling for oil off the coast of Northeast Sri Lanka.

As America’s influence in the region wanes, China’s strategy appears to be conservatively supported by other Southeast Asian nations, with the potential exception of India. Pro-U.S. nations such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines find it in their own self interests to improve and develop ties with China, while nations such as Pakistan, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia are all strong allies of Beijing. The growing perception is that a peaceful region does not now necessarily require a U.S. military presence.

Concerns remain however. Chinese fishing trawlers have been uncovered mapping the ocean floor to facilitate submarine operations, and disputes over territorial waters are increasing as the recent standoff between an American survey ship and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea demonstrates. The United States insists it was operating in international waters, the Chinese claim the incident occurred within their exclusive economic zone.

India feels threatened by the perception of a China increasingly encircling the country, with Tibet to the north, a China supported Myanmar regime to the east, an increasingly China-dependent Bangladesh beginning to emerge, and the long standing support China has shown for Pakistan. Given India’s own huge security problems with Pakistan it is unlikely, unless they can influence Sri Lanka, that the Indian government will be able to do much about the development of China’s interest within the region.

As long as Chinese interests remain benign, the “string of pearls” strategy remains the strongest pointer yet that China is both anchoring its energy supply lines with the Middle East and embarking on a level of Southeast Asian trade – and the development of regional prosperity that will come with it – on a scale never seen before. If the strategy continues without the development of regional conflicts, the ASEAN trading bloc, with China at its heart, and the massive emerging markets of India and the other Southeast Asian nations close by, will develop and begin to rival that of the EU and the United States, and lessen China’s dependence on these traditional export markets.

China is strengthening diplomatic ties and building naval bases along the sea lanes from the Middle East. This “String of Pearls” strategy is designed to protect its energy security, negate US influence in the region, and project power overseas.Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence.4 Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.”

An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” Acontainer shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water portin Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan.5 Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of theSouth China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East.

The Nature of the Pearls. China’s development of these strategic geopolitical “pearls” has beennonconfrontational, with no evidence of imperial or neocolonial ambition. The development of the “String of Pearls” may not, in fact, be a strategy explicitly guided by China’s central government. Rather, it may be a convenient label applied by some in the United States to describe an element of China’s foreign policy. Washington’s perception of China’s de facto strategy may not be a view sharedin Beijing, but the fact remains that economic benefits and diplomatic rhetoric have been an enticement for countries to facilitate China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

(see gwadar related article)

The port facility at Gwadar, for example, is a win-win prospect for both China and Pakistan. The port at Karachi currently handles 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea-borne trade, but because of its proximity to India, it is extremely vulnerable to blockade. This happened during the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and was threatened again during the Kargil conflict of 1999.6 Gwadar, a small fishing village which Pakistan identified as a potential port location in 1964 but lacked the means to develop, is 450 miles west of Karachi.7 A modern port at Gwadar would enhance Pakistan’s strategic depth along its coastline with respect to India. For China,the strategic value of Gwadar is its 240-mile distance from the Strait of Hormuz. China is facilitatingdevelopment of Gwadar and paving the way for future access by funding a majority of the $1.2 billionproject and providing the technical expertise of hundreds of engineers.8 Since construction began in2002, China has invested four times more than Pakistan and contributed an additional $200 milliontowards the building of a highway to connect Gwadar with Karachi. In August 2005, Chinese PremierWen Jiabao visited Pakistan to commemorate completion of the first phase of the Gwadar project andthe opening of the first 3 of 12 multiship berths.9The Gwadar project has enhanced the strategic, diplomatic, and economic ties between Pakistanand China. Other countries are benefiting from China’s new strategy, as well.

In November 2003, Chinasigned an agreement with Cambodia to provide military equipment and training in exchange for theright of way to build a rail line from southern China to the Gulf of Thailand.10 China also has anambitious $20 billion proposal to build a canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus which would enableships to bypass the chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca.11 Although this plan is stalled due to Thailand’snoncommittal position and political opposition in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, it reveals thescope and scale of Chinese ambition for the “String of Pearls.”

Sidharth K Menon

Defence and Intelligence Analyst.

Part 1. Chinese String of Pearl Stratergy.

Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean

Four months after the U.S. ordered its troops into Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime, China and Pakistan joined hands to break ground in building a Deep Sea Port on the Arabian Sea. The project was sited in an obscure fishing village of Gwadar in Pakistan's western province of Baluchistan, bordering Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran to the southwest. Gwadar is nautically bounded by the Persian Gulf in the west and the Gulf of Oman in the southwest.

Although the Gwadar Port project has been under study since May 2001, the U.S. entrée into Kabul provided an added impetus for its speedy execution. Having set up its bases in Central, South, and West Asian countries, the U.S. virtually brought its military forces at the doorstep of China. Beijing was already wary of the strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which supplies 60% of its energy needs. It was now alarmed to see the U.S. extend its reach into Asian nations that ring western China. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies. This vulnerability set Beijing scrambling for alternative safe supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port was one such alternative for which China had flown its Vice Premier, Wu Bangguo, to Gwadar to lay its foundation on March 22, 2002.

Pakistan was interested in the project to seek strategic depth further to the southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable to the dominant Indian Navy. In the past, it endured prolonged economic and naval blockades imposed by the Indian Navy. To diversify the site of its naval and commercial assets, Pakistan has already built a naval base at Ormara, the Jinnah Naval Base, which has been in operation since June 2000. It can berth about a dozen ships, submarines and similar harbor craft. The Gwadar port project, however, is billed to crown the Pakistan Navy into a force that can rival regional navies. The government of Pakistan has designated the port area as a "sensitive defense zone." Once completed, the Gwadar port will rank among the world's largest deep-sea ports.

The convergence of Sino-Pakistani strategic interests has put the port project onto a fast track to its early completion. In three years since its inauguration, the first phase of the project is already complete with three functioning berths. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will be on hand to mark the completion of this phase in March this year. Although the total cost of the project is estimated at $1.16 billion USD, China pitched in $198 million and Pakistan $50 million to finance the first phase. China also has invested another $200 million into building a coastal highway that will connect the Gwadar port with Karachi. The second phase, which will cost $526 million, will feature the construction of 9 more berths and terminals and will also be financed by China. To connect western China with Central Asia by land routes, Pakistan is working on building road links to Afghanistan from its border town of Chaman in Baluchistan to Qandahar in Afghanistan. In the northwest, it is building similar road links between Torkham in Pakhtunkhaw (officially known as the Northwest Frontier Province) and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Eventually, the Gwadar port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through overland links that will stretch to and from Karakoram Highway in Pakistan's Northern Areas that border China's Muslim-majority Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. In addition, the port will be complemented with a modern air defense unit, a garrison, and a first-rate international airport capable of handling airbus service.

Pakistan already gives China most favored nation (MFN) status and is now establishing a bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA), which will bring tariffs between the two countries to zero. Over the past two years, the trade volume between the two countries has jumped to $2.5 billion a year, accounting for 20% of China's total trade with South Asia. Informal trade, a euphemism for smuggling, however, is several times the formal trade. The proposed FTA is an implicit acceptance of the unstoppable "informal" trade as a "formal" one. More importantly, Chinese investment in Pakistan has increased to $4 billion, registering a 30% increase just over the past two years since 2003. Chinese companies make up 12% (60) of the foreign firms (500) operating in Pakistan, which employ over 3,000 Chinese nationals.

The growing economic cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is also solidifying their strategic partnership. Before leaving for his visit to Beijing this past December, Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz told reporters in Islamabad: "Pakistan and China are strategic partners and our relations span many areas." The rhetoric of strategic alignment is duly matched by reality. Last year, China and Pakistan conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises near the Shanghai coast. These exercises, among others, included simulation of an emergency rescue operation. Last December, Pakistan opened a consulate in Shanghai. The Gwadar Port project is the summit of such partnership that will bring the two countries closer in maritime defense as well.
Initially, China was reluctant to finance the Gwadar port project because Pakistan offered the U.S. exclusive access to two of its critical airbases in Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Baluchisntan) during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. According to a Times of India report on February 19, 2002, Gen. Musharraf had to do a lot of explaining for leasing these bases to America. China, the Times of India reported, was also upset with Pakistan for allowing the U.S. to establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet. When China finally agreed to offer financial and technical assistance for the project, it asked for "sovereign guarantees" to use the Port facilities to which Pakistan agreed, despite U.S. unease over it.

