8 CHINESE SSK'S FOR PAKISTAN - 50 CHINESE MADE JF- 17 TOO.

POSSIBLY QING CLASS SSK's [TYPE 032]

Pakistan's Defence forces , specially Pakistan's Navy has been quite vocal of arrival of Russian Nuclear powered submarine to Indian shore. Pakistan Navy chief has already told US Defence Magazine that arrival of Russian Nuclear powered submarine and India’s own Indigenous development ,will have adverse effect on its operational capability in Indian ocean . and also mentioned that Pakistani navy is already working on plans to counter this latest threat put forward by Indian Navy .

Indian Defence Experts believe that Pakistan is already working on a counter plans and might just surprise Indian pretty soon in future by producing or acquiring a Nuclear powered submarine . Pakistan always has a quieter way of weapons acquisition and even managed to keep many defence project low key affair .

Rakesh Sharma Indian Defence Expert told that “General Musharraf way back in 2006 had mentioned to a Pak daily that technology for development of a Nuclear Submarine existed in Pakistan”, but its seems help will come from its tried and tested friend china .

China has per media will be supplying 6 conventional attack submarine of Qing class , which will be equipped with a Stirling-cycle AIP system and will be able to carry up to three nuclear warhead-carrying CJ-10K LACMs each. The double-hulled Qing-class SSK, with a submerged displacement close to 3,600 tonnes, bears a close resemblance to the Russian Type 636M SSK, and features hull-retractable foreplanes and hydrodynamically streamlined sail.

Experts suggests that Pakistan’s nuclear submarine is likely to be based on the Qing Class Chinese SSK. highly advanced electric propulsion system of Qing Class Chinese SSK will able Pakistan to replace diesel engine power generation with a nuclear power plant.

Pakistan also has the expertise of submarine construction , with potential help may have been the transfer of technology from France with the Agosta 90B submarine purchase. A number of key technologies were transferred including design and development skills and tools. Building of hulls and experience with Western subsystems, many of which are used in the French nuclear submarines would help the Pakistani SSN / SSBN.


Pakistan with expertise and transfers of technology from China , will be able to field their first nuclear submarine in next 5 to 8 years and brand it “Indigenous “. But experts have difference of opinion on usage of this submarine in both forces , While Nuclear Submarine in Indian navy will complete Nuclear 2nd strike option for India , but Pakistani nuclear submarine might be built to attack prized Indian Aircraft carriers in case of conflict . India who will have 3 or more fleet of aircraft carriers in near future will always be Pakistani navies prime target , even in 1971 Indo-Pak war , Indian aircraft carrier was always a prize target for them .

JF 17 - THUNDER STORY

Pakistan will acquire 110 latest JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from China as the two countries forge closer economic and defence cooperation following President Xi Jinping's visit here earlier this week, a media report said today. Radio Pakistan reported that China will deliver the first batch of 50 jets over a period of three years.The Head of Chinese Aircraft Industry told a Chinese daily that under the contract signed between the two countries, Pakistan will receive a total of 110 JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft from China. It is not clear when the delivery of the remaining 60 jets will be completed. The JF-17 Thunder is also built in Pakistan as China has already transferred its technology. But Pakistan needs more fighter jets at faster pace due to its fight against Taliban militants. Xi also launched a $46 billion economic corridor to link China's western region to Pakistan's Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. During Xi's visit, a fleet of eight JF-17 jets escorted the special aircraft of the Chinese president when it entered Pakistan's airspace. The two countries signed 51 agreements to boost economic cooperation during Xi's trip.Earlier, reports said China would provide eight latest submarines to Pakistan, more than doubling its fleet, in a deal worth $4-5 billion.

Pakistan has witnessed new defense acquisitions in this decade than any other, and in the center of it all is the new fighter which was designed by China with partial funding from Pakistan. It is formally known as JF-17 Thunder. When the fighter was in development, Pakistani online communities were jumping with excitement comparing it with its arch rival India’s modern combatants Su-30MKI, Mig-29S & Mirage-2000H. There were claims of it featuring western Radars and long range missiles, & Chinese ordering some due to its superior capabilities. But the reality is far from it.

China having spent significant amount of money into a fighter which it is never going to use, most probably forced Pakistan to accept its avionics to offset some its development costs. Chinese who are known for their self reliance first and quality next, are further downgrading JF-17s capabilities with their poorly copy-pirated avionics. Along with their dubious weapons, any chance of JF-17 maintaining BVR edge over its adversary’s front-line combatants, for the most part, is unlikely.

