8 CHINESE SSK'S FOR PAKISTAN - 50 CHINESE MADE JF- 17 TOO.

POSSIBLY QING CLASS SSK's [TYPE 032]

Pakistan's Defence forces , specially Pakistan's Navy has been quite vocal of arrival of Russian Nuclear powered submarine to Indian shore. Pakistan Navy chief has already told US Defence Magazine that arrival of Russian Nuclear powered submarine and India’s own Indigenous development ,will have adverse effect on its operational capability in Indian ocean . and also mentioned that Pakistani navy is already working on plans to counter this latest threat put forward by Indian Navy .

Indian Defence Experts believe that Pakistan is already working on a counter plans and might just surprise Indian pretty soon in future by producing or acquiring a Nuclear powered submarine . Pakistan always has a quieter way of weapons acquisition and even managed to keep many defence project low key affair .

Rakesh Sharma Indian Defence Expert told that “General Musharraf way back in 2006 had mentioned to a Pak daily that technology for development of a Nuclear Submarine existed in Pakistan”, but its seems help will come from its tried and tested friend china .

China has per media will be supplying 6 conventional attack submarine of Qing class , which will be equipped with a Stirling-cycle AIP system and will be able to carry up to three nuclear warhead-carrying CJ-10K LACMs each. The double-hulled Qing-class SSK, with a submerged displacement close to 3,600 tonnes, bears a close resemblance to the Russian Type 636M SSK, and features hull-retractable foreplanes and hydrodynamically streamlined sail.

Experts suggests that Pakistan’s nuclear submarine is likely to be based on the Qing Class Chinese SSK. highly advanced electric propulsion system of Qing Class Chinese SSK will able Pakistan to replace diesel engine power generation with a nuclear power plant.

Pakistan also has the expertise of submarine construction , with potential help may have been the transfer of technology from France with the Agosta 90B submarine purchase. A number of key technologies were transferred including design and development skills and tools. Building of hulls and experience with Western subsystems, many of which are used in the French nuclear submarines would help the Pakistani SSN / SSBN.


Pakistan with expertise and transfers of technology from China , will be able to field their first nuclear submarine in next 5 to 8 years and brand it “Indigenous “. But experts have difference of opinion on usage of this submarine in both forces , While Nuclear Submarine in Indian navy will complete Nuclear 2nd strike option for India , but Pakistani nuclear submarine might be built to attack prized Indian Aircraft carriers in case of conflict . India who will have 3 or more fleet of aircraft carriers in near future will always be Pakistani navies prime target , even in 1971 Indo-Pak war , Indian aircraft carrier was always a prize target for them .

JF 17 - THUNDER STORY

Pakistan will acquire 110 latest JF-17 Thunder fighter jets from China as the two countries forge closer economic and defence cooperation following President Xi Jinping's visit here earlier this week, a media report said today. Radio Pakistan reported that China will deliver the first batch of 50 jets over a period of three years.The Head of Chinese Aircraft Industry told a Chinese daily that under the contract signed between the two countries, Pakistan will receive a total of 110 JF-17 Thunder fighter aircraft from China. It is not clear when the delivery of the remaining 60 jets will be completed. The JF-17 Thunder is also built in Pakistan as China has already transferred its technology. But Pakistan needs more fighter jets at faster pace due to its fight against Taliban militants. Xi also launched a $46 billion economic corridor to link China's western region to Pakistan's Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea. During Xi's visit, a fleet of eight JF-17 jets escorted the special aircraft of the Chinese president when it entered Pakistan's airspace. The two countries signed 51 agreements to boost economic cooperation during Xi's trip.Earlier, reports said China would provide eight latest submarines to Pakistan, more than doubling its fleet, in a deal worth $4-5 billion.

Pakistan has witnessed new defense acquisitions in this decade than any other, and in the center of it all is the new fighter which was designed by China with partial funding from Pakistan. It is formally known as JF-17 Thunder. When the fighter was in development, Pakistani online communities were jumping with excitement comparing it with its arch rival India’s modern combatants Su-30MKI, Mig-29S & Mirage-2000H. There were claims of it featuring western Radars and long range missiles, & Chinese ordering some due to its superior capabilities. But the reality is far from it.

China having spent significant amount of money into a fighter which it is never going to use, most probably forced Pakistan to accept its avionics to offset some its development costs. Chinese who are known for their self reliance first and quality next, are further downgrading JF-17s capabilities with their poorly copy-pirated avionics. Along with their dubious weapons, any chance of JF-17 maintaining BVR edge over its adversary’s front-line combatants, for the most part, is unlikely.

Even in close combat JF-17 lacks what it takes to win the fight. Its spine, & wings bearing resemblance(in wing twist & wing area) to a fighter which china knows inside out, the J-7, doesn’t have wing twist nor does it have enough area to provide a low wing loading. Its performance during low speeds and high alphas would be very dangerous for the pilot indeed. It has a Maximum G loading of only 8, as claimed by PAC. Its thrust to weight ratio is another negative point. When its arch rival, the Indian Air Force(IAF), was overtly critical of Tejas for having a low Thrust to Weight ratio, maybe they should have compared it with JF-17 which has even less, even with Emergency Thrust. Pakistan Aeronautical Complex(PAC) proudly displays the RD-93’s “Combat thrust with afterburner” as 19,200lbf, while the whole defense community knows RD-93’s thrust is 18,300lbf and the only real thrust increase was achieved with its new re-designed Sea Wasp RD-33MK engines- which has been explicitly stated by Klimov. However, Klimov’s RD-33 series 3(or series 2?), whose avatar is RD-93 with re-positioned Gear boxes, has a provision for emergency thrust which Klimov says can produce 8700kgf(~19200lbf) in their officially released document. They further state that as “Take-off emergency mode”. So the mentioned thrust can only be used during take-off where the Air is denser, and also only during emergency situations since it would seriously lower the engine’s lifespan. This is a far cry from PAC's “Combat thrust” claim. Why this is being stated is because, the engines(bought by the Chinese after pressurizing the Russians) are the only non-Chinese & non-Pakistani component, and even there they have lied about its capabilities. Hence the true, lower than published, specifications of Chinese and Pakistani components are open to any one’s guesses. In any case, the close combat capabilities of JF-17 is below average or average at best.

The next Achilles heal is JF-17’s speed. For a good interception, speed is an important criteria. However JF-17’s max speed is Mach 1.6 which is claimed by PAC. This indicates that JF-17 is draggier. When compared, their F-7s(Reverse engineered Mig-21s) have higher speed of mach 2+ with a lower thrust engine. The IAF fighters which it is going to face, all have speeds greater than the Thunder.

So why is Pakistan still inducting more and more of this fighter, which its critics increasingly call it Junk Fighter – 17 ? The answer may lie with Pakistan’s recent trauma & its psyche. Having sanctioned by the U.S, the star of their airforce, the F-16s were severally hit by lack of spares and most of the time grounded. The other 2 sources to procure modern Aircraft- Russia, have been sealed off due to the legacy of Soviet era friendship, current market in India & India’s pressure- and the other source, the European Union, for their extremely high costs. The third source, the Chinese, at that time were still flying their reverse engineered Mig-21s. In those circumstances, “Never again” was the motto of PAF and it instantly jumped into the project of further reversing the reverse engineered Mig-21, known as Super-7(a.k.a Super F-7) to obtain self reliance. The result of that project is the JF-17. So the decision was appropriate at that time, in those situations. However now with China having developed the J-10, and going by the recent reports of offering ToT(Transfer of Technology) to Pakistan, one wonders why are the Pakistanis still ordering 250 planes. Is the trauma of F-16 sanctions so high that they don’t even trust the Chinese? This can't be the case because they still need the Chinese to procure the RD-93 engines for them, even after the Chinese transfer all their associated JF-17 tech to PAC. So why...? The answer lies with their ego/psyche rather than the trauma. Unlike J-10, Pakistan shares copyright to JF-17 and that, for some weird reason, gives them something to celebrate about. This is strange for the reason, war machines are for fighting wars and achieving tactical & strategic objectives, not for gloating about who holds the copyrights. When JF-17 comes face to face with MKI or SMT, there won’t be much to celebrate about it, or the few millions if at all it earns though exports. In the end, it’s all about defending ones homeland from the enemy, and not copyrights.