In particular, the port project set off alarm bells in India which already feels encircled by China from three sides: Myanmar, Tibet, and Pakistan. To counter Sino-Pak collaboration, India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. Iranians are already working on Chabahar port in Sistan-Baluchistan, which will be accessible for Indian imports and exports with road links to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India is helping build a 200-kilometer road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. Once completed, Indians will use this access road to the port for their imports and exports to and from Central Asia. Presently, India is in urgent need of a shorter transit route to quickly get its trade goods to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

These external concerns are stoking internal challenges to the port project. Baluchistan, where the project is located, is once again up in arms against the federal government. The most important reason for armed resistance against the Gwadar port is that Baluch nationalists see it as an attempt to colonize them and their natural resources. Several insurgent groups have sprung up to nip the project in the bud. The three most popular are: the Baluchistan Liberation Army, Baluchistan Liberation Front, and People's Liberation Army. On May 3, 2004, the BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the port project that employs close to 500 Chinese nationals. On October 9, 2004, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in South Waziristan in the northwest of Pakistan, one of whom was killed later on October 14 in a botched rescue operation. Pakistan blamed India and Iran for fanning insurgency in Baluchistan.

Moreover, the Chinese in Pakistan are vulnerable because of their tense relationship with the Uighur Muslim majority of Xinjiang. Stretched over an area of 635,833 square miles, Xinjiang is more than twice the size of Pakistan, and one-sixth of China's landmass. However, it dwarfs in demographic size with a population of 19 million people. Beijing is investing 730 billion yuan (roughly $88 billion USD) in western China, including Xinjiang, which opens it up to the six Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite this massive investment, displacement of Uighers from Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, is drawing fire, where the population of mainland Chinese of Han descent has grown from 10% in 1949 to 41% in 2004. In direct proportion, the population of native Uighurs has declined from 90% in 1949 to 47% in 2004. Tens of thousands of displaced Uighurs have found refuge in Pakistan where the majority of them live in its two most populous cities: Lahore and Karachi.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is fighting against Chinese attempts at so-called "Hanification" of Xinjiang. Pakistan, which along with China and the U.S. lists the ETIM as a terrorist organization, killed the ETIM's head, Hasan Mahsum, in South Waziristan on October 2, 2004. Seven days after, two Chinese were kidnapped from the area, one of whom was killed in a rescue operation. The thousands of Chinese working in Pakistan make tempting targets for violent reprisals by the ETIM or Baluch nationalists.

The realization of economic and strategic objectives of the Gwadar port is largely dependent upon the reduction of separatist violence in Baluchistan and Xinjiang. Chinese response to secessionism is aggressive economic development, which is driving the Gwadar port project also. The port is intended to serve China's threefold economic objective:

First, to integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, labor-absorbing, resource-intensive industrial production to Islamabad, which will transform Pakistan into a giant factory floor for China; Second, to seek access to Central Asian markets for energy imports and Chinese exports by developing road networks and rail links through Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia; Third, to appease restive parts of western China, especially the Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang, through a massive infusion of development funds and increased economic links with the Central Asian Islamic nations of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The port, by design or by default, also provides China a strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, although to the alarm of India and the unease of the U.S. sitting opposite the Strait of Hurmoz, through which 80% of the world's energy exports flow, the Gwadar port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf, and offer it, in the case of any hostile interruption in such shipments, a safer alternative passage for its energy imports from Central Asia. Its presence on the Indian Ocean will further increase its strategic influence with major South Asian nations, particularly Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which would prompt the Indians in turn to re-strengthen their Navy.


Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst

Pakistani F - 16's

Pakistani F -16 's

The US State Department decided to sell Pakistan 18 new F-16s with an option for 18 more. The US also offers to acquire and upgrade 26 used F-16A/B aircraft from U.S. inventories and to upgrade Pakistan's current fleet of 34 F-16s.

The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale of various munitions for the planes and logistic support like:

200 AIM-9M-8/9s Sidewinders
500 AIM-120C5s AMRAAM BVR missiles
800 general purpose 2,000 and 500-pound bombs
500 JDAM bomb guidance systems
Link 16
JHMCS
Sniper targetting pod
CFTs

Pakistan intends to buy 36 new F-16 fighter jets from the US and not 77 as originally planned. Pakistan delayed its purchase last year as the country focused on recovering from a devastating earthquake.If Pakistan takes all 36 new Block 50/52 C/Ds F-16s being offered, the deal would extend F-16 production in Fort Worth until June 2011.

