Chinese
Intelligence: From a Party Outfit to Cyber Warriors
Shri
Ajit Doval
Whatever
yardstick we choose to apply – size of the economy and its rate of growth,
military hardware and pace of modernisation, stability of the polity and the
government; size, population and
geo-political setting – China qualifies for a major power status. If we decide
to be more candid than correct in making a hard headed assessment, its rise is
not an assured peaceful rise. Its military build up, maritime ambitions,
territorial claims, assertions in the cyber world and space etc have definite
security ramifications both for the region and the world at large. The
direction, intensity and 
form of these assertions among other things will be determined by China’s self view of its interests, capacities and limitations on one hand and assessment of global response to its actions on the other. In making these policy choices, the intelligence capability of the Chinese state will play a seminal role.
No one has
internalised, more than the Chinese, the fact that strategic strength of a nation is directly proportionate
to its knowledge dominance. Three millennium back, they believed in Sun Tzu’s
dictum, ‘Know thy self, know thy enemy - a thousand battles, a thousand
victories’, and they continue to believe it till date. While advances made by
China in its economy, military modernisation, defence production and technology
acquisition have been intensely studied and analysed, not much is known or
written about its intelligence apparatus, its capabilities and vulnerabilities,
role in policy making, systems and structures
etc. Though China, compared to the past, has opened up in certain fields, its
intelligence apparatus, not much understood by intelligence experts and
scholars, remains a dark area. It assumes special import in the wake of its
acquiring major power status on one hand, and expanding scope of clausewitzian doctrine of “War
through other means” like cyber war on the other. It becomes all the more relevant in the
Chinese context, as espionage has been integral to its strategic tradition and
state craft.
EVOLUTION:
The
history of Chinese intelligence is as old as that of the early warring kingdoms
of ancient China. In terms of its
antiquity, it can be compared only with the history of Indian intelligence that
dates back to about 700 BC, perfected by Chanakya during the Mauryan Empire
(322 to 185 BC); the only difference being that while the Indians proclaimed
‘resorting to secret craft by the state’ as unethical and immoral after the
Gupta period (320 AD to 600 AD), it remained an uninterrupted part of Chinese
state craft. Intelligence played a seminal role in the efforts of successive
Chinese dynasties to deal with their external enemies – primarily the warring
nomadic tribes- as also tackling internal threats.
In recent
history, Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek extensively used their spy networks to
gather information about the Manchus that led to fall of the Qing dynasty.
Intelligence also played an important role during the Sino-Japanese war and
later the Civil War that led to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) over the Kuomintang. Mao, during this extended civil war, heavily relied
on CCP’s secret apparatus and covert actions to subdue his political opponents.
It is significant that one of the first resolutions adopted by the Politburo of
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), after the creation of People’s Republic of
China (PRC) in 1949, pertained to the crucial role played by the
intelligence.
Establishment of Communist Rule to
Cultural Revolution:
On
assuming power, three factors defined CCP’s approach towards national security
and concurrently the intelligence build up. First was a strong belief that all
those who were opposed to the Communist ideology were counter revolutionaries
and thus enemies of the Chinese state and the people. Second was an inherent
distrust of all foreigners and foreign powers, particularly the Western
democracies, who were perceived to be conspiring to undo the socialist
revolution. Taiwan and Hong Kong were considered to be bases of their covert
activity. Third was a fierce undercurrent of Chinese nationalism that
emphasised on avenging ‘wrongs of history’ and transforming China into a State
with high Comprehensive National Power (CNP).
In terms
of action points, at the intelligence
front, this approach, inter alia,
manifested into (i) Creation of a strong security state- policing its citizens,
identifying ideological enemies and their neutralisation; (ii) denying access
to suspected foreign agents; (iii) penetration into claimed areas of Chinese
territory not fully under its control like Tibet, Taiwan, Hong Kong etc. (often
referred as homeland territory by the Chinese); (iv) accessing scientific and
technical information, mainly from Western sources, to build indigenous
military and civilian capacities and (v) leveraging Chinese diasporas abroad
for intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, including coverage of
activities of anti-communist elements abroad. As the CCP was envisaged to play
the central role in this secret activity, intelligence apparatus continued to
be controlled by it, albeit with some structural changes. The erstwhile
intelligence outfit, Public Security Department (PSD), was re-organised. Its
internal security tasks were partly entrusted to the Central Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) headed by Gen Luo Ruiqing, foreign intelligence was brought
under Liaison Department headed by Li Kenong and some sections were transferred
to People Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) Central General Office and the General
Staff Department. Li Kenong was also designated by Mao as Secretary of the
Central Committee’s Intelligence Commission, Director of the Central Military
Commission, Intelligence Department, as also as the country’s Deputy Foreign
Minister. Central Investigation Department, a field intelligence outfit, worked
under Li Kenong.
At this
stage, Chinese intelligence had limited exposure to the outside world,
confronted problems of access and language and faced a generally hostile
anti-communist environment internationally. These factors, abetted by
ideological proximity to the USSR made the intelligence apparatus considerably
dependent on the Soviets, particularly for external intelligence. KGB, in those
days, worked closely with Gen Luo Ruiqing and helped him develop intelligence
systems, doctrines, trade craft, training etc., whose footprints can be
observed even today. Russians also helped the Chinese develop liaison
arrangements with fraternal communist parties through ‘International Liaison of
the Chinese Communist Party’. The intelligence bonhomie with Soviets, however,
started cooling off in the mid fifties and by 1960 the operational cooperation
almost ceased to exist.