Even in close combat JF-17 lacks what it takes to win the fight. Its spine, & wings bearing resemblance(in wing twist & wing area) to a fighter which china knows inside out, the J-7, doesn’t have wing twist nor does it have enough area to provide a low wing loading. Its performance during low speeds and high alphas would be very dangerous for the pilot indeed. It has a Maximum G loading of only 8, as claimed by PAC. Its thrust to weight ratio is another negative point. When its arch rival, the Indian Air Force(IAF), was overtly critical of Tejas for having a low Thrust to Weight ratio, maybe they should have compared it with JF-17 which has even less, even with Emergency Thrust. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex(PAC) proudly displays the RD-93’s “Combat thrust with afterburner” as 19,200lbf, while the whole defense community knows RD-93’s thrust is 18,300lbf and the only real thrust increase was achieved with its new re-designed Sea Wasp RD-33MK engines- which has been explicitly stated by Klimov. However, Klimov’s RD-33 series 3(or series 2?), whose avatar is RD-93 with re-positioned Gear boxes, has a provision for emergency thrust which Klimov says can produce 8700kgf(~19200lbf) in their officially released document. They further state that as “Take-off emergency mode”. So the mentioned thrust can only be used during take-off where the Air is denser, and also only during emergency situations since it would seriously lower the engine’s lifespan. This is a far cry from PAC's “Combat thrust” claim. Why this is being stated is because, the engines(bought by the Chinese after pressurizing the Russians) are the only non-Chinese & non-Pakistani component, and even there they have lied about its capabilities. Hence the true, lower than published, specifications of Chinese and Pakistani components are open to any one’s guesses. In any case, the close combat capabilities of JF-17 is below average or average at best.

The next Achilles heal is JF-17’s speed. For a good interception, speed is an important criteria. However JF-17’s max speed is Mach 1.6 which is claimed by PAC. This indicates that JF-17 is draggier. When compared, their F-7s(Reverse engineered Mig-21s) have higher speed of mach 2+ with a lower thrust engine. The IAF fighters which it is going to face, all have speeds greater than the Thunder.

So why is Pakistan still inducting more and more of this fighter, which its critics increasingly call it Junk Fighter – 17 ? The answer may lie with Pakistan’s recent trauma & its psyche. Having sanctioned by the U.S, the star of their airforce, the F-16s were severally hit by lack of spares and most of the time grounded. The other 2 sources to procure modern Aircraft- Russia, have been sealed off due to the legacy of Soviet era friendship, current market in India & India’s pressure- and the other source, the European Union, for their extremely high costs. The third source, the Chinese, at that time were still flying their reverse engineered Mig-21s. In those circumstances, “Never again” was the motto of PAF and it instantly jumped into the project of further reversing the reverse engineered Mig-21, known as Super-7(a.k.a Super F-7) to obtain self reliance. The result of that project is the JF-17. So the decision was appropriate at that time, in those situations. However now with China having developed the J-10, and going by the recent reports of offering ToT(Transfer of Technology) to Pakistan, one wonders why are the Pakistanis still ordering 250 planes. Is the trauma of F-16 sanctions so high that they don’t even trust the Chinese? This can't be the case because they still need the Chinese to procure the RD-93 engines for them, even after the Chinese transfer all their associated JF-17 tech to PAC. So why...? The answer lies with their ego/psyche rather than the trauma. Unlike J-10, Pakistan shares copyright to JF-17 and that, for some weird reason, gives them something to celebrate about. This is strange for the reason, war machines are for fighting wars and achieving tactical & strategic objectives, not for gloating about who holds the copyrights. When JF-17 comes face to face with MKI or SMT, there won’t be much to celebrate about it, or the few millions if at all it earns though exports. In the end, it’s all about defending ones homeland from the enemy, and not copyrights.

Part 2. Chinese String of Pearls Stratergy

China’s “string of pearls” strategy appears to be taking another step forward as Beijing increases ties with the Sri Lankan government. The strategy, which was the subject of a 2005 U.S. China Commission report to Congress, is driven by China’s need to secure foreign oil and trade routes critical to its development. This has meant establishing an increased level of influence along sea routes through investment, port development and diplomacy.

To date, China’s investments extend from Hainan Island in the South China Sea, through the littorals of the Straits of Malacca, including port developments in Chittagong in Bangladesh; Sittwe, Coco, Hianggyi, Khaukphyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun in Myanmar; Laem Chabang in Thailand; and Sihanoukville in Cambodia. They extend across the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, and in islands within the Arabian Sea and into the Persian Gulf.