The precise terms of the F-16 sale to Pakistan haven't been negotiated between Lockheed and Islamabad. The company currently is producing F-16s for Poland and Chile and has a backlog of 144 planes on order.Lockheed's goal is to keep the line open until at least 2012, when the company is to begin major production of its new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, said spokesman Joseph Stout."The big order we're pursuing is in India, where they have a stated requirement for 126 aircraft," Stout said.US State Department spokesperson Julie Reside described the sale as "part of an effort to broaden our strategic partnership with Pakistan and advance our national security and foreign policy interests in South Asia"."Pakistan is a long-term partner and major non-NATO ally," she noted.Reside stressed that the sale is nothing to do with the nuclear partnership that the US is building with India. She also dismissed any suggestion that the sale could contribute to an arms race in South Asia and said a dialogue between India and Pakistan has already helped reduce tensions and provided greater stability in their region.

In December 2005, the US provided two upgraded F-16s to Pakistan for free as a "goodwill gesture".

PAF F-16A block 15

Pakistan has ordered a total of 111 F-16A/B aircraft. Of these, 71 were embargoed by the US due to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Of these 71, 28 were actually built but were flown directly to the AMARC at Davis-Monthan AFB for storage.
Over the years, various plans were conceived for these 28 aircraft: Pakistan wanted to get the aircraft or their money back; they were offered to various nations, none of which were interested; ultimately, the US Navy and USAF entered them into service as aggressor aircraft.
After Pakistan's help in the war on terror, the US lifted the embargo. In 2005, Pakistan requested 24 new Block 50/52 F-16C/Ds (with option for as much as 55 aircraft). Ultimately an order for 18 F-16s was placed with an option on another 18.

Peace Gate I

Pakistani F-16A
In December 1981, the government of Pakistan signed a letter of agreement for the purchase of up to 40 F-16A/B (28 F-16A and 12 F-16B) fighters for the Pakistan Fiza'ya (Pakistan Air Force, or PAF). The deal would be split into two batches, one of 6 aircraft and the other of 34. The first aircraft were accepted at Fort Worth in October of 1982, and the first F-16, flown by Squadron Leader Shahid Javed, landed in Pakistan at Sargodha Air Base on January 15th, 1983 as part of a package of 6 'Peace Gate I' aircraft (2 A's and 4 B's).

Peace Gate II

The remaining 34 aircraft were delivered under Peace Gate II. The Pakistani F-16A/B's are all Block 15 aircraft, the final version of the F-16A/B production run, and are powered by the Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-200 turbofan. All 40 'Peace Gate I & II' aircraft were delivered between 1983 and 1987. By 1997, 8 aircraft of the initial Peace Gate I & II order have been written off in various mishaps, hence 32 remain in service and despite the embargo, caused by the Pakistan-specific Pressler Amendment (see below), are being fully supported by commercial contracts.

The F-16s were assigned USAF serial numbers for record-keeping purposes, and carry a three-digit PAF serial number on their noses; the F-16A's being assigned numbers in sequence beginning with 701, and the F-16B's being assigned numbers beginning with 601. The two digit prefix preceding these numbers is the year of delivery of these aircraft. The PAF Falcons have a slightly altered color scheme, with the dark gray area covering most of the wings and the aft part of the horizontal tailplanes and carry toned-down markings: the national flag (normally a white moon and star on green field) on the tail and roundels on the upper wing surface.

Peace Gate III

Seven years after the first order, in December of 1988, Pakistan ordered 11 additional F-16A/B Block 15 OCU (Operational Capability Upgrade) aircraft (6 Alpha and 5 Bravo models) under the Peace Gate III program. These aircraft were purchased as attrition replacements and fully paid for, but are still awaiting delivery in the Arizona Desert. The reason for this is that Pakistan got involved in a controversy with the United States over its suspected nuclear weapons capability. Intelligence information reaching US authorities indicated that Pakistan was actively working on a nuclear bomb, had received a design for a bomb from China, had tested a nuclear trigger and was actively producing weapons-grade uranium. Furthermore, the F-16A's of no 9 and 11 squadrons at Sargodha AB have allegedly been modified to carry and deliver a Pakistani nuclear weapon. In addition, Pakistan has steadfastly refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As a result, in accordance to the Pressler amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which forbids military aid to any nation possessing a nuclear explosive device, the United States government announced on October 6th, 1990 that it had embargoed further arms deliveries to Pakistan. The 11 Peace Gate III aircraft were consequently stored at AMARC (Aircraft Maintenance and Regeneration Center) at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, also known as the Boneyard. There, they were put in 'Flyable Hold' for 5 years, during which time 85% of each aircraft's fuel system was preserved with JP-9, and each aircraft had its engine run once every 45 days. This resulted in the curious situation that most of those aircraft now have more engine run time than air time, the latter being only 6 hours. This low air-time figure, plus the fact that these aircraft are the most modern F-16A/B's built, is the main reason why countries interested in second-hand F-16s first look at the Pakistani airframes.