Pakistani Deception - Project A/B

Pakistan Nuclear Weapons - A Chronology

1965: Pakistani nuclear research reactor at Parr, Rawalpindi, starts functioning.

1968: Nonproliferation Treaty completed. Pakistan refuse to sign.

1974: India tests a device of up to 15 kilotons and calls the test a ``peaceful nuclear explosion.'' Pakistani Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tells meeting of Pakistan's top scientists of intention to develop nuclear arms.

1974 -- Pakistan proposed to India the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in south Asia

1978 -- Pakistan proposed to India a joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the acquisition and manufacture of nuclear weapons

K.S.Menon

FAS, WMD

1979 -- The United States cut off aid to Pakistan under section 669 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 FAA) after it was learned that Pakistan had secretly begun construction of a uranium enrichment facility.

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of nuclear facilities

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and Pakistan

1979 -- Pakistan proposed to India simultaneous acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards

1980s

Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained a pre-tested, atomic bomb design from China.

Early 1980's--Multiple reports that Pakistan obtained bomb-grade enriched uranium from China.

1980

1980--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Reexport via Canada (components of inverters used in gas centrifuge enrichment activities).

1981--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: New York, zirconium (nuclear fuel cladding material).

1981--AP story cites contents of reported US State Department cable stating `We have strong reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to develop a nuclear explosives capability * * * Pakistan is conducting a program for the design and development of a triggering package for nuclear explosive devices.'

1981--Publication of book, Islamic Bomb, citing recent Pakistani efforts to construct a nuclear test site.

1982/3--Several European press reports indicate that Pakistan was using Middle Eastern intermediaries to acquire bomb parts (13-inch `steel spheres' and `steel petal shapes').

1983--Declassified US government assessment concludes that `There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program * * * We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.'

1984--President Zia states that Pakistan has acquired a `very modest' uranium enrichment capability for `nothing but peaceful purposes.'

1984--President Reagan reportedly warns Pakistan of `grave consequences' if it enriches uranium above 5%.

1985--ABC News reports that US believes Pakistan has `successfully tested' a `firing mechanism' of an atomic bomb by means of a non-nuclear explosion, and that US krytrons `have been acquired' by Pakistan.

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Texas, krytrons (nuclear weapon triggers).

1985--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: US cancelled license for export of flash x-ray camera to Pakistan (nuclear weapon diagnostic uses) because of proliferation concerns.

1985/6--Media cites production of highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium in violation of a commitment to the US.

1985 -- Pressler Amendment [section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act] requires a total cut-off of U.S. aid to Islamabad unless the president can certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon, and that continued US aid will significantly decrease the probability of its developing one in the future.

1986--Bob Woodward article in Washington Post cites alleged DIA report saying Pakistan `detonated a high explosive test device between Sept. 18 and Sept. 21 as part of its continuing efforts to build an implosion-type nuclear weapon;' says Pakistan has produced uranium enriched to a 93.5% level.

1986--Press reports cite U.S. `Special National Intelligence Estimate' concluding that Pakistan had produced weapons-grade material.

1986--Commenting on Pakistan's nuclear capability, General Zia tells interviewer, `It is our right to obtain the technology. And when we acquire this technology, the Islamic world will possess it with us.'

1986--Declassified memo to then-Secretary of State Henry Kissinger states, `Despite strong U.S. concern, Pakistan continues to pursue a nuclear explosive capability * * * If operated at its nominal capacity, the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant could produce enough weapons-grade material to build several nuclear devices per year.'

1987 -- Pakistan proposed to India an agreement on a bilateral or regional nuclear test ban treaty

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: Pennsylvania, maraging steel & beryllium (used in centrifuge manufacture and bomb components).

1987--London Financial Times reports US spy satellites have observed construction of second uranium enrichment plant in Pakistan.

1987--Pakistan's leading nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan states in published interview that `what the CIA has been saying about our possessing the bomb is correct.'

1987--West German official confirms that nuclear equipment recently seized on way to Pakistan was suitable for `at least 93% enrichment' of uranium; blueprints of uranium enrichment plant also seized in Switzerland.

1987--U.S. Nuclear Export Control Violation: California, oscilloscopes, computer equipment (useful in nuclear weapon R&D).

1987--According to photocopy of a reported German foreign ministry memo published in Paris in 1990, UK government official tells German counterpart on European nonproliferation working group that he was `convinced that Pakistan had `a few small' nuclear weapons.'

1987 -- China concluded a deal with Pakistan to sell M-11 missiles and launchers.

1988--President Reagan waives an aid cutoff for Pakistan due to an export control violation; in his formal certification, he confirmed that `material, equipment, or technology covered by that provision was to be used by Pakistan in the manufacture of a nuclear explosive device.'

1988--Hedrick Smith article in New York Times reports US government sources believe Pakistan has produced enough highly enriched uranium for 4-6 bombs.

1988--President Zia tells Carnegie Endowment delegation in interview that Pakistan has attained a nuclear capability `that is good enough to create an impression of deterrence.'

1989--Multiple reports of Pakistan modifying US-supplied F-16 aircraft for nuclear delivery purposes; wind tunnel tests cited in document reportedly from West German intelligence service.

1989--Test launch of Hatf-2 missile: Payload (500 kilograms) and range (300 kilometers) meets `nuclear-capable' standard under Missile Technology Control Regime.

1989--CIA Director Webster tells Senate Governmental Affairs Committee hearing that `Clearly Pakistan is engaged in developing a nuclear capability.'

1989--Media claims that Pakistan acquired tritium gas and tritium facility from West Germany in mid-1980's.

1989--ACDA unclassified report cites Chinese assistance to missile program in Pakistan.

1989--UK press cites nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and Iraq.

1989--Article in Nuclear Fuel states that the United States has issued `about 100 specific communiques to the West German Government related to planned exports to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission and its affiliated organizations;' exports reportedly included tritium and a tritium recovery facility.

1989--Article in Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly states `sources close to the Pakistani nuclear program have revealed that Pakistani scientists have now perfected detonation mechanisms for a nuclear device.'

1989--Reporting on a recent customs investigation, West German magazine Stern reports, `since the beginning of the eighties over 70 [West German] enterprises have supplied sensitive goods to enterprises which for years have been buying equipment for Pakistan's ambitious nuclear weapons program.'

1989--Gerard Smith, former US diplomat and senior arms control authority, claims US has turned a `blind eye' to proliferation developments Pakistan in and Israel.

1989--Senator Glenn delivers two lengthy statements addressing Pakistan's violations of its uranium enrichment commitment to the United States and the lack of progress on nonproliferation issues from Prime Minister Bhutto's democratically elected government after a year in office; Glenn concluded, `There simply must be a cost to non-compliance--when a solemn nuclear pledge is violated, the solution surely does not lie in voiding the pledge.'

1990

1989-1990--reports of secret construction of unsafeguard nuclear research reactor; components from Europe.

Spring 1990 -- Pakistan reportedly reacted to Indian Army war game maneuvers near its border by preparing to drop one of seven weapons from a specially configured C-130 cargo plane. [02 December 1992 NBC News report]

1990--US News cites `western intelligence sources' claiming Pakistan recently `cold-tested' a nuclear device and is now building a plutonium production reactor; article says Pakistan is engaged in nuclear cooperation with Iran.

1990--French magazine publishes photo of West German government document citing claim by UK official that British government believes Pakistan already possesses `a few small' nuclear weapons; cites Ambassador Richard Kennedy claim to UK diplomat that Pakistan has broken its pledge to the US not to enrich uranium over 5%.

1990--London Sunday Times cites growing U.S. and Soviet concerns about Pakistani nuclear program; paper claims F-16 aircraft are being modified for nuclear delivery purposes; claims US spy satellites have observed `heavily armed convoys' leaving Pakistan uranium enrichment complex at Kahuta and heading for military airfields.

1990--Pakistani biography of top nuclear scientist (Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and the Islamic Bomb), claims US showed `model' of Pakistani bomb to visiting Pakistani diplomat as part of unsuccessful nonproliferation effort.

1990--Defense & Foreign Affairs Weekly reports `US officials now believe that Pakistan has quite sufficient computing power in country to run all the modeling necessary to adequately verify the viability of the country's nuclear weapons technology.'