During the
1950s, almost every Chinese embassy had an Investigation and Research Office –
a cover name for intelligence staff belonging to the Central Investigation
Department. These were the field units for intelligence collection which were
low in trade craft, highly secretive in their functioning and comprised of
ideologically committed members. One of their major pre-occupation was to keep
close watch on other members of the mission. They often remained present during
the meetings with their diplomatic counterparts. In the headquarters, the
analytical task was carried out by Central Investigation Department’s Eighth
Bureau, publicly known since 1978 as the "Institute of Contemporary
International Relations."
In 1962, just before
the Cultural Revolution, Li Kenong died and was succeeded by Luo Qingchang. The
legendary Kang Sheng, a confidant of Mao who for long years had headed the
Central Department of Social Affairs and in 60s was a member of the Politburo,
was entrusted with the overarching responsibility of ‘guiding’ the country’s intelligence apparatus. The
infamous Kang Sheng played a vital role during Cultural Revolution in
suppressing and neutralising Mao’s political enemies. The political confusion
that prevailed during Cultural Revolution created serious fissures with the
intelligence community also. Reportedly, on the initiative of Lin Biao, the
Central Investigation Department was abolished, most of its senior officers
shunted to the countryside for re-education and its operators and human assets,
both within and outside the country, deputed to the PLA General Staff Second
Department. It is suspected that there was an internal conspiracy, in which
some intelligence operators of the dissolved Central Investigation Department
were used, that led to mysterious death of Lin Biao in 1971 in a plane crash in
Mongolia. Following his death, the department was re-established and its representatives
sent to missions abroad.
Cultural Revolution:
The role
of intelligence in the internal polity of China during the Cultural Revolution
(1966-1976), that witnessed millions of killings, deserves a special mention.
The revolution created conditions of anarchy and uncertainty, and saw sharp
degradation of civil society and violation of human rights. There was extensive
abuse of secret police and intelligence services that were responsible for
large number of killings of political opponents. The secret apparatus became
not only the perpetrator of atrocities but also a victim of it. In April 1967,
Secretary General of the Central Investigation Department, Zou Dapeng,
committed suicide along with his wife, who herself was a senior intelligence
officer. A large number of intelligence operatives were dubbed as renegades or
traitors and punished - often for their suspected pre 1949 roles or
proclivities. Ironically, these persecutions were spearheaded by none other than
the intelligence Tzar, Kang Sheng, who himself was head of the CCP’s
Intelligence and secret apparatus from 1939-1946. In those turbulent years,
Kang, the hatchet man of Mao Zedong, headed the Central Case Examination Group
(CCEG) that dealt exclusively in secret coercive practices and dirty tricks to
bring about ‘cultural’ cleansing. At one point of time, at his behest, 88
members/alternate members of the party Central Committee were under
investigation for suspected ‘treachery’, ‘spying’ or ‘collusion with the
enemy’. Kang Sheng used his infamous
apparatus to crush Mao’s ideological opponents dubbing them as enemies of the
revolution. The powerful role of Kang and his security services in China’s
internal power play can be gauged by the fact that Kang Sheng was directed by
Mao to supervise drafting of the new Party Constitution, which was
adopted at the Ninth Congress in April 1969. He was also ‘elected’ as one of
the five members of the Politburo Standing Committee, along with Mao, Lin Biao,
Zhou Enlai and Chen Boda.
Ministry of Social Security (MSS):
The political
developments in China consequent to the death of Mao Zedong (1976), fall of the
Gang of Four (1976) and rise of Den Xiaoping heralded a new era in Chinese
politics. Following the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee Congress,
Deng Xiaoping emerged as the most powerful leader and gave a new fillip to the
pace of modernisation and structural reforms. Himself a victim of political
misuse of intelligence during Cultural Revolution, he wanted to re-structure
the intelligence apparatus making it less susceptible to political vagaries. He
resurrected the Chinese traditional concepts of Shishi Qiushi (seeking truth
from facts), ‘Xianzhi’ (foreknowledge) and ‘Hide Your Strength, Bide Your Time’ as some of
the guiding doctrines to reform the country’s
intelligence set-up. He wanted Chinese intelligence to be transformed into a
modern professional outfit – in tandem with China’s four modernisation
programmes - having high technical capabilities and insulated from day to day
party control. Deng Xiaoping was also not in favour of intelligence officers
using legal cover as diplomats and wanted them to operate under illegal covers
like media persons, representatives of business firms, scientists and
researchers in universities etc.
Many piecemeal
reforms were brought about during 1976 to 1982 that eventually culminated in
the formation of the Ministry of Social Security (MSS) in 1983. It was
envisaged to be the country’s apex intelligence outfit, a position that it
continues to hold till today. A formal proposal was initiated by Liu Fuzhi, who
at that time headed the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and was approved by
the Political Bureau of the CCP Central Committee. The new outfit that defined
its charter as “the security of the state through effective measures against
enemy agents, spies and counter-revolutionary activities designed to sabotage
or overthrow China’s socialist system”[1]
was made answerable to the Premier and the State Council. The above charter
defined by Liu Fuzhi, however, hid more than it revealed. Unstated, the primary
functions of the MSS included collection of foreign intelligence and
undertaking covert intelligence operations both within and outside the country.
It had a major internal intelligence charter as well. Ling
Yun was appointed its first Chief, who on assuming office proclaimed that
intelligence would no longer be used to settle ideological differences or allow
party barons to use the service to settle factional fights. It was, however,
nothing more than a pious wish and propaganda ploy.