Peace Gate IV

In September of 1989, plans were announced by Pakistan to acquire 60 more F-16A/B's. A contract was signed in the same year under the Peace Gate IV Foreign Military Sales Programs, for the delivery of 60 F-16s for US $1.4 billion or approximately US $23 million a piece. By March of 1994, 11 of these planes had been built and were directly flown into the Sonoran desert where they joined the 11 Peace Gate III aircraft in storage. A further six aircraft were stored by the end of 1994, so that a total of 17 aircraft (7 F-16A's and 10 F-16B's) of the Peace Gate IV order are now stored. A stop-work order affected the remaining 43 planes of the Peace Gate IV contract.

The Brown amendment later eased the restrictions on weapon exports to Pakistan, but specifically excluded the F-16s from this release. Pakistan had already paid $685 million on the contract for the first 28 F-16s (11 Peace Gate III and 17 Peace Gate IV), and insisted on either having the planes it ordered delivered or getting its money back.

The saga of the embargoed F-16s

In March 1996, nine aircraft out of those which had already been manufactured for Pakistan, were sold to Indonesia. However, Indonesia cancelled this order on June 2nd, 1997. This 'unexpected' trouble with the Indonesian F-16 deal means a bigger problem to the Clinton administration both with respect to Pakistan and Indonesia. President Clinton had pledged to the Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, that the money paid for the F-16s by Islamabad would be reimbursed if the equipment could not be delivered. In trying to come to terms with Islamabad's demand that Washington would return the money, the Clinton administration went on to see if the planes could be sold to a third country and the proceeds transferred. Interested buyers included amongst others the Republic of China.

At the end of 1997, with chances of finding a buyer close to zero, it was decided to take the PAF F-16s out of flyable hold and into the Boneyard. The airframes were offered to the Philippine Air Force, in view of its modernization plans. However, lack of funds precluded this deal as well.

In May 1998, a rumor suggested that the 28 Pakistani AF F-16A/B aircraft stored at the AMARC could possibly be donated to the Air Force of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a part of the US led 'Train & Equip' program. As Pakistan is already taking part in this program (training Bosnian Army Anti-tank missile teams), this is a solution that could satisfy both sides in this long dispute. Again, this proved to be not viable.

After the detonation of five nuclear devices by India in May 1998, in a remote area close to its border with Pakistan, Washington feared that this might escalate the old border dispute between Pakistan and India to a full crisis. In order to keep Pakistan from responding to this challenge, US president Bill Clinton suggested that the 28 stored F-16s would be delivered after all, in batches of 1 or 2. However, the internal pressure on the government proved to strong and shortly after India's demonstration, Pakistan responded by detonating an unknown number of nuclear devices.

Finally, on December 1st, 1998, the New Zealand Government announced that it would lease-buy the 28 Pakistani F-16s stored at the AMARC. Three days later, the United States said they hoped for an 'early and fair' agreement on how to compensate Islamabad for its aborted purchase of US F-16 fighters. President Clinton briefed Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on US efforts to compensate Pakistan for the $658 million it paid for the 28 F-16s. US officials said the United States has already paid $157 million of this back to Islamabad, raising the money by selling aircraft components to other countries. New Zealand agreed to pay some $105 million over 10 years to lease the fighters, providing additional funds that could be used to give Pakistan some of its money back.

At the end of 1998, the United States announced it would pay Pakistan $326.9 million in cash and up to $140 million in other compensation to settle the eight-year dispute. The $140 million will include about $60 million in US white wheat that Pakistan will receive during the current US fiscal year, which began on October 1st. The remaining $80 million in compensation will be negotiated by the two sides. The F-16 issue has been a headache for Pakistan, which is grappling to repay millions of dollars on its $32 billion in foreign debt amid a hard currency drought caused by sanctions and the suspension of International Monetary Fund programs.
In 1999 a new New Zealand government was elected who started a major reorganisation of the armed forces. One major element in this was the cancellation of the F-16 contract and the disbandment of its fighter force. The planes stayed in the boneyard for just a little longer.

In 2002, the US finally stopped trying to sell the aircraft and decided to assign them to the USAF and US Navy to fill the Aggressor role. After the demise of the (T)F-16N aggressor force, the US Navy lacked a high-performance aggressor aircraft. Because of the low airframe life of the embargoed Pakistani F-16s, these airframes were ideally suited for the demanding aggressor role. The 28 aircraft were thus evenly split between the USAF and the US Navy, and will take a vital role in DACT training of US forces.

After the attacks on 9/11 the Pakistani government became a major US ally in the war on terror. It was decided to redeliver those aircraft to Pakistan. Untill now, only half of them has been redelivered, with the remainder still to follow.

Peace Drive

On March 25th, 2005, the US Government announced that it had agreed to Pakistan's request to sell new F-16s. Initially, Pakistan has requested an additional 24 new Block 50/52 F-16C/Ds (with option for as much as 55 aircraft). Not much details are known at this moment about a possible sale of the aircraft to Pakistan. The deal is expected to be concluded by September or October of 2005. As part of the package, it was also agreed that the current fleet of older A/B models would get the MLU update.

As a sign of good gesture, the US agreed to supply Pakistan with a number of F-16s who where build under the Peace Gate III/IV programs.

Finally, after long series of negotiations, on September 30th, 2006 the contract was signed between the Pakistani and US government for the acquisition of 18 new F-16C/D block 52 aircraft and an option for another 18 more. In the deal the re-delivery of the 26 remaining Peace Gate III/IV aircraft was also agreed and the upgrade of those aircraft - and the remaining F-16A/B fleet - to MLU standards.

This order was granted and given a new FMS name at Pakistan's request. Albeit it already had the Peace Gate program, the PAF decided to choose another name since Peace Gate had too much negative commotion since the embargo of the last batch of aircraft.

The Pakistan Air Force currently has the Block 15 F-16A/B model in operation, which has an upgraded APG-66 radar that brings it close to the MLU (Mid-life Update) radar technology. The main advantage is the ability to use the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles if they were ever to be released to the PAF. Furthermore, the radar is capable of sorting out tight formations of aircraft and has a 15%-20% range increase over previous models. All the earlier F-16s were brought up to OCU standards and have received the Falcon UP structural modification package.

Armament

Pakistani F-16A with Thompson Atlis II laser designator pod on the 5L chin station, and two Paveway LGBs
Currently, Pakistani F-16s typically carry two all-aspect AIM-9L Sidewinders on the wing tip rails along with a pair of AIM-9P-4's on the outermost underwing racks, while the Matra Magic 2 (French counterpart of the Sidewinder) can be carried as well. They also have an important strike role, being capable to deliver Paveway laser-guided bombs. Pakistani F-16s are also capable of firing the French AS-30 laser guided missile.The ALQ-131 pod is carried as ECM protection.

Atlis laser designation pod. Pakistan has acquired the French-built Thompson-CSF ATLIS laser designation pod for use on its F-16s. The ATLIS pod was first fitted to Pakistani F-16s in January 1986, thus making the F-16 the first non-European aircraft to be qualified for this pod.

Operational Service

Combat

Pakistan was the second nation (after Israel) to use the F-16 in combat. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 in support of the pro-Soviet government in Kabul, which was being hard-pressed by Mujahadeen rebel forces, marked the start of a decade-long occupation. Mujahadeen rebels continued to harass the occupying Soviet military force as well as the forces of the Afghan regime that it was supporting. The war soon spilled over into neighboring Pakistan, with a horde of refugees fleeing to camps across the border in an attempt to escape the conflict. In addition, many of the rebels used Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to carry out forays into Afghanistan, and a steady flow of US-supplied arms were carried into Afghanistan from staging areas in Pakistan near the border. This inevitably resulted in border violations by Soviet and Afghan aircraft attempting to interdict these operations.