Not surprisingly, both the U.S. and Indian governments are concerned, part of these developments include the upgrading of airstrips, many supported with military facilities, such as the facility on Woody Island, close to Vietnam. These developments mean that the balance of power within the Indian and Arabian Gulf has now shifted away from the traditional Indian government management, backed up with U.S. military strength, but to China, backed up with regional diplomatic ties that dispense with the need to engage with either power.
The strategy has been developed partially in response to a lack of progress on the Kra Canal Project in Thailand, which would directly link the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. The “string of pearls” strategy however provides a forward presence for China along the sea lines of communication that now anchor China directly to the Middle East. The question both the United States and India have is whether this strategy is intended purely to cement supply lines and trade routes, or whether China will later use these in a bid to enforce regional supremacy.

India has not been an innocent party to the development of the “string of pearls.” Somewhat foolishly, it threatened to cut off China’s choke point for oil and trade – the Malacca Straits – in both 1971 and 1999, when it moved to blockade Karachi Port which at the time handled 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea trade, including oil supplies to China. India has also recently attempted to persuade the Sri Lankan government not to permit Chinese development of the country’s Hambantota Port, a project that is now well underway. Chinese investment in Sri Lanka is also likely to significantly increase given the likely conclusion of the civil war, and Chinese interests in drilling for oil off the coast of Northeast Sri Lanka.

As America’s influence in the region wanes, China’s strategy appears to be conservatively supported by other Southeast Asian nations, with the potential exception of India. Pro-U.S. nations such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines find it in their own self interests to improve and develop ties with China, while nations such as Pakistan, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia are all strong allies of Beijing. The growing perception is that a peaceful region does not now necessarily require a U.S. military presence.

Concerns remain however. Chinese fishing trawlers have been uncovered mapping the ocean floor to facilitate submarine operations, and disputes over territorial waters are increasing as the recent standoff between an American survey ship and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea demonstrates. The United States insists it was operating in international waters, the Chinese claim the incident occurred within their exclusive economic zone.

India feels threatened by the perception of a China increasingly encircling the country, with Tibet to the north, a China supported Myanmar regime to the east, an increasingly China-dependent Bangladesh beginning to emerge, and the long standing support China has shown for Pakistan. Given India’s own huge security problems with Pakistan it is unlikely, unless they can influence Sri Lanka, that the Indian government will be able to do much about the development of China’s interest within the region.

As long as Chinese interests remain benign, the “string of pearls” strategy remains the strongest pointer yet that China is both anchoring its energy supply lines with the Middle East and embarking on a level of Southeast Asian trade – and the development of regional prosperity that will come with it – on a scale never seen before. If the strategy continues without the development of regional conflicts, the ASEAN trading bloc, with China at its heart, and the massive emerging markets of India and the other Southeast Asian nations close by, will develop and begin to rival that of the EU and the United States, and lessen China’s dependence on these traditional export markets.

China is strengthening diplomatic ties and building naval bases along the sea lanes from the Middle East. This “String of Pearls” strategy is designed to protect its energy security, negate US influence in the region, and project power overseas.Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence.4 Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.”

An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” Acontainer shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water portin Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan.5 Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of theSouth China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East.

The Nature of the Pearls. China’s development of these strategic geopolitical “pearls” has beennonconfrontational, with no evidence of imperial or neocolonial ambition. The development of the “String of Pearls” may not, in fact, be a strategy explicitly guided by China’s central government. Rather, it may be a convenient label applied by some in the United States to describe an element of China’s foreign policy. Washington’s perception of China’s de facto strategy may not be a view sharedin Beijing, but the fact remains that economic benefits and diplomatic rhetoric have been an enticement for countries to facilitate China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

(see gwadar related article)

The port facility at Gwadar, for example, is a win-win prospect for both China and Pakistan. The port at Karachi currently handles 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea-borne trade, but because of its proximity to India, it is extremely vulnerable to blockade. This happened during the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and was threatened again during the Kargil conflict of 1999.6 Gwadar, a small fishing village which Pakistan identified as a potential port location in 1964 but lacked the means to develop, is 450 miles west of Karachi.7 A modern port at Gwadar would enhance Pakistan’s strategic depth along its coastline with respect to India. For China,the strategic value of Gwadar is its 240-mile distance from the Strait of Hormuz. China is facilitatingdevelopment of Gwadar and paving the way for future access by funding a majority of the $1.2 billionproject and providing the technical expertise of hundreds of engineers.8 Since construction began in2002, China has invested four times more than Pakistan and contributed an additional $200 milliontowards the building of a highway to connect Gwadar with Karachi. In August 2005, Chinese PremierWen Jiabao visited Pakistan to commemorate completion of the first phase of the Gwadar project andthe opening of the first 3 of 12 multiship berths.9The Gwadar project has enhanced the strategic, diplomatic, and economic ties between Pakistanand China. Other countries are benefiting from China’s new strategy, as well.