1990--Dr. A.Q. Khan, father of Pakistan's bomb, receives `Man of the Nation Award.'

1990--Washington Post documents 3 recent efforts by Pakistan to acquire special arc-melting furnaces with nuclear and missile applications.

October 1990 -- President Bush announced that he could no longer provide Congress with Pressler Amendment certification that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear weapon. Economic and military aid was duly terminated, though the Bush administration continued to permit a limited number of commercial military sales to Pakistan. Pakistan handled the cutoff with little public rancor and committed itself to freezing the nuclear program in an attempt to placate the United States.

1991 -- Pakistan proposed to India commencement of a multilateral conference on the nuclear proliferation in south Asia

1991--Wall Street Journal says Pakistan is buying nuclear-capable M-11 missile from China.

1991--Sen. Moynihan says in television interview, `Last July [1990] the Pakistanis machined 6 nuclear Pakistan warheads. And they've still got them.'

1991--Time quotes businessman, `BCCI is functioning as the owners' representative for Pakistan's nuclear-bomb project.'

1991--India and Pakistan enter agreement prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear installations.

July 1991 - Reliable reports from Islamabad confirm that Pakistan had frozen production of HEU and halted the manufacturing of nuclear weapons components.

1992--Pakistani foreign secretary publicly discusses Pakistan's possession of `cores' of nuclear devices.

Late 1992 -- The US Government determines that China had transferred items controlled under the international Missile Technology Control Regime to Pakistan.

December 1992 -- The US Government asked Pakistan to return eight US Navy frigates and a supply ship that had been leased to the Pakistan Navy, which accounted for more than half of Pakistan's major surface combatants.

01 December 1992 -- Senator Larry Pressler reportedly stated in a press interview that he had been told by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that Pakistan had assembled seven weapons and could air drop one in a matter of hours [Dec. 1, 1992 NBC News broadcast].

1993 -- Pakistan proposed to India creation of a missile-free zone in south Asia

25 August 1993 -- The United States imposed "Category Two" sanctions against certain Chinese and Pakistani entities that were involved in an M-11 missile-related transfer, which is prohibited under US law.

Late 1993 -- The Clinton Administration, citing what it considered to be asymmetrical treatment accorded to Pakistan and India over their respective nuclear programs, proposed revising the Pressler Amendment and certain "country-specific" sections of the Foreign Assistance Act. The administration argued that by the time nuclear nonproliferation provisions had been added to the Foreign Assistance Act, India had already acquired the capability to build nuclear weapons and thus Pakistan had borne the brunt of most United States sanctions.

Early 1994 -- The Clinton Administration withdrew its proposal to revise the amendment because of strong criticism from a number of influential members of Congress, including Senator Pressler himself.

April 1994 - Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visits Islamabad to propose a one-time sale of F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan. Delivery of the planes would be contingent on specific commitments from Pakistan regarding its nuclear program, including a verifiable cap on the production of fissile materials. Talbott states that there is "broad agreement" between the United States and Pakistan on the goal of "first capping, then reducing, and eventually eliminating weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from South Asia."

April 1995 -- Prime Minister Bhutto visits Washington.

September 1995 -- The Clinton Administration proposes revisions to the Pressler Amendment, citing the Amendment's roadblocks to cooperation with Pakistan's Government in areas such as combatting terrorism and furthering US commercial interests in Pakistan. Under the Brown Amendment, the US would not deliver the controversial F-16 aircraft or resume an official military supply relationship with Pakistan, but the President decided to sell the F-16 aircraft to other countries and return the proceeds to Pakistan.

1996

01 January 1996 -- India and Pakistan exchange lists of atomic installations which each side has pledged not to attack under an over seven-year-old confidence-building agreement.

January 1996 -- The Brown amendment was signed into law to relieve some of the pressures created by the Pressler sanctions, which had crippled parts of the Pakistani military, particularly the Air Force. The Brown amendment allowed nearly $370 million of previously embargoed arms and spare parts to be delivered to Pakistan. It also permited limited military assistance for the purposes of counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, anti-narcotics efforts, and some military training.

March 1996 -- Pakistan commissioned an unsafeguarded nuclear reactor, expected to become fully operational in the late 1990s, that will provide it with a capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Late 1996 -- Pakistan's main nuclear weapons laboratory, the A.Q. Khan Laboratory in Kahuta, purchased 5,000 ring magnets from China. The ring magnets would allow Pakistan to effectively double its capacity to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons production.

03 October 1996 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto called for the convening of a South Asia security conference that would deal with, among other things, Kashmir and the nuclear arms issue.

04 July 1997 -- Pakistan confirms test-firing of new indigenous Hatf missile.

06 September 1997 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, saying that: "Pakistan's nuclear capability is now an established fact. Whatever we have, we have a right to keep it...."

1998
28 May 1998: Pakistan detonates five nuclear devices. Pakistan claimed that the five nuclear tests measured up to 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT).

30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warheads, with a yield of 12 kilotons, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six.

04 July 1997 -- Pakistan confirms test-firing of new indigenous Hatf missile.

06 September 1997 -- Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claims Pakistan possesses nuclear weapons, saying that: "Pakistan's nuclear capability is now an established fact. Whatever we have, we have a right to keep it...."


28 May 1998: Pakistan detonates five nuclear devices. Pakistan claimed that the five nuclear tests measured up to 5.0 on the Richter scale, with a reported yield of up to 40 KT (equivalent TNT).

30 May 1998 Pakistan tested one more nuclear warheads, with a yield of 12 kilotons, bringing the total number of claimed tests to six.

Indo Israeli Relations

RAW and Mossad


Thirty-five years ago, in September 1968, when the Research and Analysis Wing was founded with Rameshwar Nath Kao at its helm, then prime minister Indira Gandhi asked him to cultivate Israel's Mossad. She believed relations between the two intelligence agencies was necessary to monitor developments that could threaten India and Israel.

The efficient spymaster he was, Kao established a clandestine relationship with Mossad. In the 1950s, New Delhi had permitted Tel Aviv to establish a consulate in Mumbai . But full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel were discouraged because India supported the Palestinian cause; having an Israeli embassy in New Delhi, various governments believed, would rupture its relations with the Arab world.

This was where the RAW-Mossad liaison came in. Among the threats the two external intelligence agencies identified were the military relationship between Pakistan and China and North Korea, especially after then Pakistan foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto visited Pyongyang in 1971 to establish a military relationship with North Korea.

Again, Israel was worried by reports that Pakistani army officers were training Libyans and Iranians to handle Chinese and North Korean military equipment.

RAW-Mossad relations were a secret till Morarji Desai became prime minister in 1977. RAW officials had alerted him about the Zia-ul Haq regime's plans to acquire nuclear capability. While French assistance to Pakistan for a plutonium reprocessing plant was well known, the uranium enrichment plant at Kahuta was a secret. After the French stopped helping Islamabad under pressure from the Carter administration, Pakistan was determined to keep the Kahuta plant a secret. Islamabad did not want Washington to prevent its commissioning.

RAW agents were shocked when Desai called Zia and told the Pakistani military dictator: 'General, I know what you are up to in Kahuta. RAW has got me all the details.' The prime minister's indiscretion threatened to expose RAW sources.
The unfortunate revelation came about the same time that General Moshe Dayan, hero of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, was secretly visiting Kathmandu for a meeting with Indian representatives. Islamabad believed Dayan's visit was connected with a joint operation by Indian and Israeli intelligence agencies to end Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Apprehensive about an Indo-Israeli air strike on Kahuta, surface-to-air missiles were mounted around the uranium enrichment plant. These fears grew after the Israeli bombardment of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.

Zia decided Islamabad needed to reassure Israel that it had nothing to fear from Pakistan's nuclear plans. Intermediaries -- Americans close to Israel -- established the initial contacts between Islamabad and Tel Aviv. Israel was confidant the US would not allow Pakistan's nuclear capability to threaten Israel. That is why Israeli experts do not mention the threat from Pakistan when they refer to the need for pre-emptive strikes against Iraq, Iran and Libya's nuclear schemes.

By the early 1980s, the US had discovered Pakistan's Kahuta project. By then northwest Pakistan was the staging ground for mujahideen attacks against Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Zia no longer feared US objections to his nuclear agenda. But Pakistani concerns over Israel persisted, hence Zia decided to establish a clandestine relationship between Inter-Services Intelligence and Mossad via officers of the two services posted at their embassies in Washington, DC.

The ISI knew Mossad would be interested in information about the Libyan, Syrian, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian military. Pakistani army officers were often posted on deputation in the Arab world -- in these very countries -- and had access to valuable information, which the ISI offered Mossad.

When young Israeli tourists began visiting the Kashmir valley in the early nineties Pakistan suspected they were Israeli army officers in disguise to help Indian security forces with counter-terrorism operations. The ISI propaganda inspired a series of terrorist attacks on the unsuspecting Israeli tourists. One was slain, another kidnapped.

The Kashmiri Muslim Diaspora in the US feared the attacks would alienate the influential Jewish community who, they felt, could lobby the US government and turn it against Kashmiri organisations clamouring for independence. Soon after, presumably caving into pressure, the terrorists released the kidnapped Israeli. During negotiations for his release, Israeli government officials, including senior intelligence operatives, arrived in Delhi.

The ensuing interaction with Indian officials led to India establishing embassy-level relations with Israel in 1992. The decision was taken by a Congress prime minister -- P V Narasimha Rao -- whose government also began pressing the American Jewish lobby for support in getting the US to declare Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism. The lobbying bore some results.

The US State Department put Pakistan on a 'watch-list' for six months in 1993. The Clinton administration 'persuaded' then Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif to dismiss Lieutenant General Javed Nasir, then director general of the ISI. The Americans were livid that the ISI refused to play ball with the CIA who wanted to buy unused Stinger missiles from the Afghan mujahideen, then in power in Kabul.
After she returned to power towards the end of 1993, Benazir Bhutto intensified the ISI's liaison with Mossad. She too began to cultivate the American Jewish lobby. Benazir is said to have a secret meeting in New York with a senior Israeli emissary, who flew to the US during her visit to Washington, DC in 1995 for talks with Clinton.

From his days as Bhutto's , Pervez Musharraf has been a keen advocate of Pakistan establishing diplomatic relations with the state of Israel. The new defence relationship between India and Israel -- where the Jewish State has become the second-biggest seller of weapons to India, after Russia -- bother Musharraf no end. Like another military dictator before him, the Pakistan president is also wary that the fear of terrorists gaining control over Islamabad's nuclear arsenal could lead to an Israel-led pre-emptive strike against his country.
Musharraf is the first Pakistani leader to speak publicly about diplomatic relations with Israel. His pragmatic corps commanders share his view that India's defence relationship with Israel need to be countered and are unlikely to oppose such a move. But the generals are wary of the backlash from the streets. Recognising Israel and establishing an Israeli embassy in Islamabad would be unacceptable to the increasingly powerful mullahs who see the United States, Israel and India as enemies of Pakistan and Islam.



Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst.

Comparison of Asian Powers

China, India and Pakistan. Nuclear Asians.


Currently, there is an increased frenzy about China’s incursions, referred to by some of the seasoned analysts as “war hysteria”. China, from 1962, never deviated from its path of an aggressive posture. While India is being blamed for its 1962 syndrome, China is equally guilty of freezing its 1962 mindset on India.
But India is itself to blame for the present situation.. While China, slowly and steadily was on the military build-up, Indian leadership has continuously followed an ostrich like approach towards the implications. It pains to accept the China’s description of India as a ‘paper tiger’. By this, I don’t refer to the capability of our armed forces but to the timidity of our Indian leadership. Many articles, have already been written on the timidity of Indian leadership and the ineptitude towards strategic and military doctrines. Hence, this article mainly tries to draw a comparison of the nuclear forces by these countries to assess where India stands, at present.

Nuclear Forces by 2006-2007

The data for the countries were not available at the same timeline hence, the closest available data were used. According to the Nuclear Notebook published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, China’s nuclear arsenal comprised of around 130 nuclear warheads deployed in missiles and aircraft and 70 more is predicted to be in storage. According to the report around 80 warheads are deployed in the ballistic missiles of DF-3, DF-4, DF-5 and DF-21. China is retiring some of its liquid fueled DF-3 missiles with a range of about 3100Km but has slowed down the retirement of the missiles, apparently, due to delay in the deployment of modified DF-21 and DF-21A missiles with a range of around 2100Km.

China has deployed around 22 two-stage DF-4 missiles with a range over 5500Km, the targets for some of these missiles is expected to be in Russia, India and Guam. While the number of Chinese ICBM, DF-5, is unclear Chinese military power 2005 claims to have deployed 20 of them in 20 launchers. These missiles are capable of targeting the entire continental US. China, undergoing military modernization, for quite sometime is also developing a new 3-stage, solid-fueled, mobile ICBM, DF-31 with a range of about 7200-8000Km and a circular error probable of 300 to 600 meters. The targets for these missiles are expected to be in India and Russia from the range of the missiles. Another version of DF-31, DF-31A, is expected to have range of about 12000Km. Reportedly, China have had the capability for Multiple Reentry Vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry vehicles. China is also developing new nuclear powered submarine capable of carrying 16 modified versions of DF-31 missiles which is expected to be deployed in 2008-2010 or later. China also has a stock of nuclear payload to be delivered through aircraft, whose combat radius is around 3100 Km.

In 2007, Pakistan was credited with a nuclear arsenal of 60 and it is busy in increasing its capability rapidly. From 2005-2007, Pakistan has deployed two nuclear capable missiles and developments are underway for the third. According to the reports, Pakistan, which declared a moratorium in 1991 on the production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) soon resumed its production of the weapon grade uranium and has setup a 40-50MW heavy water Khushab plutonium production reactor completed in 1998 and work were under way for the second reactor which will double its production capability. In this venture Pakistan is being helped totally by china. No one appears to blame China which is the root cause of proliferation by Pakistan.
Pakistani nuclear devises are expected to have a yield in between 5 – 10 kilotons. Pakistan was developing a nuclear capable cruise missile with a range of around 500 Km.

By 2007, India has produced enough plutonium for around 100 payloads but is estimated to possess only 50-60 warheads by the time. According to the report, India’s nuclear deterrent is predominantly aircraft-based. While, after the repeated announcements of Indian officials, US Air force in 2006 reported that India has not deployed Agni I and Agni II. While Agni III, Dhanush and Sagarika are underdevelopment, a cloud of uncertainty surrounds the Indian missile based nuclear deterrent capability. While technical capability exists in India for developing and deploying missiles, the reports questions on the number of missile currently deployed.

Nuclear Forces by 2008-2009

In 2009, Bulletin of Atomic scientists has estimated the Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal to include 70-90 warheads and that it is busily enhancing its nuclear capabilities. In 2009, Pakistan was readying a new nuclear capable ballistic missile and two cruise missiles for deployment. Pakistan is believed to have produced around 2000kg of HEU and 90 Kg of plutonium sufficient to build 80-130 Kg. But based on several factors, the report suggests that Pakistan has not yet crossed 100 warheads. Reportedly, all of Pakistan’s missiles and aircrafts are of dual purpose. Pakistan is also expanding its nuclear processing facilities. Hilary Clinton, in her address to Congress have said that Pakistan’s Nuclear arsenal are spread across the country and not in a single central location. The aircrafts deployed for nuclear mission are predominantly F-16s given by the US by waiving the Pressler Amendment. The cruise missile of Pakistan, Babar, is similar to that of the Chinese DH-10 air launched cruise missile and has a range of about 320Km, according to US intelligence agencies, as opposed to the media that suggests it to have a range of 500-700Km. The design of the missile also suggests that Pakistan scientists to have made progress in warhead miniaturization. The other cruise missile Ra’ad is expected to have stealth and standoff capability at sea and land.

In report on Chinese nuclear forces in 2008, it is believed that China is expanding its nuclear arsenal boosting its number by 25 percent since 2005. In 2008, China also deployed DF-31, DF-31A and DH-10 missiles. By 2008, China is also reported to be building 4 new ballistic missile submarines. By 2008, China is estimated to possess around 176 nuclear arsenals deployed by missiles and aircrafts. Another 65 warheads is expected to be in storage. The nuclear arsenals are expected to have a yield of 10Kilotons to 3 Megatons. The Pentagon projects that by 2010 Chinese nuclear forces would include DF-4s, DF-5As, DF-31, DF-31As and upto 5 Jin class submarines carrying between 10 and 12 Jl-2 SLBMs.

According to report on Indian nuclear capability in 2008, India is reported to be struggling to develop a complete nuclear triad and currently only its fighter bombers constitute the fully operational leg. All Indian nuclear delivery systems are dual-capable but their operational status are ambiguous. The report estimates, India to have assembled around 70 warheads but only 50 is expected to be operational. Currently, out of the four land based missile systems, only Prithivi has been fully deployed but how many of them are deployed with nuclear warheads is uncertain. Of the variants of Prithivi, only the army version is identified by CIA to have a nuclear role. The report is skeptical about India acquiring multiple warhead capability any time soon. Another subsonic cruise missile is also reported to be under development.

Conclusion

Compared with Pakistan and China, India scores low with respect to its military modernization and preparedness. Much of the India’s long range missiles were not fully operational. It is also alarming to note that Pakistan as well as China are expanding their nuclear arsenal rapidly creating a huge gap between the numbers with India. Indian leadership is yet to shed its timidity and ineptitude to come up with a strong military doctrine. It is also worth noting that, apparently the current government's diplomacy and the so-called US relationship seems to have no say in the expansion of the nuclear capability of Pakistan. Pakistan’s Babur cruise missile, which is believed to be based on DH-10 of China also asserts beyond doubt the proliferation of missile technology by China, which is a member of security council and it is be noted that none of the superpowers have done anything to put a tab on China.

In this scenario, India still is unlikely go down the 1962 scenario. But this time, India has to remember that Pakistan’s interest in India is not just Kashmir. It is also foolish to believe that China’s interest is limited to Arunachal Pradesh. In practice, India should build up to be fully capable of deterring Chinese incursions. It has to expect a two multi-point war as China has covered India on all sides and with a strong ally in the west. India’s missile systems are not fully developed and/or deployed restricting its capability. India is also continuously failing to take advantage of its technically developed workforce, much of which moves to other nations for better education, and opportunities. Indian establishment is yet to take steps to bring in the Indian minds from abroad. To be eligible for an NRI to be considered for DRDO, he has to have a PhD and at least 3 years of experience abroad. Most of the people by the time would have settled and it is practically not possible for them to return even if they wish to. ISRO, has not even an option for an NRI. Corruption and the lethargic unchecked bureaucracy is continuing to be another checkpoint for India to develop.

It is also to be noted that Pakistan’s ISI is having a significant presence in India but not the other way around. Indian RAW is considered to be one of the most bureaucratic organizations and Mr. Gujral’s misplaced trust has fully left India vulnerable. Taking into consideration the Chinese publication to split India into many parts it could be expected by Pakistan to up its shadow war against India with China acting as a pressure point for any retaliation by India. India lost its covert capability long ago and will the political leadership allow the organization to renew it?

If Indian governments timidity and lack of foresight continues then Indians should brace themselves for another 1962 embarrassment .

*The source on Nuclear arsenals were taken from Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.
Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst

Part 2. Chinese String of Pearls Stratergy

China’s “string of pearls” strategy appears to be taking another step forward as Beijing increases ties with the Sri Lankan government. The strategy, which was the subject of a 2005 U.S. China Commission report to Congress, is driven by China’s need to secure foreign oil and trade routes critical to its development. This has meant establishing an increased level of influence along sea routes through investment, port development and diplomacy.

To date, China’s investments extend from Hainan Island in the South China Sea, through the littorals of the Straits of Malacca, including port developments in Chittagong in Bangladesh; Sittwe, Coco, Hianggyi, Khaukphyu, Mergui and Zadetkyi Kyun in Myanmar; Laem Chabang in Thailand; and Sihanoukville in Cambodia. They extend across the Indian Ocean, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, and in islands within the Arabian Sea and into the Persian Gulf.

Not surprisingly, both the U.S. and Indian governments are concerned, part of these developments include the upgrading of airstrips, many supported with military facilities, such as the facility on Woody Island, close to Vietnam. These developments mean that the balance of power within the Indian and Arabian Gulf has now shifted away from the traditional Indian government management, backed up with U.S. military strength, but to China, backed up with regional diplomatic ties that dispense with the need to engage with either power.
The strategy has been developed partially in response to a lack of progress on the Kra Canal Project in Thailand, which would directly link the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea. The “string of pearls” strategy however provides a forward presence for China along the sea lines of communication that now anchor China directly to the Middle East. The question both the United States and India have is whether this strategy is intended purely to cement supply lines and trade routes, or whether China will later use these in a bid to enforce regional supremacy.

India has not been an innocent party to the development of the “string of pearls.” Somewhat foolishly, it threatened to cut off China’s choke point for oil and trade – the Malacca Straits – in both 1971 and 1999, when it moved to blockade Karachi Port which at the time handled 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea trade, including oil supplies to China. India has also recently attempted to persuade the Sri Lankan government not to permit Chinese development of the country’s Hambantota Port, a project that is now well underway. Chinese investment in Sri Lanka is also likely to significantly increase given the likely conclusion of the civil war, and Chinese interests in drilling for oil off the coast of Northeast Sri Lanka.

As America’s influence in the region wanes, China’s strategy appears to be conservatively supported by other Southeast Asian nations, with the potential exception of India. Pro-U.S. nations such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines find it in their own self interests to improve and develop ties with China, while nations such as Pakistan, Vietnam, Myanmar and Cambodia are all strong allies of Beijing. The growing perception is that a peaceful region does not now necessarily require a U.S. military presence.

Concerns remain however. Chinese fishing trawlers have been uncovered mapping the ocean floor to facilitate submarine operations, and disputes over territorial waters are increasing as the recent standoff between an American survey ship and Chinese vessels in the South China Sea demonstrates. The United States insists it was operating in international waters, the Chinese claim the incident occurred within their exclusive economic zone.

India feels threatened by the perception of a China increasingly encircling the country, with Tibet to the north, a China supported Myanmar regime to the east, an increasingly China-dependent Bangladesh beginning to emerge, and the long standing support China has shown for Pakistan. Given India’s own huge security problems with Pakistan it is unlikely, unless they can influence Sri Lanka, that the Indian government will be able to do much about the development of China’s interest within the region.

As long as Chinese interests remain benign, the “string of pearls” strategy remains the strongest pointer yet that China is both anchoring its energy supply lines with the Middle East and embarking on a level of Southeast Asian trade – and the development of regional prosperity that will come with it – on a scale never seen before. If the strategy continues without the development of regional conflicts, the ASEAN trading bloc, with China at its heart, and the massive emerging markets of India and the other Southeast Asian nations close by, will develop and begin to rival that of the EU and the United States, and lessen China’s dependence on these traditional export markets.

China is strengthening diplomatic ties and building naval bases along the sea lanes from the Middle East. This “String of Pearls” strategy is designed to protect its energy security, negate US influence in the region, and project power overseas.Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence.4 Hainan Island, with recently upgraded military facilities, is a “pearl.”

An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” Acontainer shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deep water portin Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan.5 Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of theSouth China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle East.

The Nature of the Pearls. China’s development of these strategic geopolitical “pearls” has beennonconfrontational, with no evidence of imperial or neocolonial ambition. The development of the “String of Pearls” may not, in fact, be a strategy explicitly guided by China’s central government. Rather, it may be a convenient label applied by some in the United States to describe an element of China’s foreign policy. Washington’s perception of China’s de facto strategy may not be a view sharedin Beijing, but the fact remains that economic benefits and diplomatic rhetoric have been an enticement for countries to facilitate China’s strategic ambitions in the region.

(see gwadar related article)

The port facility at Gwadar, for example, is a win-win prospect for both China and Pakistan. The port at Karachi currently handles 90 percent of Pakistan’s sea-borne trade, but because of its proximity to India, it is extremely vulnerable to blockade. This happened during the India-Pakistan War of 1971 and was threatened again during the Kargil conflict of 1999.6 Gwadar, a small fishing village which Pakistan identified as a potential port location in 1964 but lacked the means to develop, is 450 miles west of Karachi.7 A modern port at Gwadar would enhance Pakistan’s strategic depth along its coastline with respect to India. For China,the strategic value of Gwadar is its 240-mile distance from the Strait of Hormuz. China is facilitatingdevelopment of Gwadar and paving the way for future access by funding a majority of the $1.2 billionproject and providing the technical expertise of hundreds of engineers.8 Since construction began in2002, China has invested four times more than Pakistan and contributed an additional $200 milliontowards the building of a highway to connect Gwadar with Karachi. In August 2005, Chinese PremierWen Jiabao visited Pakistan to commemorate completion of the first phase of the Gwadar project andthe opening of the first 3 of 12 multiship berths.9The Gwadar project has enhanced the strategic, diplomatic, and economic ties between Pakistanand China. Other countries are benefiting from China’s new strategy, as well.

In November 2003, Chinasigned an agreement with Cambodia to provide military equipment and training in exchange for theright of way to build a rail line from southern China to the Gulf of Thailand.10 China also has anambitious $20 billion proposal to build a canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus which would enableships to bypass the chokepoint at the Strait of Malacca.11 Although this plan is stalled due to Thailand’snoncommittal position and political opposition in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, it reveals thescope and scale of Chinese ambition for the “String of Pearls.”

Sidharth K Menon

Defence and Intelligence Analyst.

Part 1. Chinese String of Pearl Stratergy.

Gwadar: China's Naval Outpost on the Indian Ocean

Four months after the U.S. ordered its troops into Afghanistan to remove the Taliban regime, China and Pakistan joined hands to break ground in building a Deep Sea Port on the Arabian Sea. The project was sited in an obscure fishing village of Gwadar in Pakistan's western province of Baluchistan, bordering Afghanistan to the northwest and Iran to the southwest. Gwadar is nautically bounded by the Persian Gulf in the west and the Gulf of Oman in the southwest.

Although the Gwadar Port project has been under study since May 2001, the U.S. entrée into Kabul provided an added impetus for its speedy execution. Having set up its bases in Central, South, and West Asian countries, the U.S. virtually brought its military forces at the doorstep of China. Beijing was already wary of the strong U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, which supplies 60% of its energy needs. It was now alarmed to see the U.S. extend its reach into Asian nations that ring western China. Having no blue water navy to speak of, China feels defenseless in the Persian Gulf against any hostile action to choke off its energy supplies. This vulnerability set Beijing scrambling for alternative safe supply routes for its energy shipments. The planned Gwadar Deep Sea Port was one such alternative for which China had flown its Vice Premier, Wu Bangguo, to Gwadar to lay its foundation on March 22, 2002.

Pakistan was interested in the project to seek strategic depth further to the southwest from its major naval base in Karachi that has long been vulnerable to the dominant Indian Navy. In the past, it endured prolonged economic and naval blockades imposed by the Indian Navy. To diversify the site of its naval and commercial assets, Pakistan has already built a naval base at Ormara, the Jinnah Naval Base, which has been in operation since June 2000. It can berth about a dozen ships, submarines and similar harbor craft. The Gwadar port project, however, is billed to crown the Pakistan Navy into a force that can rival regional navies. The government of Pakistan has designated the port area as a "sensitive defense zone." Once completed, the Gwadar port will rank among the world's largest deep-sea ports.

The convergence of Sino-Pakistani strategic interests has put the port project onto a fast track to its early completion. In three years since its inauguration, the first phase of the project is already complete with three functioning berths. The Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao will be on hand to mark the completion of this phase in March this year. Although the total cost of the project is estimated at $1.16 billion USD, China pitched in $198 million and Pakistan $50 million to finance the first phase. China also has invested another $200 million into building a coastal highway that will connect the Gwadar port with Karachi. The second phase, which will cost $526 million, will feature the construction of 9 more berths and terminals and will also be financed by China. To connect western China with Central Asia by land routes, Pakistan is working on building road links to Afghanistan from its border town of Chaman in Baluchistan to Qandahar in Afghanistan. In the northwest, it is building similar road links between Torkham in Pakhtunkhaw (officially known as the Northwest Frontier Province) and Jalalabad in Afghanistan. Eventually, the Gwadar port will be accessible for Chinese imports and exports through overland links that will stretch to and from Karakoram Highway in Pakistan's Northern Areas that border China's Muslim-majority Autonomous Region of Xinjiang. In addition, the port will be complemented with a modern air defense unit, a garrison, and a first-rate international airport capable of handling airbus service.

Pakistan already gives China most favored nation (MFN) status and is now establishing a bilateral Free Trade Area (FTA), which will bring tariffs between the two countries to zero. Over the past two years, the trade volume between the two countries has jumped to $2.5 billion a year, accounting for 20% of China's total trade with South Asia. Informal trade, a euphemism for smuggling, however, is several times the formal trade. The proposed FTA is an implicit acceptance of the unstoppable "informal" trade as a "formal" one. More importantly, Chinese investment in Pakistan has increased to $4 billion, registering a 30% increase just over the past two years since 2003. Chinese companies make up 12% (60) of the foreign firms (500) operating in Pakistan, which employ over 3,000 Chinese nationals.

The growing economic cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad is also solidifying their strategic partnership. Before leaving for his visit to Beijing this past December, Pakistani Prime Minister Aziz told reporters in Islamabad: "Pakistan and China are strategic partners and our relations span many areas." The rhetoric of strategic alignment is duly matched by reality. Last year, China and Pakistan conducted their first-ever joint naval exercises near the Shanghai coast. These exercises, among others, included simulation of an emergency rescue operation. Last December, Pakistan opened a consulate in Shanghai. The Gwadar Port project is the summit of such partnership that will bring the two countries closer in maritime defense as well.
Initially, China was reluctant to finance the Gwadar port project because Pakistan offered the U.S. exclusive access to two of its critical airbases in Jacobabad (Sind) and Pasni (Baluchisntan) during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. According to a Times of India report on February 19, 2002, Gen. Musharraf had to do a lot of explaining for leasing these bases to America. China, the Times of India reported, was also upset with Pakistan for allowing the U.S. to establish listening posts in Pakistan's Northern Areas, which border Xinjiang and Tibet. When China finally agreed to offer financial and technical assistance for the project, it asked for "sovereign guarantees" to use the Port facilities to which Pakistan agreed, despite U.S. unease over it.

In particular, the port project set off alarm bells in India which already feels encircled by China from three sides: Myanmar, Tibet, and Pakistan. To counter Sino-Pak collaboration, India has brought Afghanistan and Iran into an economic and strategic alliance. Iranians are already working on Chabahar port in Sistan-Baluchistan, which will be accessible for Indian imports and exports with road links to Afghanistan and Central Asia. India is helping build a 200-kilometer road that will connect Chabahar with Afghanistan. Once completed, Indians will use this access road to the port for their imports and exports to and from Central Asia. Presently, India is in urgent need of a shorter transit route to quickly get its trade goods to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

These external concerns are stoking internal challenges to the port project. Baluchistan, where the project is located, is once again up in arms against the federal government. The most important reason for armed resistance against the Gwadar port is that Baluch nationalists see it as an attempt to colonize them and their natural resources. Several insurgent groups have sprung up to nip the project in the bud. The three most popular are: the Baluchistan Liberation Army, Baluchistan Liberation Front, and People's Liberation Army. On May 3, 2004, the BLA killed three Chinese engineers working on the port project that employs close to 500 Chinese nationals. On October 9, 2004, two Chinese engineers were kidnapped in South Waziristan in the northwest of Pakistan, one of whom was killed later on October 14 in a botched rescue operation. Pakistan blamed India and Iran for fanning insurgency in Baluchistan.

Moreover, the Chinese in Pakistan are vulnerable because of their tense relationship with the Uighur Muslim majority of Xinjiang. Stretched over an area of 635,833 square miles, Xinjiang is more than twice the size of Pakistan, and one-sixth of China's landmass. However, it dwarfs in demographic size with a population of 19 million people. Beijing is investing 730 billion yuan (roughly $88 billion USD) in western China, including Xinjiang, which opens it up to the six Muslim countries of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Despite this massive investment, displacement of Uighers from Urumqi, Xinjiang's capital, is drawing fire, where the population of mainland Chinese of Han descent has grown from 10% in 1949 to 41% in 2004. In direct proportion, the population of native Uighurs has declined from 90% in 1949 to 47% in 2004. Tens of thousands of displaced Uighurs have found refuge in Pakistan where the majority of them live in its two most populous cities: Lahore and Karachi.

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is fighting against Chinese attempts at so-called "Hanification" of Xinjiang. Pakistan, which along with China and the U.S. lists the ETIM as a terrorist organization, killed the ETIM's head, Hasan Mahsum, in South Waziristan on October 2, 2004. Seven days after, two Chinese were kidnapped from the area, one of whom was killed in a rescue operation. The thousands of Chinese working in Pakistan make tempting targets for violent reprisals by the ETIM or Baluch nationalists.

The realization of economic and strategic objectives of the Gwadar port is largely dependent upon the reduction of separatist violence in Baluchistan and Xinjiang. Chinese response to secessionism is aggressive economic development, which is driving the Gwadar port project also. The port is intended to serve China's threefold economic objective:

First, to integrate Pakistan into the Chinese economy by outsourcing low-tech, labor-absorbing, resource-intensive industrial production to Islamabad, which will transform Pakistan into a giant factory floor for China; Second, to seek access to Central Asian markets for energy imports and Chinese exports by developing road networks and rail links through Afghanistan and Pakistan into Central Asia; Third, to appease restive parts of western China, especially the Muslim-majority autonomous region of Xinjiang, through a massive infusion of development funds and increased economic links with the Central Asian Islamic nations of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

The port, by design or by default, also provides China a strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, although to the alarm of India and the unease of the U.S. sitting opposite the Strait of Hurmoz, through which 80% of the world's energy exports flow, the Gwadar port will enable China to monitor its energy shipments from the Persian Gulf, and offer it, in the case of any hostile interruption in such shipments, a safer alternative passage for its energy imports from Central Asia. Its presence on the Indian Ocean will further increase its strategic influence with major South Asian nations, particularly Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which would prompt the Indians in turn to re-strengthen their Navy.


Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst

Pakistani F - 16's

Pakistani F -16 's

The US State Department decided to sell Pakistan 18 new F-16s with an option for 18 more. The US also offers to acquire and upgrade 26 used F-16A/B aircraft from U.S. inventories and to upgrade Pakistan's current fleet of 34 F-16s.

The Government of Pakistan has requested a possible sale of various munitions for the planes and logistic support like:

200 AIM-9M-8/9s Sidewinders
500 AIM-120C5s AMRAAM BVR missiles
800 general purpose 2,000 and 500-pound bombs
500 JDAM bomb guidance systems
Link 16
JHMCS
Sniper targetting pod
CFTs

Pakistan intends to buy 36 new F-16 fighter jets from the US and not 77 as originally planned. Pakistan delayed its purchase last year as the country focused on recovering from a devastating earthquake.If Pakistan takes all 36 new Block 50/52 C/Ds F-16s being offered, the deal would extend F-16 production in Fort Worth until June 2011.

The precise terms of the F-16 sale to Pakistan haven't been negotiated between Lockheed and Islamabad. The company currently is producing F-16s for Poland and Chile and has a backlog of 144 planes on order.Lockheed's goal is to keep the line open until at least 2012, when the company is to begin major production of its new F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, said spokesman Joseph Stout."The big order we're pursuing is in India, where they have a stated requirement for 126 aircraft," Stout said.US State Department spokesperson Julie Reside described the sale as "part of an effort to broaden our strategic partnership with Pakistan and advance our national security and foreign policy interests in South Asia"."Pakistan is a long-term partner and major non-NATO ally," she noted.Reside stressed that the sale is nothing to do with the nuclear partnership that the US is building with India. She also dismissed any suggestion that the sale could contribute to an arms race in South Asia and said a dialogue between India and Pakistan has already helped reduce tensions and provided greater stability in their region.

In December 2005, the US provided two upgraded F-16s to Pakistan for free as a "goodwill gesture".

PAF F-16A block 15

Pakistan has ordered a total of 111 F-16A/B aircraft. Of these, 71 were embargoed by the US due to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Of these 71, 28 were actually built but were flown directly to the AMARC at Davis-Monthan AFB for storage.
Over the years, various plans were conceived for these 28 aircraft: Pakistan wanted to get the aircraft or their money back; they were offered to various nations, none of which were interested; ultimately, the US Navy and USAF entered them into service as aggressor aircraft.
After Pakistan's help in the war on terror, the US lifted the embargo. In 2005, Pakistan requested 24 new Block 50/52 F-16C/Ds (with option for as much as 55 aircraft). Ultimately an order for 18 F-16s was placed with an option on another 18.

Peace Gate I

Pakistani F-16A
In December 1981, the government of Pakistan signed a letter of agreement for the purchase of up to 40 F-16A/B (28 F-16A and 12 F-16B) fighters for the Pakistan Fiza'ya (Pakistan Air Force, or PAF). The deal would be split into two batches, one of 6 aircraft and the other of 34. The first aircraft were accepted at Fort Worth in October of 1982, and the first F-16, flown by Squadron Leader Shahid Javed, landed in Pakistan at Sargodha Air Base on January 15th, 1983 as part of a package of 6 'Peace Gate I' aircraft (2 A's and 4 B's).

Peace Gate II

The remaining 34 aircraft were delivered under Peace Gate II. The Pakistani F-16A/B's are all Block 15 aircraft, the final version of the F-16A/B production run, and are powered by the Pratt & Whitney F100-PW-200 turbofan. All 40 'Peace Gate I & II' aircraft were delivered between 1983 and 1987. By 1997, 8 aircraft of the initial Peace Gate I & II order have been written off in various mishaps, hence 32 remain in service and despite the embargo, caused by the Pakistan-specific Pressler Amendment (see below), are being fully supported by commercial contracts.

The F-16s were assigned USAF serial numbers for record-keeping purposes, and carry a three-digit PAF serial number on their noses; the F-16A's being assigned numbers in sequence beginning with 701, and the F-16B's being assigned numbers beginning with 601. The two digit prefix preceding these numbers is the year of delivery of these aircraft. The PAF Falcons have a slightly altered color scheme, with the dark gray area covering most of the wings and the aft part of the horizontal tailplanes and carry toned-down markings: the national flag (normally a white moon and star on green field) on the tail and roundels on the upper wing surface.

Peace Gate III

Seven years after the first order, in December of 1988, Pakistan ordered 11 additional F-16A/B Block 15 OCU (Operational Capability Upgrade) aircraft (6 Alpha and 5 Bravo models) under the Peace Gate III program. These aircraft were purchased as attrition replacements and fully paid for, but are still awaiting delivery in the Arizona Desert. The reason for this is that Pakistan got involved in a controversy with the United States over its suspected nuclear weapons capability. Intelligence information reaching US authorities indicated that Pakistan was actively working on a nuclear bomb, had received a design for a bomb from China, had tested a nuclear trigger and was actively producing weapons-grade uranium. Furthermore, the F-16A's of no 9 and 11 squadrons at Sargodha AB have allegedly been modified to carry and deliver a Pakistani nuclear weapon. In addition, Pakistan has steadfastly refused to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

As a result, in accordance to the Pressler amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which forbids military aid to any nation possessing a nuclear explosive device, the United States government announced on October 6th, 1990 that it had embargoed further arms deliveries to Pakistan. The 11 Peace Gate III aircraft were consequently stored at AMARC (Aircraft Maintenance and Regeneration Center) at Davis-Monthan AFB, Arizona, also known as the Boneyard. There, they were put in 'Flyable Hold' for 5 years, during which time 85% of each aircraft's fuel system was preserved with JP-9, and each aircraft had its engine run once every 45 days. This resulted in the curious situation that most of those aircraft now have more engine run time than air time, the latter being only 6 hours. This low air-time figure, plus the fact that these aircraft are the most modern F-16A/B's built, is the main reason why countries interested in second-hand F-16s first look at the Pakistani airframes.

Peace Gate IV

In September of 1989, plans were announced by Pakistan to acquire 60 more F-16A/B's. A contract was signed in the same year under the Peace Gate IV Foreign Military Sales Programs, for the delivery of 60 F-16s for US $1.4 billion or approximately US $23 million a piece. By March of 1994, 11 of these planes had been built and were directly flown into the Sonoran desert where they joined the 11 Peace Gate III aircraft in storage. A further six aircraft were stored by the end of 1994, so that a total of 17 aircraft (7 F-16A's and 10 F-16B's) of the Peace Gate IV order are now stored. A stop-work order affected the remaining 43 planes of the Peace Gate IV contract.

The Brown amendment later eased the restrictions on weapon exports to Pakistan, but specifically excluded the F-16s from this release. Pakistan had already paid $685 million on the contract for the first 28 F-16s (11 Peace Gate III and 17 Peace Gate IV), and insisted on either having the planes it ordered delivered or getting its money back.

The saga of the embargoed F-16s

In March 1996, nine aircraft out of those which had already been manufactured for Pakistan, were sold to Indonesia. However, Indonesia cancelled this order on June 2nd, 1997. This 'unexpected' trouble with the Indonesian F-16 deal means a bigger problem to the Clinton administration both with respect to Pakistan and Indonesia. President Clinton had pledged to the Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms. Benazir Bhutto, that the money paid for the F-16s by Islamabad would be reimbursed if the equipment could not be delivered. In trying to come to terms with Islamabad's demand that Washington would return the money, the Clinton administration went on to see if the planes could be sold to a third country and the proceeds transferred. Interested buyers included amongst others the Republic of China.

At the end of 1997, with chances of finding a buyer close to zero, it was decided to take the PAF F-16s out of flyable hold and into the Boneyard. The airframes were offered to the Philippine Air Force, in view of its modernization plans. However, lack of funds precluded this deal as well.

In May 1998, a rumor suggested that the 28 Pakistani AF F-16A/B aircraft stored at the AMARC could possibly be donated to the Air Force of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as a part of the US led 'Train & Equip' program. As Pakistan is already taking part in this program (training Bosnian Army Anti-tank missile teams), this is a solution that could satisfy both sides in this long dispute. Again, this proved to be not viable.

After the detonation of five nuclear devices by India in May 1998, in a remote area close to its border with Pakistan, Washington feared that this might escalate the old border dispute between Pakistan and India to a full crisis. In order to keep Pakistan from responding to this challenge, US president Bill Clinton suggested that the 28 stored F-16s would be delivered after all, in batches of 1 or 2. However, the internal pressure on the government proved to strong and shortly after India's demonstration, Pakistan responded by detonating an unknown number of nuclear devices.

Finally, on December 1st, 1998, the New Zealand Government announced that it would lease-buy the 28 Pakistani F-16s stored at the AMARC. Three days later, the United States said they hoped for an 'early and fair' agreement on how to compensate Islamabad for its aborted purchase of US F-16 fighters. President Clinton briefed Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on US efforts to compensate Pakistan for the $658 million it paid for the 28 F-16s. US officials said the United States has already paid $157 million of this back to Islamabad, raising the money by selling aircraft components to other countries. New Zealand agreed to pay some $105 million over 10 years to lease the fighters, providing additional funds that could be used to give Pakistan some of its money back.

At the end of 1998, the United States announced it would pay Pakistan $326.9 million in cash and up to $140 million in other compensation to settle the eight-year dispute. The $140 million will include about $60 million in US white wheat that Pakistan will receive during the current US fiscal year, which began on October 1st. The remaining $80 million in compensation will be negotiated by the two sides. The F-16 issue has been a headache for Pakistan, which is grappling to repay millions of dollars on its $32 billion in foreign debt amid a hard currency drought caused by sanctions and the suspension of International Monetary Fund programs.
In 1999 a new New Zealand government was elected who started a major reorganisation of the armed forces. One major element in this was the cancellation of the F-16 contract and the disbandment of its fighter force. The planes stayed in the boneyard for just a little longer.

In 2002, the US finally stopped trying to sell the aircraft and decided to assign them to the USAF and US Navy to fill the Aggressor role. After the demise of the (T)F-16N aggressor force, the US Navy lacked a high-performance aggressor aircraft. Because of the low airframe life of the embargoed Pakistani F-16s, these airframes were ideally suited for the demanding aggressor role. The 28 aircraft were thus evenly split between the USAF and the US Navy, and will take a vital role in DACT training of US forces.

After the attacks on 9/11 the Pakistani government became a major US ally in the war on terror. It was decided to redeliver those aircraft to Pakistan. Untill now, only half of them has been redelivered, with the remainder still to follow.

Peace Drive

On March 25th, 2005, the US Government announced that it had agreed to Pakistan's request to sell new F-16s. Initially, Pakistan has requested an additional 24 new Block 50/52 F-16C/Ds (with option for as much as 55 aircraft). Not much details are known at this moment about a possible sale of the aircraft to Pakistan. The deal is expected to be concluded by September or October of 2005. As part of the package, it was also agreed that the current fleet of older A/B models would get the MLU update.

As a sign of good gesture, the US agreed to supply Pakistan with a number of F-16s who where build under the Peace Gate III/IV programs.

Finally, after long series of negotiations, on September 30th, 2006 the contract was signed between the Pakistani and US government for the acquisition of 18 new F-16C/D block 52 aircraft and an option for another 18 more. In the deal the re-delivery of the 26 remaining Peace Gate III/IV aircraft was also agreed and the upgrade of those aircraft - and the remaining F-16A/B fleet - to MLU standards.

This order was granted and given a new FMS name at Pakistan's request. Albeit it already had the Peace Gate program, the PAF decided to choose another name since Peace Gate had too much negative commotion since the embargo of the last batch of aircraft.

The Pakistan Air Force currently has the Block 15 F-16A/B model in operation, which has an upgraded APG-66 radar that brings it close to the MLU (Mid-life Update) radar technology. The main advantage is the ability to use the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles if they were ever to be released to the PAF. Furthermore, the radar is capable of sorting out tight formations of aircraft and has a 15%-20% range increase over previous models. All the earlier F-16s were brought up to OCU standards and have received the Falcon UP structural modification package.

Armament

Pakistani F-16A with Thompson Atlis II laser designator pod on the 5L chin station, and two Paveway LGBs
Currently, Pakistani F-16s typically carry two all-aspect AIM-9L Sidewinders on the wing tip rails along with a pair of AIM-9P-4's on the outermost underwing racks, while the Matra Magic 2 (French counterpart of the Sidewinder) can be carried as well. They also have an important strike role, being capable to deliver Paveway laser-guided bombs. Pakistani F-16s are also capable of firing the French AS-30 laser guided missile.The ALQ-131 pod is carried as ECM protection.

Atlis laser designation pod. Pakistan has acquired the French-built Thompson-CSF ATLIS laser designation pod for use on its F-16s. The ATLIS pod was first fitted to Pakistani F-16s in January 1986, thus making the F-16 the first non-European aircraft to be qualified for this pod.

Operational Service

Combat

Pakistan was the second nation (after Israel) to use the F-16 in combat. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 in support of the pro-Soviet government in Kabul, which was being hard-pressed by Mujahadeen rebel forces, marked the start of a decade-long occupation. Mujahadeen rebels continued to harass the occupying Soviet military force as well as the forces of the Afghan regime that it was supporting. The war soon spilled over into neighboring Pakistan, with a horde of refugees fleeing to camps across the border in an attempt to escape the conflict. In addition, many of the rebels used Pakistan as a sanctuary from which to carry out forays into Afghanistan, and a steady flow of US-supplied arms were carried into Afghanistan from staging areas in Pakistan near the border. This inevitably resulted in border violations by Soviet and Afghan aircraft attempting to interdict these operations.

Between May 1986 and November of 1988, PAF F-16s have shot down at least eight intruders from Afghanistan. The first three of these (one Su-22, one probable Su-22, and one An-26) were shot down by two pilots from No. 9 Squadron. Pilots of No. 14 Squadron destroyed the remaining five intruders (two Su-22s, two MiG-23s, and one Su-25). Most of these kills were by the AIM-9 Sidewinder, but at least one (a Su-22) was destroyed by cannon fire. Flight Lieutenant Khalid Mamood is credited with three of these kills. At least one F-16 was lost in these battles, this one in an encounter between two F-16s and six Afghan Air Force aircraft on April 29th, 1987. However, the lost F-16 appears to have been an 'own goal', having been hit by a Sidewinder fired by the other F-16. The unfortunate F-16 pilot (Flight Lieutenant Shahid Sikandar Khan) ejected safely.


Sidharth K Menon
Defence and Intelligence Analyst.