Between May 1986 and November of 1988, PAF F-16s have shot down at least eight intruders from Afghanistan. The first three of these (one Su-22, one probable Su-22, and one An-26) were shot down by two pilots from No. 9 Squadron. Pilots of No. 14 Squadron destroyed the remaining five intruders (two Su-22s, two MiG-23s, and one Su-25). Most of these kills were by the AIM-9 Sidewinder, but at least one (a Su-22) was destroyed by cannon fire. Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mamood is credited with three of these kills. At least one F-16 was lost in these battles, this one in an encounter between two F-16s and six Afghan Air Force aircraft on April 29th, 1987. However, the lost F-16 appears to have been an 'own goal', having been hit by a Sidewinder fired by the other F-16. The unfortunate F-16 pilot (Flight Lieutenant Shahid Sikandar Khan) ejected safely.


Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst.

The Myth of China Weapons Embargo

The Myth of China Weapons Embargo



How can the thirsty merchants of war avoid the cheesecake called China. A booming economy, a country in the process of modernization of its defence forces. A country longing for state of the art killing machines.

The US wants it, the EU wants it gone. The fight over the weapons embargo against China has smoldered for weeks. The fact is that European firms already deliver weapons to China -- so do American ones. The EU weapons embargo against China can be summed up in a single sentence: "For the moment, the European Parliament thinks it is necessary to take the follow measures: break off military cooperation and institute a weapons embargo against China." With these words, the leaders of the EU countries instituted their policy following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Which weapons are to be affected and how the embargo should be monitored has never been put in writing.

Great Britain decided that British weapons and parts that are not "deadly effective" can be exported. Today, Chinese warplanes lift off with Rolls Royce engines. France and Italy, long after 1989, also continued to deliver radar systems, rockets and airplanes to China. They had these contracts before China cracked down on the democracy movement, goes the argument. Italy and Spain have delivered helicopter technology which they didn't want to equate with weapons systems, but which now is used in Chinese military helicopters. A German firm received contracts for 2,000 diesel engines to be used for Chinese submarines. Whether the contract was filled is unclear. In total, the EU states' "exemptions" from the weapons embargo was worth about EUR 413 million ($550 million) in 2003. The biggest exporter is France, followed by Great Britain and Italy. The German contribution is relatively small.

The official newspaper of the EU calculated that in 2002, the amount of weapons exporting royalties was worth merely EUR 210 million. But before a year had passed, the amount EU was selling to China had almost doubled. According to critics of weapons exports, guarantees by leading politicians such as German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who says abolishing the embargo doesn't necessarily mean an export boom in weapons, can't be trusted. The European weapons manufacturer EADS just concluded an agreement with a Chinese partner, AviChina, and wants to become active as long as they are allowed to by law.

The Americans also sell weapons As measured as a percentage of the total of the Chinese-European trade volume, valued at around EUR 115 billion annually, the weapons transactions are only a side note. China currently buys about EUR 7 billion worth of weapons annually on the international market in order to modernize their army and is on its way to becoming the world's biggest weapons importer. American firms also deliver weapons to China even though the government strictly rejects the abolishment of the embargo. In fact, from 1989 to 1998, about $350 million worth of weapons were delivered to China, reported the Arms Control Association, an independent organization based in Washington, DC, using data collected by the Government Accounting Office. Israel sold China technology it had acquired from the US. Also, some so-called "dual-use-wares," equipment that can be used for civilian and military purposes, have to be counted, even though they are missing from weapons export statistics.

The almost 16-year-old EU weapons embargo is full of holes. It should be strengthened through a stricter code of conduct for member states, says Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU commissioner for foreign relations. This code has existed since 1998 and a revised and stronger version is under consideration, something France vehemently opposes. But if the code of conduct rules remain as they are, EU member states generally if unenthusiastically agree that the embargo should be abolished. That will be decided on in June. Meanwhile, the US Congress is threatening trade sanctions against the EU. The Americans are afraid that, through their cooperation on the Europeans' new Galileo satellite navigation system, China will acquire a previously undreamed of military advantage. Until now, there had only been one satellite navigation system, one controlled by the US military. The European Parliament has repeatedly spoken out against the abolishment of the weapons embargo against China in the past: As long as there are dismal considerations for human rights and threats against Taiwan, this symbolic gesture should not be removed, members say, adding that the economic interests of the French, British and German weapons industry must remain in second place.

Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst.-