Major segments of
the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities of the Ministry of Public
Security (MPS) and remnants of the Chinese Communist Party’s Investigation
Division under Central Department of Social
Affairs (CDSA) were merged into the new outfit. For the first time, foreign
intelligence was collected, collated and analysed in a systematic manner on modern
lines. As MSS did not have a body of experienced analysts to interpret the
data, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), which
had existed since 1980 and had a professional research staff, was brought under
its control. The organisation, though has an open profile, is a feeder outfit
that provides MSS with intelligence assessments based on inputs received from
all sources including open sources and interaction with foreign think-tanks. It
is a conglomerate of eleven institutes and two research divisions specialising
in diverse areas of international interest to China. According to some press
reports, “the CICIR has provided intelligence
collection support to the MSS and the Foreign Affairs Leading
Group (FALG), the Communist Party of China’s top foreign-policy body.[2]”
The MSS over the years has emerged as China’s largest and most
effective intelligence organisation, working under the state council with its
headquarters in Beijing. Under Article 4 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Law,
it enjoys police powers to arrest and initiate prosecution in cases involving
national security. It has different wings covering foreign intelligence,
internal intelligence, counter-espionage and counter-intelligence. There is a
certain degree of overlap with the Second Department of the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) in respect of foreign intelligence and Ministry of Public Security
(MPS) in the field of domestic intelligence.
Ministry of Public Security (MPS):
Though
essentially a national security agency, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)
has a wide intelligence network. Enjoying overriding powers over the police and
law enforcing agencies, huge resources and proximity to the CCP makes it a
powerful security cum intelligence outfit.
In its
intelligence gathering and operational role, it keeps a close watch on internal
political developments and concurrently reports to the State Council (executive
component of the state) and Central Political and Legislative Affairs Committee
(party apparatus). Besides collection of intelligence through police
organisation at provincial and local levels, MPS performs its intelligence
functions using ‘working units’ of the ‘Chinese citizens’. MPS is empowered to
draft any citizen to spy over fellow citizens or foreigners living in their
area. Surveillance over visiting foreigners is an important function of the MPS
which it performs through local law enforcement units besides its dedicated
intelligence units. However, deficient in skills, experience and equipment, its
trade craft is primitive and crude and easily detectable.
While the
intricate network of MPS informers allows the system to keep a close watch on
its citizenry, it often leads to erroneous or disproportionate police actions
on account of perfunctory reporting, informers settling personal scores through
false reporting and intervention by party bosses. Some of the problems
encountered by MPS include managing the unwieldy data generated by diverse
working groups spread throughout the country, validation and analysis of data,
delayed real time flow of information among the provinces and from provinces to
the MPS headquarters in Beijing and lack of coordinated decision making process
due to two parallel masters - the state executive and the party apparatus. Intervention by the Central Political and
Legislative Affairs Committee, that is supposed to deal with coordination
problems, often proves to be delayed and non-workable.
As
custodian of ideological security, the MPS also performs an important political
role of monitoring political opinions of the people, logging people’s
grievances and collecting information about rivalries among the party
cadres/leaders. To assist its political role, it maintains a massive national
database covering personal information from national to local levels. The
inputs are derived from police reports, inputs of working groups, local level
party sources, interception of e-mails
and telephonic communications, employment records, data available with banks
and industrial concerns, prosecution and
immigration records etc. This data is integrated and aggregated to identify
‘persons of interest’ which in turn are sent to police stations for stipulated
action.
Internally,
China has created intelligence capacities for a panoptic state where it can
identify, monitor, control, intervene and, when required, coerce citizens to
submission for furthering perceived national interests. This trend got further
strengthened after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, that badly shook
China and whose after effects continue to haunt it. Growing unrest in Tibet and
Xianjiang and the spate of suicides in
Tibet have further unnerved China. The declining face of economic growth,
unemployment and exponential rise in agitations and protests have further
compounded the internal security landscape.
In 2011,
Zhou Yongkang, China’s senior party
leader in charge of security and stability, emphasised the need of integrating
MPS intelligence system for “social management” that would include monitoring
political views, moulding public opinion and propaganda to shape people’s
decision. In furtherance of this policy in December 2011, MPS directed units
under it to visit villages and houses to win over their hearts and minds on the
one hand and monitor their opinions on the other. This is illustrative of the Chinese
management of state affairs intricately intertwining security, development,
political and civil society controls. Though it has not drawn the attention of
strategic analysts abroad, in last one decade, both the size and influence of
MPS has increased substantially. However, to what degree the MPS influences
political decision making process and policy formulation needs further
investigation.
Military Intelligence - 2nd General Staff Department (2nd GSD):
The
powerful Chinese military apparatus has dedicated intelligence apparatus of its
own under the General Staff Department (GSD) of the PLA. Second Intelligence
Department (2nd GSD) is one of the most important departments of the
military intelligence setup. It is headed by a Director who is assisted by two
Deputy Directors and a Political Commissioner. The Director and Political
Commissar are equivalent to a Group Army Commander. [3] As it works directly under
the General Staff, political control over it is lesser than in the case of MPS
and MSS. STRATFOR, a leading intelligence research organization, avers that
border intelligence is one of the primary responsibilities of the MID in which
it is assisted by the PLA’s reconnaissance units. [4] Specializing in tactical intelligence, it
keeps tab of the order of battle (ORBAT) of foreign armies, their doctrines,
strategies, location, identity of field formations and profiles of their
commanders etc. Its responsibilities include terrain assessment of target areas
of military interest, identification of military command and control centres,
plotting vulnerable Areas/Points (VA/VPs), equipment profile,
counter-intelligence tasks, etc. It also monitors the activities of foreign armies
operating in the Asian continent.[5]
Some
of the important wings of the 2nd GSD include (i) ‘Department 2’
collecting information through human assets (HUMINT) with seven bureaus working under it, (ii)
‘Department 3’ collecting intelligence through communication interceptions
(SIGINT) located in seven of its military
regions and (iii) Department 4 specializing in battle field Electronic
Intelligence. Electronic intelligence is sourced through Electronic Warfare
(EW) Regiment/Reconnaissance Units functioning at the Group Army (GA) level.
Other departments deal with administration, logistics, training etc.
The
2nd GSD’s field formations have Military Reconnaissance Units (MRs)
in border areas, Intelligence Analysis Centre at the Divisional level and
Intelligence Peace Units at Company levels. During war time, the Intelligence
Analysis Centers function at the Battalion Headquarter level also with a
limited remit. It also monitors the activities of foreign armies operating in
the Asian continent. Earlier the 2nd GSD primarily focused on human
intelligence and traditional military intelligence activities but has recently
expanded the range of its activities to cover scientific and technological
information.[6] [7]
The
2nd Department is further sub-divided in functional bureaus such
as Military Intelligence Bureau,
Tactical Reconnaissance Bureau, Political Bureau, Confidential Bureau,
Comprehensive Bureau and Confidential File Bureau. [8] Military Intelligence Bureau
focuses mainly on Taiwan, Macau and Hong Kong; collects technical intelligence
to improve and develop military hardware for the PLA and establishes contact
with potential clients for weapons exports concealing PLA’s direct involvement
in arms trade. The Tactical Reconnaissance Bureau streamlines the information
flow from specialized units at the MR level.
The 3rd Bureau (Military Attaché Bureau) screens and debriefs military
attaches who are deputed to foreign missions abroad. The 4th Bureau’s
responsibility is Intelligence analysis for Russia, former Soviet republics,
and other East European countries. The 5thBureau is also known as
the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Its responsibilities include organizing foreign
visits of PLA officers, military exchanges and receiving foreign military
visitors. It, at times, works under the cover name of “the Ministry of National
Defence Foreign Affairs Office”. It has its work divided on territorial lines
like America & Canada Bureau, Europe & Asia Bureau, etc. It is learnt
that the Press Bureau, known as "Ministry of National Defence Press
Affairs Office", also works in conjunction with 2nd GSD. Several
PLA Universities and Command colleges are directly subordinate to the Foreign
Affairs Bureau.[9] The 6th Bureau focuses on analysis of
Intelligence pertaining to the neighbouring Asian countries. The 7th Bureau
(Technology and Equipment Bureau) plans and carries out cyber espionage operations
through six governmental research institutions and two computer centers. It
also enlists the services of individual civilian hackers and uses companies
that produce electronic equipment for carrying out its activities. In addition, the 2nd GSD oversees
working of the Arms Control Bureau, Space Reconnaissance Bureau, Computer
Institute, PLA College of International Relations.
3rd
General Staff Department:
The
3rd GSD or the Technical Department primarily focuses on signal
intelligence (SIGINT) operations of the PLA. In the American jargon, the
quintessential SIGINT task is to carry out cyber surveillance or Computer
Network Exploitation (CNE). Computer network operations (CNO) in China are often
referred to as ― “Network Attack and Defense”, based on the premise that
–“without understanding how to attack, one will not know how to defend”. The 3rd
Department’s SIGINT targets are diplomatic missions, military activities,
economic entities, public education institutions, and individuals of
interest. There may also be bureaus
operating at the Military Districts for conducting network defense and attack,
technical reconnaissance, and psychological operations. Bureau Directors and
Political Commissars are equivalent in rank to an Army Major-General.[10]
4th
General Staff Department:
The
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) and Radar Department, also known as the 4th
GSD Department, is responsible for developing equipments, doctrines, and
tactics for electronic warfare and information. Established in 1990, it
maintains a data base of electronic and radar signatures of foreign armies. The
department is headed by a Director and two Deputy Directors and has at least, four
bureaus, one brigade, and two regiments. It is widely believed that an ECM
Brigade is headquartered at Langfang in Hebei Province with subordinate
battalion-level entities located in Anhui, Jiangxi and Shandong. Two units,
including one with operational or experimental satellite jamming
responsibilities, are located at Hainan Islands with the purpose of jamming US
satellites. All PLA, PLAAF and PLAN Military Regions have one ECM Regiment. The
3rd and 4th General Staff Departments also operate a
joint centre dedicated for network attack/ defense training system.
General
Political Department (GPD):
The
GPD functions directly under the Central Military Commission (CMC). It oversees
the discipline, political education and indoctrination of PLA personnel. It has
an organisation called the China Association for International Friendly
Contacts which infiltrates foreign armies in order to subvert loyalty of their
personnel and propagate Chinese ideology among them to further their aim. The
Political or the Liaison Department also conducts counter-espionage activities
in foreign countries to keep a watch on its own intelligence operatives. The
GPD maintains Liaison Departments at the Military Region (MR) level. The
Department also oversees the Military Museum of the Chinese
People's Revolution, Liberation Army Daily, the PLA Literature and Art Press (Kunlun Press),
PLA Pictorial, and PLA Press.
Human Intelligence:
The modus operandi of
the Chinese intelligence is uniquely Chinese in its application characterised
by Chinese cultural traits. As only few cases of Chinese intelligence
operations are available for detailed study and analysis, it is generally
presumed that Chinese intelligence trade craft is primitive and low in its
reach. The famous case of Larry Wu-Tai Chin is indicative that even before
People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into existence, the CCP’s intelligence
setup had started recruiting deep penetration sources in target areas. Chin
passed on classified information to China while working for the US intelligence
community for over 35 years. He supplied a stream of high grade intelligence
till his retirement in 1981. He was detected only in 1985 when his cover was
blown by a defector leading to his suicide before being brought to trial. The
trade craft used for intelligence collection, contacts between the source and
handling officers, communications, briefing and debriefing etc. show a high
degree of sophistication. The fact that Chin was able to operate undetected for
35 years also indicates high level of secrecy standards in protecting source
identity.