In November 2003, Chinasigned an agreement with Cambodia to provide military equipment and training in exchange for theright of way to build a rail line from southern China to the Gulf of Thailand.10 China also has anambitious $20 billion proposal to build a canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus which would enableships to bypass the chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca.11 Although this plan is stalled due to Thailand’snoncommittal position and political opposition in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, it reveals thescope and scale of Chinese ambition for the “String of Pearls.”

Sidharth K Menon

Defence and Intelligence Analyst.

Part 1. Chinese String of Pearl Stratergy.

Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean

Four months after the U.S. ordered its troops into Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime, China and Pakistan joined hands to break ground in building a Deep Sea Port on the Arabian Sea. The project was sited in an obscure fishing village of Gwadar in Pakistan's western province of Baluchistan, bordering Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran to the southwest. Gwadar is nautically bounded by the Persian Gulf in the west and the Gulf of Oman in the southwest.

Although the Gwadar Port project has been under study since May 2001, the U.S. entrée into Kabul provided an added impetus for its speedy execution. Having set up its bases in Central, South, and West Asian countries, the U.S. virtually brought its military forces at the doorstep of China. Beijing was already wary of the strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which supplies 60% of its energy needs. It was now alarmed to see the U.S. extend its reach into Asian nations that ring western China. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies. This vulnerability set Beijing scrambling for alternative safe supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port was one such alternative for which China had flown its Vice Premier, Wu Bangguo, to Gwadar to lay its foundation on March 22, 2002.

Pakistan was interested in the project to seek strategic depth further to the southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable to the dominant Indian Navy. In the past, it endured prolonged economic and naval blockades imposed by the Indian Navy. To diversify the site of its naval and commercial assets, Pakistan has already built a naval base at Ormara, the Jinnah Naval Base, which has been in operation since June 2000. It can berth about a dozen ships, submarines and similar harbor craft. The Gwadar port project, however, is billed to crown the Pakistan Navy into a force that can rival regional navies. The government of Pakistan has designated the port area as a "sensitive defense zone." Once completed, the Gwadar port will rank among the world's largest deep-sea ports.

The convergence of Sino-Pakistani strategic interests has put the port project onto a fast track to its early completion. In three years since its inauguration, the first phase of the project is already complete with three functioning berths. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will be on hand to mark the completion of this phase in March this year. Although the total cost of the project is estimated at $1.16 billion USD, China pitched in $198 million and Pakistan $50 million to finance the first phase. China also has invested another $200 million into building a coastal highway that will connect the Gwadar port with Karachi. The second phase, which will cost $526 million, will feature the construction of 9 more berths and terminals and will also be financed by China. To connect western China with Central Asia by land routes, Pakistan is working on building road links to Afghanistan from its border town of Chaman in Baluchistan to Qandahar in Afghanistan. In the northwest, it is building similar road links between Torkham in Pakhtunkhaw (officially known as the Northwest Frontier Province) and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Eventually, the Gwadar port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through overland links that will stretch to and from Karakoram Highway in Pakistan's Northern Areas that border China's Muslim-majority Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. In addition, the port will be complemented with a modern air defense unit, a garrison, and a first-rate international airport capable of handling airbus service.

Pakistan already gives China most favored nation (MFN) status and is now establishing a bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA), which will bring tariffs between the two countries to zero. Over the past two years, the trade volume between the two countries has jumped to $2.5 billion a year, accounting for 20% of China's total trade with South Asia. Informal trade, a euphemism for smuggling, however, is several times the formal trade. The proposed FTA is an implicit acceptance of the unstoppable "informal" trade as a "formal" one. More importantly, Chinese investment in Pakistan has increased to $4 billion, registering a 30% increase just over the past two years since 2003. Chinese companies make up 12% (60) of the foreign firms (500) operating in Pakistan, which employ over 3,000 Chinese nationals.

