Chinese Naval Prowess

Chinese Naval Growth

Often discussed in the same breath as the country’s economic rise, China’s military modernization is nothing new. However, the specific issue of the country’s naval development has gained critical currency only in the last few years. Last year alone saw a flurry of media reports and discussion pieces on the subject. A recent editorialin The New York Times highlighted what it saw as China’s intention to challenge US naval supremacy in the Western Pacific, its aggressive pursuit of the disputed offshore islands in the East and South China Seas and how “Washington must respond, carefully but firmly.”

Should we be really concerned? The short answer is yes – and not because China seeks to become a belligerent power. There is currently no evidence to suggest that China seeks to exercise the kind of global hegemonic ambitions often depicted by hawks and the far-right in American, Indian and Japanese political circles. Yet, China’s naval power merits concern because the maritime realm is the most probable dimension in which a Chinese-related military conflict will be triggered and fought. There are several reasons for this.

Securing economic, geopolitical aims

One reason has to do with China’s rapid economic growth. History tells us that a country’s naval power tends to be directly linked with its economic strength, and China, in recent times, is no exception. To be sure, China has been slow to shift away from its deeply entrenched continental mindset. After all, 14 land powers share territorial frontiers with China, while only six maritime countries surround the Chinese coast. However, now that China has settled 12 out of 14 land border disputes with its neighbors, the sea is the final frontier that Beijing feels compelled to secure.

There is some urgency in this quest. The bulk of global trade is only possible by sea-borne freight. Beijing feels it must protect the sea lanes that make both the movement of goods (about 90 percent of its import and exports) and the importation of resources and energy possible, without which China’s economy would come to a standstill. The Chinese leadership also feels that it must protect what they perceive to be its maritime territorial sovereignty. As a matter of “coastal defense”, the Chinese Navy is compelled to secure its 18,000-kilometer shoreline.

Now, the Chinese Navy is attempting to secure the country’s claim to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles from the country’s continental shelf. The legitimacy of the zone is disputed by Japan, and non-combatant US naval vessels have made excursions into these waters in the past. Chinese officials would also like to claim about three million out of nearly five million square kilometers of “coastal real estate” in the East and South China Seas and the Yellow Sea that contain a wealth of oceanic natural resources. Beijing is simply striving to establish better naval control of these areas than its regional neighbors, propelling the Chinese Navy toward the concept of “offshore defense” – a venture that increases the chances of a naval skirmish.

Not only economic interests but also geopolitical ones are fueling China’s naval prowess, particularly in the Taiwan Straits – the most likely naval flashpoint. Beijing’s option to unify Taiwan with the mainland by military force if necessary is no longer fuelled by ideology but geopolitics. As a 2008 US government report correctly put it, Taiwan is regarded as the focal point from which China can ‘break out’ from its centuries-long containment along the Pacific littoral” and secure its immediate security environment within the Asia-Pacific region. This ‘line of containment’ is also known as the oft-mentioned “first-island chain” running south from the Japanese archipelago to the Philippines, which naturally denies the mainland from having unfettered access to the oceanic thoroughfare. The possession of Taiwan would permanently break China’s geographical curse. As a result, the Taiwan Straits – as well as the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea – have become pressing geopolitical priorities that drive China’s expansive military planning and procurement.

Naval prowess – only one head of the hydra

Moreover, it must be said that China’s growing ‘naval power’ is not only about an expanding fleet of ships and submarines. All militaries advancing towards greater sophistication seek to integrate their sea, air, land and space capabilities in order to increase overall lethality, efficiency and effectiveness. The Chinese Navy is but one head of the country’s military hydra. In a larger sense, the Chinese Navy should be regarded as a placeholder for the sea, air, land, and space-related capabilities that China will bring to bear against an adversary in the maritime realm of conflict.

US strategic planners have been increasingly concerned with China’s recent development and impending deployment of certain air, land, and space-related capabilities, which affect Taiwan’s ability to impede a Chinese naval advance toward its shores and also the US Navy’s capacity to project its military power in the Straits. Some of these developments include an aircraft carrier, anti-ship ballistic missiles, stealth fighter-aircraft and anti-satellite missiles.

In January, the Chinese media published a video of China’s first aircraft carrierPapua New Guinea.

China’s fledgling anti-ship missile capability threatens US aircraft carriers. In early January, the US Navy’s intelligence director acknowledged that China’s anti-ship ballistic missile, the DF-21D, had finally reached its initial operating capability, leaving US carriers open to attack. Previously, US observers were sceptical that Chinese engineers could master the complicated science of hitting a manoeuvrable target such as a moving aircraft carrier. With the impending deployment of the DF-21D, its immediate role would be to deter the US Seventh Fleet from approaching the Taiwan Strait. The key target would be the USS George Washington, the aircraft carrier assigned to this fleet which carries the US Navy’s best strike aircraft capable of attacking Chinese sea, air and land targets and destroying vital Chinese radar systems. These carried-launched aircraft have a range of less than 1,000 kilometers. Therefore, the DF-21D, which shares a similar range, is intended to keep the aircraft belonging to the George Washington out of lethal range.

The US and Taiwanese airborn-early-warning aircraft that support their respective navies are also not immune from attack. It was reported in early January that the Chinese military successfully test flew their own indigenously-built fifth-generation stealth fighter aircraft known as the J-20 “Black Eagle”, designed to creep up and destroy those aircraft that would otherwise provide real-time intelligence and surveillance of a Chinese naval attack. Until recently, US officials have played down China’s ability to make advances on its J-20 program launched in the 1990s. In fact, the American defence community previously estimated that the J-20 would be operational only around 2020 when it is more likely to be ready in about three years from now.

Lastly, the Chinese military is very close to fielding an anti-satellite missile capability that stands to cripple the network of satellites that the US military depends upon to marshal and coordinate its air, land and naval forces effectively. Chinese military planners realize that the US military satellite and communications network is both its greatest strength and greatest weakness. While it makes the US military more effective and efficient, it is also reduced to fighting ‘blind, deaf and dumb’ without it. In January 2007, Beijing successfully destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a direct ascent anti-satellite missile, based on the same missile airframe used for the DF-21D, hence proving that it could obliterate US satellites in low earth orbit.

These developments bolster the Chinese military’s confidence in achieving what it views to be its national security imperatives. Whether or not China does possess hegemonic aspirations, it is becoming clear that Beijing is removing the shackles that previously placed limits on its strategic reach. In particular, as a recent US Office of Naval Intelligence report has noted, the Chinese Navy has begun removing the geographical limits to its ‘offshore defense’ thinking. It appears to have been given the mandate to venture “as far as [its] capabilities will allow it to operate task forces out at sea with the requisite amount of support and security.” The deployment of a Chinese naval convoy to the Gulf of Aden to protect the country’s shipping from Somali pirates in early January is instructive. The question that should now be asked is how much maritime security is really enough for Beijing. The answer determines how far Beijing will ask its navy to go.

 Researched by:

Graham Ong-Webb, Sidharth K Menon

Part 2. Chinese String of Pearls Stratergy

China’s “string of pearls” strategy appears to be taking another step forward as Beijing increases ties with the Sri Lankan government. The strategy, which was the subject of a 2005 U.S. China Commission report to Congress, is driven by China’s need to secure foreign oil and trade routes critical to its development. This has meant establishing an increased level of influence along sea routes through investment, port development and diplomacy.

To date, China’s investments extend from Hainan Island in the South China Sea, through the littorals of the Straits of Malacca, including port developments in Chittagong in Bangladesh; Sittwe, Coco, Hianggyi, Khaukphyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun in Myanmar; Laem Chabang in Thailand; and Sihanoukville in Cambodia. They extend across the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, and in islands within the Arabian Sea and into the Persian Gulf.

Not surprisingly, both the U.S. and Indian governments are concerned, part of these developments include the upgrading of airstrips, many supported with military facilities, such as the facility on Woody Island, close to Vietnam. These developments mean that the balance of power within the Indian and Arabian Gulf has now shifted away from the traditional Indian government management, backed up with U.S. military strength, but to China, backed up with regional diplomatic ties that dispense with the need to engage with either power.
The strategy has been developed partially in response to a lack of progress on the Kra Canal Project in Thailand, which would directly link the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. The “string of pearls” strategy however provides a forward presence for China along the sea lines of communication that now anchor China directly to the Middle East. The question both the United States and India have is whether this strategy is intended purely to cement supply lines and trade routes, or whether China will later use these in a bid to enforce regional supremacy.

India has not been an innocent party to the development of the “string of pearls.” Somewhat foolishly, it threatened to cut off China’s choke point for oil and trade – the Malacca Straits – in both 1971 and 1999, when it moved to blockade Karachi Port which at the time handled 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea trade, including oil supplies to China. India has also recently attempted to persuade the Sri Lankan government not to permit Chinese development of the country’s Hambantota Port, a project that is now well underway. Chinese investment in Sri Lanka is also likely to significantly increase given the likely conclusion of the civil war, and Chinese interests in drilling for oil off the coast of Northeast Sri Lanka.

As America’s influence in the region wanes, China’s strategy appears to be conservatively supported by other Southeast Asian nations, with the potential exception of India. Pro-U.S. nations such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines find it in their own self interests to improve and develop ties with China, while nations such as Pakistan, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia are all strong allies of Beijing. The growing perception is that a peaceful region does not now necessarily require a U.S. military presence.

Concerns remain however. Chinese fishing trawlers have been uncovered mapping the ocean floor to facilitate submarine operations, and disputes over territorial waters are increasing as the recent standoff between an American survey ship and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea demonstrates. The United States insists it was operating in international waters, the Chinese claim the incident occurred within their exclusive economic zone.

India feels threatened by the perception of a China increasingly encircling the country, with Tibet to the north, a China supported Myanmar regime to the east, an increasingly China-dependent Bangladesh beginning to emerge, and the long standing support China has shown for Pakistan. Given India’s own huge security problems with Pakistan it is unlikely, unless they can influence Sri Lanka, that the Indian government will be able to do much about the development of China’s interest within the region.

As long as Chinese interests remain benign, the “string of pearls” strategy remains the strongest pointer yet that China is both anchoring its energy supply lines with the Middle East and embarking on a level of Southeast Asian trade – and the development of regional prosperity that will come with it – on a scale never seen before. If the strategy continues without the development of regional conflicts, the ASEAN trading bloc, with China at its heart, and the massive emerging markets of India and the other Southeast Asian nations close by, will develop and begin to rival that of the EU and the United States, and lessen China’s dependence on these traditional export markets.

China is strengthening diplomatic ties and building naval bases along the sea lanes from the Middle East. This “String of Pearls” strategy is designed to protect its energy security, negate US influence in the region, and project power overseas.Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence.4 Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.”

An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” Acontainer shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water portin Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan.5 Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of theSouth China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East.

The Nature of the Pearls. China’s development of these strategic geopolitical “pearls” has beennonconfrontational, with no evidence of imperial or neocolonial ambition. The development of the “String of Pearls” may not, in fact, be a strategy explicitly guided by China’s central government. Rather, it may be a convenient label applied by some in the United States to describe an element of China’s foreign policy. Washington’s perception of China’s de facto strategy may not be a view sharedin Beijing, but the fact remains that economic benefits and diplomatic rhetoric have been an enticement for countries to facilitate China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

(see gwadar related article)

The port facility at Gwadar, for example, is a win-win prospect for both China and Pakistan. The port at Karachi currently handles 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea-borne trade, but because of its proximity to India, it is extremely vulnerable to blockade. This happened during the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and was threatened again during the Kargil conflict of 1999.6 Gwadar, a small fishing village which Pakistan identified as a potential port location in 1964 but lacked the means to develop, is 450 miles west of Karachi.7 A modern port at Gwadar would enhance Pakistan’s strategic depth along its coastline with respect to India. For China,the strategic value of Gwadar is its 240-mile distance from the Strait of Hormuz. China is facilitatingdevelopment of Gwadar and paving the way for future access by funding a majority of the $1.2 billionproject and providing the technical expertise of hundreds of engineers.8 Since construction began in2002, China has invested four times more than Pakistan and contributed an additional $200 milliontowards the building of a highway to connect Gwadar with Karachi. In August 2005, Chinese PremierWen Jiabao visited Pakistan to commemorate completion of the first phase of the Gwadar project andthe opening of the first 3 of 12 multiship berths.9The Gwadar project has enhanced the strategic, diplomatic, and economic ties between Pakistanand China. Other countries are benefiting from China’s new strategy, as well.

In November 2003, Chinasigned an agreement with Cambodia to provide military equipment and training in exchange for theright of way to build a rail line from southern China to the Gulf of Thailand.10 China also has anambitious $20 billion proposal to build a canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus which would enableships to bypass the chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca.11 Although this plan is stalled due to Thailand’snoncommittal position and political opposition in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, it reveals thescope and scale of Chinese ambition for the “String of Pearls.”

Sidharth K Menon

Defence and Intelligence Analyst.

Part 1. Chinese String of Pearl Stratergy.

Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean

Four months after the U.S. ordered its troops into Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime, China and Pakistan joined hands to break ground in building a Deep Sea Port on the Arabian Sea. The project was sited in an obscure fishing village of Gwadar in Pakistan's western province of Baluchistan, bordering Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran to the southwest. Gwadar is nautically bounded by the Persian Gulf in the west and the Gulf of Oman in the southwest.

Although the Gwadar Port project has been under study since May 2001, the U.S. entrée into Kabul provided an added impetus for its speedy execution. Having set up its bases in Central, South, and West Asian countries, the U.S. virtually brought its military forces at the doorstep of China. Beijing was already wary of the strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which supplies 60% of its energy needs. It was now alarmed to see the U.S. extend its reach into Asian nations that ring western China. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies. This vulnerability set Beijing scrambling for alternative safe supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port was one such alternative for which China had flown its Vice Premier, Wu Bangguo, to Gwadar to lay its foundation on March 22, 2002.

Pakistan was interested in the project to seek strategic depth further to the southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable to the dominant Indian Navy. In the past, it endured prolonged economic and naval blockades imposed by the Indian Navy. To diversify the site of its naval and commercial assets, Pakistan has already built a naval base at Ormara, the Jinnah Naval Base, which has been in operation since June 2000. It can berth about a dozen ships, submarines and similar harbor craft. The Gwadar port project, however, is billed to crown the Pakistan Navy into a force that can rival regional navies. The government of Pakistan has designated the port area as a "sensitive defense zone." Once completed, the Gwadar port will rank among the world's largest deep-sea ports.

The convergence of Sino-Pakistani strategic interests has put the port project onto a fast track to its early completion. In three years since its inauguration, the first phase of the project is already complete with three functioning berths. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will be on hand to mark the completion of this phase in March this year. Although the total cost of the project is estimated at $1.16 billion USD, China pitched in $198 million and Pakistan $50 million to finance the first phase. China also has invested another $200 million into building a coastal highway that will connect the Gwadar port with Karachi. The second phase, which will cost $526 million, will feature the construction of 9 more berths and terminals and will also be financed by China. To connect western China with Central Asia by land routes, Pakistan is working on building road links to Afghanistan from its border town of Chaman in Baluchistan to Qandahar in Afghanistan. In the northwest, it is building similar road links between Torkham in Pakhtunkhaw (officially known as the Northwest Frontier Province) and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Eventually, the Gwadar port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through overland links that will stretch to and from Karakoram Highway in Pakistan's Northern Areas that border China's Muslim-majority Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. In addition, the port will be complemented with a modern air defense unit, a garrison, and a first-rate international airport capable of handling airbus service.

Pakistan already gives China most favored nation (MFN) status and is now establishing a bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA), which will bring tariffs between the two countries to zero. Over the past two years, the trade volume between the two countries has jumped to $2.5 billion a year, accounting for 20% of China's total trade with South Asia. Informal trade, a euphemism for smuggling, however, is several times the formal trade. The proposed FTA is an implicit acceptance of the unstoppable "informal" trade as a "formal" one. More importantly, Chinese investment in Pakistan has increased to $4 billion, registering a 30% increase just over the past two years since 2003. Chinese companies make up 12% (60) of the foreign firms (500) operating in Pakistan, which employ over 3,000 Chinese nationals.

The growing economic cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is also solidifying their strategic partnership. Before leaving for his visit to Beijing this past December, Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz told reporters in Islamabad: "Pakistan and China are strategic partners and our relations span many areas." The rhetoric of strategic alignment is duly matched by reality. Last year, China and Pakistan conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises near the Shanghai coast. These exercises, among others, included simulation of an emergency rescue operation. Last December, Pakistan opened a consulate in Shanghai. The Gwadar Port project is the summit of such partnership that will bring the two countries closer in maritime defense as well.
Initially, China was reluctant to finance the Gwadar port project because Pakistan offered the U.S. exclusive access to two of its critical airbases in Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Baluchisntan) during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. According to a Times of India report on February 19, 2002, Gen. Musharraf had to do a lot of explaining for leasing these bases to America. China, the Times of India reported, was also upset with Pakistan for allowing the U.S. to establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet. When China finally agreed to offer financial and technical assistance for the project, it asked for "sovereign guarantees" to use the Port facilities to which Pakistan agreed, despite U.S. unease over it.

In particular, the port project set off alarm bells in India which already feels encircled by China from three sides: Myanmar, Tibet, and Pakistan. To counter Sino-Pak collaboration, India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. Iranians are already working on Chabahar port in Sistan-Baluchistan, which will be accessible for Indian imports and exports with road links to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India is helping build a 200-kilometer road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. Once completed, Indians will use this access road to the port for their imports and exports to and from Central Asia. Presently, India is in urgent need of a shorter transit route to quickly get its trade goods to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

These external concerns are stoking internal challenges to the port project. Baluchistan, where the project is located, is once again up in arms against the federal government. The most important reason for armed resistance against the Gwadar port is that Baluch nationalists see it as an attempt to colonize them and their natural resources. Several insurgent groups have sprung up to nip the project in the bud. The three most popular are: the Baluchistan Liberation Army, Baluchistan Liberation Front, and People's Liberation Army. On May 3, 2004, the BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the port project that employs close to 500 Chinese nationals. On October 9, 2004, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in South Waziristan in the northwest of Pakistan, one of whom was killed later on October 14 in a botched rescue operation. Pakistan blamed India and Iran for fanning insurgency in Baluchistan.

Moreover, the Chinese in Pakistan are vulnerable because of their tense relationship with the Uighur Muslim majority of Xinjiang. Stretched over an area of 635,833 square miles, Xinjiang is more than twice the size of Pakistan, and one-sixth of China's landmass. However, it dwarfs in demographic size with a population of 19 million people. Beijing is investing 730 billion yuan (roughly $88 billion USD) in western China, including Xinjiang, which opens it up to the six Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite this massive investment, displacement of Uighers from Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, is drawing fire, where the population of mainland Chinese of Han descent has grown from 10% in 1949 to 41% in 2004. In direct proportion, the population of native Uighurs has declined from 90% in 1949 to 47% in 2004. Tens of thousands of displaced Uighurs have found refuge in Pakistan where the majority of them live in its two most populous cities: Lahore and Karachi.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is fighting against Chinese attempts at so-called "Hanification" of Xinjiang. Pakistan, which along with China and the U.S. lists the ETIM as a terrorist organization, killed the ETIM's head, Hasan Mahsum, in South Waziristan on October 2, 2004. Seven days after, two Chinese were kidnapped from the area, one of whom was killed in a rescue operation. The thousands of Chinese working in Pakistan make tempting targets for violent reprisals by the ETIM or Baluch nationalists.

The realization of economic and strategic objectives of the Gwadar port is largely dependent upon the reduction of separatist violence in Baluchistan and Xinjiang. Chinese response to secessionism is aggressive economic development, which is driving the Gwadar port project also. The port is intended to serve China's threefold economic objective:

First, to integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, labor-absorbing, resource-intensive industrial production to Islamabad, which will transform Pakistan into a giant factory floor for China; Second, to seek access to Central Asian markets for energy imports and Chinese exports by developing road networks and rail links through Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia; Third, to appease restive parts of western China, especially the Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang, through a massive infusion of development funds and increased economic links with the Central Asian Islamic nations of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The port, by design or by default, also provides China a strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, although to the alarm of India and the unease of the U.S. sitting opposite the Strait of Hurmoz, through which 80% of the world's energy exports flow, the Gwadar port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf, and offer it, in the case of any hostile interruption in such shipments, a safer alternative passage for its energy imports from Central Asia. Its presence on the Indian Ocean will further increase its strategic influence with major South Asian nations, particularly Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which would prompt the Indians in turn to re-strengthen their Navy.


Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst

INS Arihant and SLBM Sagarika (K-15), Shourya & Nirbhay

INS Arihant



Class and type: Arihant class submarine

Name: INS Arihant

Builder: Shipbuilding Centre (SBC), Vishakapatnam

Laid down: Unknown

Launched: 26 July, 2009

Commissioned: 2012 (planned)

Status: On trials General characteristics

Type: SSBN

Displacement: 6000 tons (Est.)

Length: 110m

Beam: 11m

Draft: 9m (29.5ft) (Est.) Propulsion: PWR using 40% enriched uranium fuel (80MW); one turbine (47,000hp/70MW); one shaft; one 7-bladed, high-skew propeller. (Est.)

Range: unlimited except by food supplies

Test depth: 300 m (984.2ft). (Est.)

Complement: 100 officers and men

Sensors andprocessing systems: BEL USHUS Armament: 6 x 533mm torpedoes, 12 x K-15 Sagarika SLBM


INS Arihant is India's lead ship of the Arihant class of nuclear-powered Fleet submarines. The 6000-tonne vessel was built under the top-secret ATV (advanced technology vessel) project at the Ship Building Centre in Vishakapatnam at a cost of USD 2.9 billion. It was formally launched on 26 July 2009 by Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh at the naval dockyard of the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) in Visakhapatnam by Gursharan Kaur, wife of the Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, who broke a coconut and later dedicated it to the nation.Arihant (Sanskrit for 'destroyer of enemies') is the first nuclear-powered submarine to be built by India. When launched, it will make India only the sixth country in the world to have the capability to build Nuclear submarines indigenously. The launch of INS Arihant constitutes a big step towards India's endeavor to build a credible Nuclear triad — the capability to fire nukes from air, land and sea. There has been lot of confusion as to whether Arihant Class of submarines are SSN or SSGN or SSBN. Arihant Class is designed to carry Sagarika, which is an SLBM, a submarine launched ballisitic missile and not a cruise missile. Hence, that designates Arihant Class as SSBN without any doubt.The project to indigenously develop a nuclear-powered submarine was first conceived during Indira Gandhi's reign as Prime Minister in 1970,but really got going only in the mid-1980s. However, until early 2009 India officially denied the existence of such a project.


Sagarika / K-15 / Shourya / Nirbhay

While published reports are generally consistent about the characteristics and chronology of this system, there is general disagreement on one fundamental point, whether the missile is a ballistic missile or a cruise missile. The reported physical dimensions of the missile seem to support the reporting that it is a cruise missile. Sagarika appears to be the designation of the sea-based version of the missile which is designated Shourya when deployed on a land-based Transporter Erector Launcher. The K-15 launch sile is well attested, and appears to be intended for the Advanced Tehnology Vessel nuclear submarine. It is, however, far too large for the Sagarika missile.

It is reasonable to believe that this launcher would initially be employed with 3 Sagarika cruise missiles in each tube, which could subsequently be back-fitted with a single Agni-III ballistic missile.
Sagarika (Oceanic)

Started in the early 1990s, DRDO was reported to have developed a 300-km submarine-launched ballistic missile, Sagarika, based on the Prithvi. The program is reported to have started in 1992 and was originally reported to involve adapting a ramjet engine to the missile to reduce the need for heavy oxidizers. In 1994 the periodical Flight International reported that India's Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) had for the past two years been engaged in designing a ramjet-powered, submarine-launched missile dubbed the Sagarika. Other reports state that Sagarika was initially designed as a solid-fuelled version of the Prithvi. But the idea was shelved after the navy indicated its preference for a cruise missile. India did not have a submarine configured for launching ballistic missiles.

In October 2005 it was reported that India was developing the Sagarika, said to be a submarine-launched cruise missile with a range of about 300 km.

Something about the Sagarika inspires a cloak of secrecy. In 2005 defence minister Pranab Mukherjee confirmed the program: “This is a DRDO project but we would not like to make a premature advertisement.” Later, in Parliament, he denied the project even existed. As late as 2006 one observer suggested that the Sagarika was merely a figment of the Non-Proliferation community’s imagination

In April 2007 it was reported that the indigenously-built Sagarika cruise missile, with a range of nearly 1,000 km and a 500-kg warhead, had two variants capable of being launched from aircraft and submarines. Sagarika was said to be the primary armament for the long-delayed Advanced Technology Vessel indigenous nuclear submarine, and the IAF was said to be considering equipping the forthcoming Medium Transport Aircraft with the stand-off missile. And in June 2007 it was reported that DRDO was currently working on the Sagarika submarine launched cruise missile. The nuclear capable Sagarika was said to have the capability to carry a 500 kg warhead over a distance of 1,000 km. It is also planned to develop an air launched version of Sagarika.

In April 2007 India conducated a test of the Sagarika from a submersible pontoon launcher.
In July 2007 it was reported that India's Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) had started work on three new types of missiles: a superior version of the Agni III, a hypersonic BrahMos and a naval missile known as Sagarika. The Sagarika would be a submarine launched, nuclear-armed, missile with a range of 1000 kilometers.
On 27 February 2008 India proved that it had the capability to launch missiles from underwater by successfully test-firing the Sagarika missile from a pontoon off the coast of Visakhapatnam. The pontoon simulated the conditions of a submarine. Shortly after noon, the missile's booster ignited and Sagarika rose from the pontoon. It impacted the sea over 700 km away. A Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) missile technologist said "It has been consistently successful. This is not the first time that we have launched the missile. We have done it earlier a few times although it went by different names."

This test, the sixth test of the 700-km range Sagarika missile, completed its goal of having air, land and sea ballistic systems, the defence ministry said. The launch from a submerged pontoon took place off India’s southeast coast near the port city of Visakhapatnam around 1:00 pm (0730 GMT), a defence ministry spokesman said. With the latest test, India joins an elite group — the United States, Russia, France and China — that has such ability. The test came two months after India’s chief military scientist M. Natarajan said New Delhi would test a ballistic missile with a range of 6,000 kilometers in 2008.

The tactical, submarine-to-surface missile was said to be a light, miniaturised system, which was about 6.5 meters long and weighed seven tons. Powered by solid propellants, it was reported to be able to carry a payload of about 500 kg and can be launched from different platforms - from the ground, from underwater and mobile launchers. Other reports said the missile was powered by a turbojet, could carry a 500-kg payload, and was 8.5 metres long and about a metre in diameter. Ultimately, it will be launched from the indigenous nuclear powered submarine under construction at Kalpalrkam in Tamil Nadu and Visakhapatnam. The missile can carry both nuclear and conventional warheads.

Sagarika was developed at the DRDOs missile complex in Hyderabad. The complex consists of the Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL) and the Research Center, Imarat (RCI). The missile was designed and developed by the DRDL, the ASL provided the motors and propulsion systems. The RCI's contribution was in avionics, including control and guidance systems and inertial navigation systems.
In July 2008 DDRO was reported to be near breakthrough in test firing the country's first underwater launch ballistic missile, Sagarika. Sagarika had already been test-fired from a pontoon, but now DRDO is planning a full-fledged test of the missile from a submarine and for this purpose may use the services of a Russian Amur class submarine.

Project K-15 Launcher

The Project K-15 launcher was designed and developed for testing of missiles. The system was been delivered to the user in 2004 and mounted inside a pontoon. Design by analysis approach has been adopted for final configuration of the launcher. The material used for launcher structure is high-strength-lowalloy (HSLA) steel. Sets of guide rails are bolted to the container to hold the launcher.
Advanced fabrication technology has been used to ensure the desired perpendicularity, parallesim and concentricity. A 2.3 m static seal, which restricts water ingress to the bottom of the container, was designed and experimentally validated for extreme hydrostatic pressure.

Platform launcher has been designed for launching medium range surface-to-surface missiles. It comprises a launcher structure, a set of shock isolation systems, a set of launcher locking mechanism, a set of special seals and a connector alignment mechanisms for connector blind mating. The launcher structure is having precision dimensional features for perfect interfacing with the missile and other subsystems. The structure is made of special high strength stainless steel for a maintenance-free service life. This material does not need any corrosion protection against any aggressive marine environment.

The shock isolation systems protect the launcher against shock load. The shock isolation systems comprise disc spring stacks in longitudinal direction and elastic beams in lateral direction. This particular non-conventional combination takes care of compactness and mode decoupling. The locking mechanism locks the shock isolation suspension system and provide rigid support during launch operation. It is a fail-safe all mechanical device. The 2.4 m diameter diaphragm seal prevents water entrance and flexes when the launcher vibrates on the shock isolation mounts. The seal has been developed based on steel reinforced radial tire technology. The connector alignment mechanism has all six degrees of freedom and, therefore, capable to take care of any misalignment within the envisaged limit during blind mating of connector.

In early 2008 India announced that it had perfected the technology for launching missiles from a submerged submarine. That meant the silo design had been perfected as well.

K-15 Missile

DRDO is working on the K-15 SLBM, having tested it from submersible pontoon launchers, with the aim to integrate it on the indigenous nuclear submarines being built under the secretive ATV (advanced technology vessel) project. Though not in the range of the over 5,000-km SLBMs in the arsenal of US, Russia and China, the 750-km range K-15 will accord India with the desperately-needed third leg of the nuclear weapon triad.

The launch of the K-15 Sagarika missile on 26 February 2008 from a submerged pontoon in the Bay of Bengal simulated the conditions of a submarine launch. India, for the first time on Wednesday 12 November 2008, test-fired from a defence base in Orissa its submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) K-15 from a land-based launcher. It was test-fired successfully from the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur in the district of Balasore, about 230 km from state capital Bhubaneswar. The test was intended to check speed, trajectory, azimuth and other parameters of the missile. The missile had earlier undergone a few tests in an underwater platform.

The K-15 missile has two stages fitted into its half-meter diameter body. It can carry a payload up to one ton and has a maximum range of 700 km. The K-15 missile has a length of around 11 meters [other reports say only 7 meters], larger than the 8.5-meters-long Prithvi short-range ballistic missile but smaller than the 15-meter-long Agni-1 ballistic missile - both of which have a diameter of 1 meter, twice that reported for the K-15.

Shourya (Valor)

On 12 November 2008 India conducted the fourth successful test of its K15 Sagarika SLBM (Sea Launched Ballistic Missile). This test was from a land-based missile silo. In the last few tests, the metal silo was being tested as well. The K-15 seven ton has a 1,000 kilometer range, and a half ton payload. India test fired the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) K-15 from a land-based launcher from Orissa. The land based version is named as ‘Shourya’.

The Shourya missile is said to be about 10 meters long. It can carry warheads weighing more than 500 kg. W. Selvamurthy, Chief Controller (R&D), DRDO, said the Shourya missile provided the country with “a second strike capability” because it was a variant of the under-water launched K-15 missile (Sagarika). “We can keep the missile in a secured position [silo] to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads,” Dr. Selvamurthy said. Reportedly, although the Shourya needed a silo with a maximum depth of 50 meters to lift off, it could be launched from 30-meter deep silos [these numbers are too big, and don't make much sense]. It had a booster which fired underground and another which fired in the air.

The DRDO termed as “successful” the flight-test of the ‘Shourya’ missile system from the Interim Test Range (ITR) at Balasore in Orissa at 1125 hours 12 November 2008. The “Shourya” missile "flew at five times the speed of sound, that is Mach 5, for 300 km” of its 600-km range, according to M. Natarajan, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister. Its velocity gradually tapered off during the remaining 300 km of its flight and then it plunged vertically over the targeted site in the Bay of Bengal. What was outstanding about the Shourya’s success was the performance of its indigenous navigation system with the help of a ring-laser gyroscope, Mr. Natarajan said. He called it “a sophisticated navigation and guidance system produced by the Research Centre, Imarat” (RCI) in Hyderabad.

The missile was test fired from a 30-40 feet deep pit with in-built canister specially designed for this purpose. There was no water in the pit. The missile has a range of 600 km and flight duration of 485 seconds. The test was intended to check speed, trajectory, azimuth and other parameters of the missile. What was outstanding about the Shourya’s success was the performance of its indigenous navigation system with the help of a ring-laser gyroscope, according to M. Natarajan, Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister.

According to one report Shourya can reach targets 700 km away, carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. It is 10 meters long and 74 cm in diameter and weighs 6.2 tonnes. It is a two-stage missile and both its stages are powered by solid propellants. Its flight time is 500 seconds to 700 seconds. It can carry warheads weighing more than 500 kg.

The missile has a unique feature of simplicity of operation and maintenance. It can be easily handled, transported and stored within the canister for longer shelf life. The missile, encased in a canister, is mounted on a single vehicle, which has only a driver’s cabin, and the vehicle itself is the launch platform. This “single vehicle solution” reduces its signature – it cannot be easily detected by satellites – and makes its deployment easy. The composite canister make the missile much easier to store for long periods without maintenance as well as to handle and transport. It also houses the gas generator to eject the missile from the canister before its solid propellant motors take over to hurl it at the intended target.

The high manoeuvrability of the missile makes it less vulnerable to available anti-missile defence systems. The missile performed a maneuver of rolling to spread the heat uniformly on its surface. Its high manoeuvrability makes it less vulnerable to present-day anti-missile defence systems.

Nirbhay

In mid-2007 it was reported that India was developing a new medium-range, multi-platform missile, called the Nirbhay [Dauntless or Fearless], that was slated to be tested by end-2009. The missile, with a range of 1,000 km, was being developed at the Advanced Systems Laboratory (ASL), a unit of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) under the defence ministry. The latest in the series of India's missile development programme, the Nirbhay follows the Agni (I, II and III), the Prithvi (I and II), the Indo-Russian joint venture supersonic Brahmos, Akash, Trishul and Nag.

"It (Nirbhay) will be better than Babur," explained Avinash Chander, director of ASL, referring to Pakistan's first subsonic, low-level terrain-mapping missile, developed originally with a 500 km range and later upgraded to 700 km. First tested in 2005, the Babur is similar in design to the US BGM-109 Tomahawk land attack cruise missile-the two being roughly the same size and shape. Pakistan is said to be working on a more advanced version with a range of 1,000 km.
The subsonic Nirbhay weighs 1,000 kg with a 1,000 km range and a speed of 0.7 mach. A missile is subsonic when its speed is less than the speed of sound (1 mach). Nirbhay was said to be six meters in length with a 520 mm diameter. While the missile was being developed in-house, India was looking at partnerships for the engine. The requirement for Nirbhay was anticipated by India's three armed forces. Nirbhay is to have multiple platforms and can be launched from ground, sea and air.

Sidharth K Menon

SCORPIENE v/s U214

Analysis of Indian and Pakistani (Future) Diesel Electric Submarines.

The 6 Scorpienes ordered by the Indian Navy has not yet been commisioned but we could analise the capabilities of these key military weapons.



The Indian Option Scorpene Diesel Electric


Scorpene Attack Submarine


Key Data:
Crew
32

Dimensions:
Overall Length
63.5m

Draught
5.4m
Submerged Displacement
1,590t
Surface Displacement
1,450t
Pressure Hull Weldable and High-Tensile Steel
80HLES, more than 700Mpa

Performance:
Maximum Operating Depth
350m
Submerged Speed
Over 20 kt

Range (at 8kt)
6,400nm
Endurance
50 days

Weapon Systems:
Torpedoes / Missiles
Six 21in torpedo tubes for 18 torpedoes / missiles

The Scorpene submarine has been jointly developed by DCNS of France (formerly DCN) and Navantia (formerly Bazan, then Izar) of Spain. Two Scorpene submarines were ordered by Chile. The vessels replace two Oberon Class submarines which were retired in 1998 and 2003.

The first, O'Higgins, built at DCN shipyard in Cherbourg, was launched in November 2003 and commissioned in September 2005. It arrived in Chile in January 2006. The second, Carrera, built at the Cartagena shipyard of Navantia in Spain was launched in November 2004 and commissioned in July 2006. Carrera arrived at its homeport of Talcahuano in December 2006.

The Royal Malaysian Navy placed a contract for two Scorpene submarines in June 2002. The first vessel, KD Tunku Abdul Rahman, was launched at DCNS Cherbourg in October 2007 and was handed over in January 2009 in Toulon. It is scheduled to arrive in Malaysia in mid-2009.

"The SSK Scorpene attack submarine is equipped with six bow-located 21in torpedo tubes providing salvo launch capability."
The second, Tun Razak, was launched at Navantia Cartagena in October 2008 and is to commission in October 2009. DCNS is building the bow sections, Navantia the aft sections.

In October 2005, India placed an order for six Scorpene submarines. The submarines will be built at the state-owned Mazagon dockyard in Bombay, with technical assistance and equipment from French companies DCN and Thales. At the same time, India also placed an order for 36 MBDA SM-39 Exocet anti-ship missiles to arm the submarines. Construction of the first vessel began in December 2006 and is scheduled to be delivered in December 2012. One submarine will be delivered each year until 2017.

In December 2008, Brazil placed an order for four diesel-electric-powered submarines based on the Scorpene. The submarines will be built by a joint venture company set up by DCNS and Odebrecht of Brazil and will enter service in 2015.
Scorpene for the Chilean Navy

The 1,500t Scorpene built for the Chilean Navy has a length of 66.4m. The two vessels are powered by four diesel generators providing more than 2,500kW using GM synchronous motors with permanent magnets.

The Chilean Scorpene will have a hull-mounted medium-frequency active / passive sonar. The vessels are armed with WASS (Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subaquei) Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes.
The Black Shark is a dual-purpose, wire-guided torpedo which is fitted with Astra active / passive acoustic head and a multi-target guidance and control unit incorporating a counter-countermeasures system. It has an electrical propulsion system based on a silver oxide and aluminium battery. Black Shark will also arm the two Scorpene vessels for the Royal Malaysian Navy.

The six torpedo tubes will be capable of firing SM-39 Exocet anti-ship missiles, which have a range of 50km, but they will not initially be carried. The vessels will be equipped with EDO Reconnaissance Systems AR-900 electronic support measures/direction-finding (ESM/DF) system.

Weapons systems
Scorpene is equipped with six bow-located 21in torpedo tubes providing salvo launch capability. Positive discharge launching is by an air turbine pump.
"Handling and loading of weapons is automated."
The submarine's weapons include anti-ship and anti-submarine torpedoes and anti-surface missiles.
18 torpedoes and missiles or 30 mines can be carried by the Scorpene attack submarine. The handling and loading of weapons is automated.

SUBTICS combat management system
The SUBTICS combat management system, with up to six multifunction common consoles and a centrally situated tactical table, is collocated with the platform-control facilities.
The combat management system is composed of a command and tactical data handling system, a weapon control system and an integrated suite of acoustic sensors with an interface to a set of air surface detection sensors and to the integrated navigation system. The system can also download data from external sources.
The integrated navigation system combines data from global positioning systems, the log, depth measurement and the ship's trim / list monitoring system. The Scorpene monitors the environment including seawater density and temperature and the submarine's own noise signature.

Sonar suite
The vessel's sonar suite includes a long-range passive cylindrical array, an intercept sonar, active sonar, distributed array, flank array, a high-resolution sonar for mine and obstacle avoidance and a towed array.

Control and monitoring
All submarine handling operations are carried out from the control room. The vessel features a high level of automation and surveillance, with automatic control mode of rudders and propulsion, continuous monitoring of the propulsion systems and platform installations, centralised and continuous surveillance of all potential hazards (leaks, fires, presence of gases) and the status of the installations that affect the safety while submerged.
"The submarine's weapons include anti-ship and anti-submarine torpedoes and anti-surface missiles."

Construction
The submarine incorporates a high level of system redundancy to achieve an average 240 days at sea a year for each submarine. The maximum diving depth is 300m, giving the commander more tactical freedom than previously available on conventional submarines. There is no limit to the duration of dives at a maximum depth, other than the power systems and crew limitations.
The structure of the submarine uses high-yield stress-specific steel which allows for as many dives to maximum depth as necessary.

The use of high-tensile steels has reduced the weight of the pressure hull, allowing a larger load of fuel and ammunition. The reduced complement minimises training costs and increase combat efficiency by making more space, while a larger payload enhances the ship's autonomy.
When dived the Scorpene has low radiated noise which permits improved detection ranges of its own sensors and reduced risk of detection by hostile sensors. The low radiated noise is achieved through the use of advanced hydrodynamics with an albacore bow shape, with fewer appendages and an optimised propeller.
Between the suspended decks, the equipment is mounted on elastic mountings wherever possible, and the noisiest systems have a double-elastic mounting to reduce the risk of their noise profiles being radiated outside the submarine. The shock-resistant systems have been developed from systems incorporated in advanced nuclear-powered submarine designs.
The low acoustic signature and hydrodynamic shock resistance give the Scorpene class the capability to carry out anti-submarine and anti-surface ship warfare operations in closed or open sea conditions, as well as the capability of working with special forces in coastal waters.

Crew facilities
The ship can hold a total company of 31 men with a standard watch team of nine. The control room and the living quarters are mounted on an elastically supported and acoustically isolated floating platform. All living and operational areas are air-conditioned. The submarine also has space for six additional fold-down bunks for special operations crew.
"The ship can hold a total company of 31 men with a standard watch team of nine."
The vessel is equipped with all the necessary systems to provide vital supplies, water, provisions, regeneration of the atmosphere, to ensure the survival of all the crew for seven days.
The ship is equipped with full rescue and safety systems. A connection point for a diving bell or deep submergence rescue vehicle (DSRV) allows collective rescue operations.

Stealth design
The planning and design of the Scorpene was directed towards achieving an extremely quiet vessel with a great detection capability and offensive power.
The forms of the hull, the sail and the appendages have been specifically designed to produce minimum hydrodynamic noise. The various items of equipment are mounted on elastic supports, which are in turn mounted on uncoupled blocks and suspended platforms. The isolation also provides better shock protection to the equipment.

Propulsion systems
The Scorpene has two diesel generation sets providing 1,250kW of power. At the top of the hull immediately above the diesel generator sets is a Dutch Breach machinery shipping hatch. The submarine has an elastically supported 2,900kW electronic engine.
There are two variants of Scorpene, the CM-2000 with the conventional propulsion system and the AM-2000 equipped with air independent propulsion. The AM-2000 is capable of remaining submerged on underwater patrol for three times longer than the CM-2000.

Air independent propulsion
A conventional diesel-electrical submarine sailing underwater is difficult to detect. However the need to come repeatedly to periscope depth to recharge the batteries using the diesel engine greatly increases vulnerability by:
Its aerial detectability, since the snorkel projecting from the water is detectable by radar
Its underwater detectability due to increase in radiated noise from the working diesels
The ratio between this time of greater vulnerability and the total operating time is known as the "indiscretion rate" and for all conventional modem submarines the indiscretion ratio ranges typically from 7% to 10% on patrol at 4kt, and 20% to 30% in transit at about 8kt.
"To lessen the submarine's vulnerability, Scorpene can be equipped with an air independent propulsion system."
To lessen the submarine's vulnerability, the vessel can be equipped with an air independent propulsion system such as: the Stirling engine, the fuel cell, the closed circuit diesel and the module d'energie sous-marine autonome (MESMA) system .
The MESMA anaerobic system, in which heat in the primary circuit is produced by burning ethanol with oxygen, can be easily installed either at the start of the submarine's construction or in a later modernisation to convert the CM-2000 to an AM-2000 build standard.
With the MESMA system the AM-2000 submarine can stay down on underwater patrol three times longer than the CM-2000.
Its performance features remain the same in all other respects, except that the length increases to 70m and its submerged displacement to 1.870t (against the 61.7m and the 1,565t of the CM2000).




The Pakistani option U 214 Diesel Electric



The Agosta 90 B class of Diesel attack submarine (Pakistani Navy has three submarines of this class, and is trying to upgrade the existing ones to the latest versions. Pakistan is also trying to procure Geerman Submarines. But has not yet materialised.)



U214 Attack Submarines, Germany


Key Data:

Crew
27 (including five officers)

Weapon Systems:
Torpedoes
six 533mm tubes, 24 STN Atlas Elektronik DM2A4 torpedoes
Combat Data Syetem
Basic Command and Weapons Control System (BCWCS)
Countermeasures:
ESM
EADS FL1800U
Decoys
TAU 2000 torpedo countermeasures system
Radar
Kelvin hughes type 1007 I-band navigation radar
Sonar
STN Atlas Elektronik DBQS-40 sonar suite and STN Atlas Elektronik MOA 3070 mine detection sonar
Periscopes
Zeiss Optronic SERO 14 search and SERO 15 attack

Propulsion
Diesel-electric, MTU 16V-396 diesel engine, 3.12MW, HDW / Siemens AIP (Air-Independent Propulsion) system, 300kW

U214 Dimensions:
Length
64m
Height
13m

Surface Displacement
1,700m³
Presure Hull Diameter
6.3m
Buoyancy Reserve
10%

U214 Performance:
Submerged Patrol Speed of Advance
6kt
Range
12,000nm
Mission Endurance
12 weeks
Constantly Submerged
Three weeks without snorkelling
Mission Sprint Speed
15kt to 20kt
Maximum Dive Depth
400m+

HDW has developed the Type 214 submarine, which is a further improvement on the Type 212.

The Greek Navy has ordered three Type 214 submarines. The first, Papanikolis (S120), was built at the HDW Kiel shipyard and was launched in April 2004. As of April 2008, the Greek government has refused to accept delivery of the vessel and a commissioning date is uncertain. The vessel successfully completed a further series of sea trials in September 2008.

The Hellenic Shipyards is building the second (Pipinos S121, launched November 2006) and third (Matrozos 122) vessels at Skaramanga. Hellenic Shipyards was acquired by HDW (now part of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems) in May 2002. A fourth vessel, Katsonis (S123) was ordered by Greece in June 2002 and is expected to commission in 2012.

South Korea has also ordered three Type 214, to enter service in 2007, 2008 and 2009. These are being built by Hyundai Heavy Industries. The first, Admiral Sohn Won-il, was launched in June 2006 and commissioned in December 2007. The second, Jung Ji, was launched in June 2007 and is to be delivered in November 2008. The third, Ahn Jung-geun, was launched in June 2008 and will be commissioned in November 2009. The submarines will form the KSS2 Class. An additional three submarines may be ordered.

The Type 214 will have an increased diving depth of over 400m, due to improvements in the pressure hull materials. Hull length is 65m and displacement 1,700t. Four of the eight torpedo tubes will be capable of firing missiles.

Type 214 submarines for the Hellenic Navy will be armed with the WASS (Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subaquei) Black Shark heavyweight torpedo. The Black Shark is a dual-purpose, wire-guided torpedo which is fitted with Astra active / passive acoustic head and a multi-target guidance and control unit incorporating a counter-countermeasures system. It has an electrical propulsion system based on a silver oxide and aluminium battery.

"The Type 214 will have an increased diving depth of over 400m."

Performance of the AIP system has been increased with two Siemens PEM fuel cells which produce 120kW per module and will give the submarine an underwater endurance of two weeks.

A hull shape which has been further optimised for hydrodynamic and stealth characteristics and a low-noise propeller combine to decrease the submarine's acoustic signature.

The integrated sensor underwater system ISUS 90, from ATLAS Elektronik integrates all sensors, command and control functions on board the submarine. BAE Systems provides the link 11 tactical data link. The sensor suite of the U214 submarine consists of the sonar systems, an attack periscope and an optronic mast. The submarine's electronic support measures system and global positioning system sensors are also installed on the optronic mast.

According to my knowledge. Pakistan has plans to buy three of these ships and negotiations have reached 95% according to German sources. But have not pushed in any orders.Pakistani Navy sees the 214 a worthy adversory to the Scorpiens. France is tryin to lobby beaurocrats (bribing them) to opt a French submarine design. We have to wait and see, which ship Pakistan is going to choose.




Sidharth K Menon


Thanks,

Naval Technology (SPG Media)