The technique and
methodology adopted by the Chinese operatives in respect of raising and
handling human assets (intelligence sources) is slightly different from those
employed by other modern intelligence agencies. Even after the initial ‘ice
breaking exercises’, the handler remains vague and circumspect in specifying
his needs and considerations in return. Emphasis is more on personal and
friendly relations. Quite often, even when
a human asset starts passing on information, he is not consciously aware of
working as an intelligence agent. The trade craft used is elementary and the
relationship between the handler and the source is nebulous and ill-defined. It
is only after considerable period of time that the handler discloses his real
intentions, requirements and identity; asking the agent to follow more rigorous
trade craft for collection of classified information, fixing of RVs,
communications etc. Despite the fact that during its formative years the
Chinese intelligence operatives were trained by the KGB, who make a fetish of
traditional trade craft, their cultural trait of being circumspect and
employing symbols to communicate is
discernible in their intelligence practices. Nigel Inkstar, in his ‘Chinese
Intelligence in the Cyber Age’ however, feels that “when the need arises, or
when they are sure of their ground, Chinese intelligence officers can be very
direct and explicit and capable of deploying sophisticated tradecraft”.
Chinese are also
known to effectively provide cover identities to its human assets using forged
documents. The case of Liu Kang-Sheng, a
MSS operative, who was caught using forged Thai and Singaporean passports is
illustrative. Though passports of these countries have high security features,
it was found that the forged documents were almost perfect in incorporating
these features. It is obvious that Chinese intelligence has well developed
facilities for forging documents.
Among the Chinese
intelligence officers, there is a marked preference for people of Chinese
ethnicity and those seen as friends of China for cultivation as human assets.
However, this phenomenon is gradually undergoing a change. Valentin Danilov, a
Russian physicist who headed the Thermo-Physics Centre at Krasnoyarsk
State Technical University (KTSU) and had researched on effects of solar
activity on space satellites is a case in point. In 2004, he was sentenced to
14 years imprisonment for passing on classified information to the Chinese.
Similarly, Swedes uncovered diplomats in the Chinese embassy in Stockholm who
recruited a Uyghur émigré to monitor the activities of Uyghurs in Europe. The
case of US nationals Noshir Gowadia and Glenn Duffy Shriver are also
illustrative of Chinese intelligence recruiting foreign nationals for
espionage. Shriver was arrested for spying in June 2010 while flying to China.
He pleaded guilty of unlawful communication of national defence information
after a polygraph test and was imprisoned for four years. He had met his
Chinese handlers about 20 times and received $70,000 for the services rendered.
Gertz Bill reported in Washington Times
on March 25, 2013 that “Shriver is not the first spy for the Chinese to target
the CIA. U.S. intelligence sources have said at least three CIA officers who reported to Director George J. Tenet in 1999 as having spied for China, but were never caught. One of the agents was
paid $60,000 by Beijing”.
Chinese
intelligence pursues its defined operational missions, once defined and
approved, most doggedly unmindful of its
cost-benefit ratio. Chinese efforts to go for outright purchase of a Stealth
aircraft parts manufacturing company for obtaining the in-flight refuelling
capability for its Air Force is a case in point. The attempt was foiled at the
last moment. It resorts to all means, including most unethical practices to
achieve its operational missions. The case of Da Chuang Zheng, a Chinese
intelligence agent, who was caught while attempting to steal advanced radar and
electronic surveillance technology to China is one among many such cases of
heist.
The Chinese have
mastered the technique of amalgamating disparate micro intelligence accessed
from incongruous sources with no comparable gradations in respect of their
authenticity and reliability. This technique of ‘Thousand Grains’ entails
collecting small bits of information and then piecing them together to make intelligence sense.
This has particularly been used for acquiring mid level technologies using
inputs both from human and technical sources. Widely spread Chinese diasporas
working in research and academic establishments, high technology using
manufacturing concerns, business houses etc. are often utilised for the
purpose. Potential targets are, at times, recruited during their visits to
China. Another variation is collecting micro intelligence bits during participation
in scientific cooperation programmes, seminars and conferences in foreign
countries and visits of scientists under scholar overseas exchange programmes.
FBI investigations in 1988 had revealed that the technology for neutron bomb
detonated by China was not indigenously developed but acquired from Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories in California. Various Chinese delegations
comprising ostensibly of scientists, but actually MSS intelligence operatives,
visited the facility and were able to collect the required information in bits
and pieces over a prolonged period of time.
Chinese
intelligence closely monitors activities of political dissidents and groups
both within and outside China, suspected foreign agents, visitors and scholars
visiting China and members of diplomatic missions. Human assets are often
placed in vantage positions to cover their activities. In June 1989, Shou
Huaqiang, a delegate to the Chinese Alliance for Democracy Convention in
California, an anti-China dissident group, publically declared that he was an
MSS agent sent to spy on the activities of the Alliance. He alleged that he was
forced for the job by MSS officers who made him sign an agreement with
instructions to disrupt its work.
Cyber Intelligence:
When the rest of the world was busy celebrating the great strides in
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in the late eighties, the
Chinese Strategic Community was busy evaluating its security implications. They
realised that they could not allow the revolution in ICT bypass it, lest their
modernisation programme come to a naught. At the same time, if allowed free
access, it could not escape its concomitant adverse fallouts. The American
military successes during the Gulf War during 1990s shook them and made them
realise formidable capabilities of war machine supported by the informatics.
Internally, in the wake of people’s uprising culminating in Tiananmen Square
massacre in 1989, there were apprehensions about internal security if people
were allowed unchecked access to the outside world through internet. By 1996,
the number of internet users in China had touched the figure of 2 million,
which was fraught with danger. The ‘bourgeoisie’ influence through the internet
posed a threat to the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing Patriotic Education
Campaign launched in early nineties. These developments led China to embark on
an ambitious programme of acquiring cyber dominance, both in offensive and
defensive modes. It became evident by 2008 that Chinese intelligence had made
remarkable strides in this direction on both fronts.
While
there is no direct evidence to prove culpability of Chinese intelligence
undertaking covert cyber intelligence operations abroad, there is ample
circumstantial evidence to infer that. Besides reliable intelligence inputs,
tracing large number of cyber attacks to servers in China, technological
sophistication of cyber attacks, resources required to carry out the operations
at global scale, selection of targets, type of information accessed and long
history of Chinese intelligence for science and technology thefts strongly
point towards state involvement.[11]
Many instances of cyber attacks on countries like the US, Canada, Japan and
India have been tracked to China. There are strong pointers to infer that China
is indulging in large scale cyber espionage using an army of hackers, drawn
from military, intelligence, cyber professionals etc. As an intelligence
activity, it has enabled China to penetrate classified domains of target countries
to extract technological and systems information and collect military and
security related information about programmes and activities of the countries
on its intelligence radar. On the internal security front, it is being used to
contain and counter liberal and democratic ideas of political dissidents.
However, there is little information to assess China’s ability to validate and
analyse the colossal data collected by it both internally and externally.
The Gulf
War, in addition to highlighting the potential of information and communication
technology (ICT), also made the Chinese aware of the heavy dependence of
Western military systems on these state of the art technologies and attendant
vulnerabilities. They saw in it an opportunity of developing asymmetric
capabilities which could defeat advanced technical capabilities through
counter-electronic systems.
Col Ling
Qiu and Col Wang Xiangusi in 1998 in their book ‘Unrestricted Warfare’
conceptualised how huge US combat superiority emanating from its IT edge could
be transformed into their vulnerability. It was a doctrinal shift for preparing
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to fight under informationised conditions.
According to Nigel Inkster, “the PLA is pursuing a highly ambitious
cyber-warfare agenda that aims to link all service branches via a common ICT
platform capable of being accessed at multiple levels of command and has
created three new departments of Informatisation, Strategic Planning and
Training to bring this agenda into being.”[12]
Though
late to enter the internet domain, China took giant strides, both in
development of hardware and software on one hand and training people on the
other, that made up for the lost time. The first indications of Chinese
capabilities started trickling in the early years of the last decade when
hackers broke into US official networks to steal sensitive information which US
investigators code-named as ‘Titan Rain’. Nathan Thornburgh writing in the Time Magazine
said that the targets included US military establishments, NASA, the World
Bank, etc Similar attempts were
reported from United Kingdom, Germany and New Zealand during 2006-07 detailing
cyber attacks that had emanated from China. Mandiant, an American firm dealing
with information security, reported that PLA Unit 61398, one amongst many such
units, was responsible for the cyber attacks on more than 140 companies the
world over since 2006. In 2009, University of Toronto’s Information Warfare
Monitor Citizen came out with its so-called ‘Ghost Net” report detailing
intrusion by Chinese hackers into the network system of Indian security
establishment and offices of Dalai Lama’s secretariat.[13]
Though rejected by the Chinese, it was a well researched and accessed
professional report which concluded that the cyber operations were being
conducted by the “2nd Bureau of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) General
Staff Department’s (GSD) 3rd Department”.[14]
The
Chinese have been systematically recruiting and training a pool of cyber
professionals to undertake these tasks. In 2005, hacker competitions were held at the regional and provincial levels in China
for hiring computer network operators. In 2007-08, the Ministry of Public
Security (MPS), internal intelligence cum security outfit advertised job
vacancies for hackers under the cover name of computer operators. According to
a report in Asia Times of Feb 9, 2010, Chinese embassies were contacting
Chinese IT graduates in different foreign universities purportedly for jobs in
public security departments but essentially for computer network operations.[15]
China’s
cyber capabilities are not only confined to military combat needs, espionage
and internal security. Economic and Technical intelligence, that have figured
high in its national priorities, are also being served through cyber warfare.
In target countries, computer networks containing classified data pertaining to
trade secrets or denied technologies are being accessed. According to a report
of the Office of National Counter Intelligence Executive submitted to US
Congress in 2011, US networks were facing Chinese onslaught for trade
information, communication technology, data pertaining to scarce natural
resources and civilian technologies in energy and health sectors.[16]
Accessing critical defence technologies is more alarming. A recent report
published in the Washington Post points out that Chinese hackers have broken
into several defence production firms involved in the manufacturing of critical
military hardware including the Patriot missile system, the Terminal High
Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, as also vital combat aircraft and ships like
the F/A-18 fighter jet, the V-22 Osprey, the Black Hawk helicopter and the
Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship. The report submitted to the Pentagon by the
Defense Science Board underlines the enormity of the Chinese cyber-espionage
activities and investment of effort to overcome the US military advantage.[17] One illustrative case is of US company AMSC,
specializing in wind turbine manufacturing, having lost its centre software
code to the Chinese hackers. This theft led to the company losing 80 % of its
revenues. Similar was the experience of Nortel, Canadian Telecommunication
giant that went into bankruptcy. Brian, its former security adviser in an
interview to CBC on October 11, 2012 said that, “Huawei spent years hacking
into Nortel’s system and stealing information so it could compete with Nortel
on world markets and added that, “These kind of things are not done just by
average hackers. I believe these are nation state activities”.[18] A disclosure was made by Daily Mail in March 2012 that Chinese
hackers were able to find “full access” to NASA computers containing
information about 13 spacecrafts. It is believed by experts that it helped the
Chinese in their quest for outer space utilization programme. Similar evidence
of Chinese efforts to beef up its cyber warfare capabilities came to light in
2011 when McAfee, an American cyber security company brought out its White
Paper, code named ‘Operation Shady Rat’. McAfee reported about the attacks,
some of them raging for as long as five years targeting 70 government and
private agencies in different parts of the world. Forty nine of these were US
based networks while others were located in Taiwan, India, UK, South Korea,
etc. Through these digital storms, the Chinese have also been undertaking
‘Spear-Phishing’ operations that involves sending innocuous e mails to targeted
individuals, websites etc and to extract stored data from the computers.
Through a detailed and carefully researched trade craft, high potential targets
are selected, artificial identities created, and malware messages routed
through multiple destinations that are often difficult to trace. A report
brought out by the Northrop Grumman in 2009 geographically detailed the modus
operandi used first to breach and then to ‘exploit’ [19]
Information
about what is the cyber intelligence infrastructure, who controls it, how the
key intelligence needs are identified, what is the co-ordination mechanism, how
the data is validated and integrated to convert information into usable
intelligence are still grey, if not black, areas. Going by the scale of
activity and swathe of their operational targets, it presents a highly
confusing picture. It is believed that 3/PLA has the highest technological
capabilities at least to gain covert entry into targeted domains and access the
data. However, except for information of military value, its capability to
process other inputs are seriously doubted. The co-ordination mechanism
available with the MSS also appears to be inadequate and while the relationship
between MSS and MPS, uncomfortable though, is known to some extent, the working
mechanism of 3/PLA with other intelligence outfits is a matter of speculation.
Intelligence in Internal Security:
To make a
holistic assessment of what the Chinese call Comprehensive National Power
(CNP), it is essential to evaluate its internal stability and political
dynamics and the role intelligence services play in this arena. It assumes
special import as with the opening of China and its modernisation programme,
the Chinese are finding it increasingly difficult to keep a lid over internal
dissidence. Murray Scot Tanner in his ‘Cracks in the Wall: China’s Eroding Coercive
State’ as back as 2001, observed that, “Beijing’s control over the coercive
system, as well as that system’s capacity to maintain social control appears to
be slipping”. Since then, the internal security landscape has further
deteriorated. There have been well over one hundred thousand incidents of mass
protests and agitations in 2012. Large scale visits of Chinese, particularly
the students abroad, access to internet and mobile phones, activities of
pro-democracy groups and economic affluence have raised the threshold of
political awareness. The situation in Tibet has become precarious, particularly
after the Olympic Games in 2008. Besides, a large number of protests and
agitations, there have been over a hundred cases of self immolation by Tibetans
since the Olympics. The rise of Islamic radicalism and violence in Xinjiang is
another cause of serious concern. The Tiananmen Square massacre still looms
large on the psyche of the people and have accentuated Chinese fears of
internal destabilisation which they attribute to conspiratorial
counter-revolutionary forces propped up by external enemies. The anxiety was
discernible when in the year 2011, the then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, in a
public address, stated that “We have
not yet fundamentally solved a number of issues that the masses feel strongly
about”. The Jasmine Revolution in
2011 further shook the Chinese administration and they hiked their budget for
internal security, reportedly, to $95 billion in 2011 and $111 billion in 2012.
It is significant that notwithstanding China’s massive military modernisation
programme, the internal security budget ranks above the defence budget.
China’s
internal intelligence apparatus is much more complex and multilayered; with
both the party and state having overlapping roles. Department one of MSS, the
premier national intelligence agency, handles ‘homeland security’ while its
department six and nine deal with ‘counter espionage’ and ‘counter defection
and counter surveillance’ respectively.
The Indian Experience:
The Indian
experience of Chinese intelligence dates back to early fifties when its
intelligence apparatus started operating in Tibet. It assisted both the CCP and
the PLA in degrading Dalai Lama’s regime and consolidating its position in
Tibet, politically and militarily. Dalai Lama was eventually coerced to sign
the 1951 agreement. Extensive reconnaissance of the areas bordering India was
done and construction of national highway 219 was undertaken through Aksai Chin
connecting Lhasa in Tibet to Xinjiang. The Indian intelligence, though
reporting about Chinese activities in Tibet for quite many years to a
government that was not listening, had physical confrontation with the Chinese,
when on November 21, 1959, Karam Singh, a Deputy Central Intelligence Officer (DCIO) of the Intelligence Bureau was
killed at Kongka La (Hot Springs) in Ladakh.[20] The
years that followed saw intensified Chinese intelligence activities mainly
undertaken by the PLA and party apparatus in Tibet.
Following
the exodus of over 80,000 Tibetans, led by the Dalai Lama, in 1959 to India and
a deep sense of fear that, his influence over the Tibetans created in Chinese
minds, coverage of Dalai Lama and Tibetan refugees in India became a high
priority item for Chinese intelligence. Ethnic Tibetans are regularly recruited
and infiltrated into India, mostly through Nepal, to cover the activities of
the Dalai Lama. Arrest of Pema Tsering, a former PLA combatant, on May 23, 2013
from Dharamshala in Himachal Pradesh for spying is one of the recently reported
cases. He infiltrated into India a few years back, acquired an Indian voter ID
card in 2011 and was masquerading as a Tibetan refugee.[21]
Intelligence
coverage through diplomatic staff has remained in vogue all through and got
intensified particularly after 1959. Even during Den Xiaoping’s regime when
this practice was discouraged, use of legal cover for intelligence operations
in India remained unabated. In some instances, Chinese nationals from mainland
China with illegal cover are sent to India for coverage of political
intelligence, establishing contact with the insurgent and extremist groups and
collecting defence related intelligence. One of the illustrative case is of
Wang Qing, a young Chinese lady who operated in India using different covers
before she was arrested in Dimapur (Nagaland) on January 18, 2011. She flew to
Kolkata from Kunming on a tourist visa as an executive of a Chinese timber
company, and visited Nagaland where she held a four hour long secret meeting
with Naga insurgent leader T Muivah. She was deported and a protest note was
sent by the Indian government to the Chinese embassy.
Chinese
intelligence has also been active in supporting North-eastern insurgent groups
and providing them with weapons, training and financial support. Coinciding
with the Cultural Revolution at home, the first group of Naga insurgents,
comprising 300 strong Naga rebels, led by Muivah and Isak Swu were imparted
military and ideological training in Yunan in 1966 and sent to India with a
consignment of arms. This trend continues till today with Chinese assisting the
Assamese, Manipuri and other rebels besides Left-Wing extremists.[22] One
of the recent cases of Chinese support to Indian insurgents was revealed during
questioning of Anthony Shimray, who after his return from China in 2010 was
arrested in Nepal. He was assured supply of 1,800 pieces of arms that included
AK series rifles, M 16 rifles, machine guns, sniper rifles, and rocket
launchers. The shipment was to be loaded from a port in Beihei in China and
sent to Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh via a shipping agent based in Bangkok.[23]
One
of the marked features of China’s intelligence activity in India is its close
relationship with Pakistan’s ISI. Besides, their close
strategic relationship, the advantages enjoyed by Pakistanis in respect of
language, appearance, well entrenched local networks account for the special
relationship. This cooperation started way back in mid sixties with Dhaka as
the operational hub where Chinese and Pakistani intelligence officers first
established contacts with the North Eastern insurgents together. With the
deepening of this relationship, it got extended to other areas of common
interest. Daily Mail (UK) in its report dated September 30, 2012 observed that,
“Chinese agencies are financing and providing assistance to Pakistan’s ISI to
keep insurgent groups active in the North East.[24]
However, with Chinese intelligence coming of age, there are indications that it
is now launching independent operations.
Conclusion:
In last
six decades, starting from a primitive party apparatus, Chinese intelligence
has attained new heights and capabilities. Its intelligence apparatus is highly
complex and intricately intertwined between party and the government, internal
and external, civilian and military et al with parallel roots of command,
control and reporting etc. All this has led to large degrees of duplication and
redundancy. Though over the years, governmental machinery has taken control of
large segments of intelligence activity, the party apparatus continues to reign
supreme. Deeply concerned about internal security, all its intelligence
agencies have a marked internal intelligence or counter-intelligence role. The
PLA, over the years, has upgraded its intelligence capabilities at tactical,
technological and strategic levels, particularly in Asia Pacific Region, South
Asia and Central Asia. It has
built an extensive technical and signal intelligence infrastructure, and its
electronic intelligence capabilities have been considerably augmented by
cyberspace and space based platforms. The MSS has evolved itself as the premier
foreign intelligence agency and besides diplomatic intelligence, it has been
aggressively hunting for technological data and systems information to augment
national economic and military capabilities. It continues to bank heavily on
Chinese global diaspora that provides it a vast catchment area for human assets
for intelligence gathering and espionage. To widen its catchment area, it is
expanding its illegal cover for intelligence gathering by using commercial
companies and business houses, media agencies, Chinese banks etc. Establishment
of nearly 380 Confucius Institutes in 180 countries, Chinese language
institutes etc. also are part of its foreign intelligence activities. China
envisions for itself a big power role and, silently but steadily, is building
up its intelligence capabilities commensurate to that vision.
[1] Ministry of State Security, Intelligence Resource Program,
Federation of American Scientists, accessed online at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/china/mss/history.htm
[2] Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: Terrorists’ Antics, The Washington
Times, May 16, 2012, accesed at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/16/inside-the-ring-terrorists-antics/?page=all
[3] Ibid (3) above
[4] sinodefence.com, accessed at http://www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gsd.asp
[5] sinodefence.com, accessed at http://www.sinodefence.com/overview/organisation/gsd.asp
[7] Nicholas Eftimiade, Chinese Intelligence Operations, 1994.
[9] Ibid (8) above
[10] Mark A. Stokes, Jenny Lin and L.C. Russell Hsiao, The Chinese
People’s
Liberation Army Signals Intelligence
and Cyber Reconnaissance Infrastructure, Project 2049 Institute, November 11,
2011
[11] Many instances of
cyber attacks on countries like the US, Canada, Japan and India have been
tracked to China. On the internal security front it is being used to contain
and counter liberal and democratic ideas of political dissidents.
[12] Nigel Inkster (2010):
China in Cyberspace, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52:4, 55-56, IISS
[13] Tracking Ghost net:
Investigating a cyber espionage network, Information Warfare Monitor,
March 29, 2009. accessed at http://www.infowar.monitor.net/ghostnet
[14] Mandiant report,
accessed at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/
[15] Willy Lamb, “Beijing
beefs up Cyber Warfare capacity”, Asia Times, Feb 9, 2010
[16] Foreign spies stealing US economic secrets in cyberspace – Report
submitted to Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive, accessed at
http:// www.ncix.gov/publication/reports/fecie_all/
[17] Ellen Nakashima,
‘Confidential report lists US weapons system designs compromised by Chinese cyberspies.
The Washington Post, May 28, 2013, accessed at
[18] CBC News, Oct 11,
2012, ‘Former Nortel executive warms against working with Huawei’, accessed at
[19] Ibid (13) above.
[20] Ram Pradhan, Debacle to revival: Y.B. Chavan as Defence Minister,
1962-65.
[21] The Indian Express,
May 24, 2013, accessed at http://www.indianexpress.com/news/suspected-chinese-spy-arrested-from-dharamsala/1119797/
[22] N Manoharan, China’s Involvement in
India’s Internal Security Threats: An Analytical Appraisal, Vivekanda
International Foundation, 2012, accessed at
[23] Is China backing Indian Insurgents, The Diplomat, January 22, 2011,
accessed at http://thediplomat.com/2011/03/22/is-china-backing-indian-insurgents/