The growing economic cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is also solidifying their strategic partnership. Before leaving for his visit to Beijing this past December, Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz told reporters in Islamabad: "Pakistan and China are strategic partners and our relations span many areas." The rhetoric of strategic alignment is duly matched by reality. Last year, China and Pakistan conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises near the Shanghai coast. These exercises, among others, included simulation of an emergency rescue operation. Last December, Pakistan opened a consulate in Shanghai. The Gwadar Port project is the summit of such partnership that will bring the two countries closer in maritime defense as well.
Initially, China was reluctant to finance the Gwadar port project because Pakistan offered the U.S. exclusive access to two of its critical airbases in Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Baluchisntan) during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. According to a Times of India report on February 19, 2002, Gen. Musharraf had to do a lot of explaining for leasing these bases to America. China, the Times of India reported, was also upset with Pakistan for allowing the U.S. to establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet. When China finally agreed to offer financial and technical assistance for the project, it asked for "sovereign guarantees" to use the Port facilities to which Pakistan agreed, despite U.S. unease over it.

In particular, the port project set off alarm bells in India which already feels encircled by China from three sides: Myanmar, Tibet, and Pakistan. To counter Sino-Pak collaboration, India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. Iranians are already working on Chabahar port in Sistan-Baluchistan, which will be accessible for Indian imports and exports with road links to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India is helping build a 200-kilometer road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. Once completed, Indians will use this access road to the port for their imports and exports to and from Central Asia. Presently, India is in urgent need of a shorter transit route to quickly get its trade goods to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

These external concerns are stoking internal challenges to the port project. Baluchistan, where the project is located, is once again up in arms against the federal government. The most important reason for armed resistance against the Gwadar port is that Baluch nationalists see it as an attempt to colonize them and their natural resources. Several insurgent groups have sprung up to nip the project in the bud. The three most popular are: the Baluchistan Liberation Army, Baluchistan Liberation Front, and People's Liberation Army. On May 3, 2004, the BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the port project that employs close to 500 Chinese nationals. On October 9, 2004, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in South Waziristan in the northwest of Pakistan, one of whom was killed later on October 14 in a botched rescue operation. Pakistan blamed India and Iran for fanning insurgency in Baluchistan.

Moreover, the Chinese in Pakistan are vulnerable because of their tense relationship with the Uighur Muslim majority of Xinjiang. Stretched over an area of 635,833 square miles, Xinjiang is more than twice the size of Pakistan, and one-sixth of China's landmass. However, it dwarfs in demographic size with a population of 19 million people. Beijing is investing 730 billion yuan (roughly $88 billion USD) in western China, including Xinjiang, which opens it up to the six Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite this massive investment, displacement of Uighers from Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, is drawing fire, where the population of mainland Chinese of Han descent has grown from 10% in 1949 to 41% in 2004. In direct proportion, the population of native Uighurs has declined from 90% in 1949 to 47% in 2004. Tens of thousands of displaced Uighurs have found refuge in Pakistan where the majority of them live in its two most populous cities: Lahore and Karachi.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is fighting against Chinese attempts at so-called "Hanification" of Xinjiang. Pakistan, which along with China and the U.S. lists the ETIM as a terrorist organization, killed the ETIM's head, Hasan Mahsum, in South Waziristan on October 2, 2004. Seven days after, two Chinese were kidnapped from the area, one of whom was killed in a rescue operation. The thousands of Chinese working in Pakistan make tempting targets for violent reprisals by the ETIM or Baluch nationalists.

The realization of economic and strategic objectives of the Gwadar port is largely dependent upon the reduction of separatist violence in Baluchistan and Xinjiang. Chinese response to secessionism is aggressive economic development, which is driving the Gwadar port project also. The port is intended to serve China's threefold economic objective:

First, to integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, labor-absorbing, resource-intensive industrial production to Islamabad, which will transform Pakistan into a giant factory floor for China; Second, to seek access to Central Asian markets for energy imports and Chinese exports by developing road networks and rail links through Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia; Third, to appease restive parts of western China, especially the Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang, through a massive infusion of development funds and increased economic links with the Central Asian Islamic nations of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The port, by design or by default, also provides China a strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, although to the alarm of India and the unease of the U.S. sitting opposite the Strait of Hurmoz, through which 80% of the world's energy exports flow, the Gwadar port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf, and offer it, in the case of any hostile interruption in such shipments, a safer alternative passage for its energy imports from Central Asia. Its presence on the Indian Ocean will further increase its strategic influence with major South Asian nations, particularly Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which would prompt the Indians in turn to re-strengthen their Navy.


Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst